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Preface 
'History', Napoleon once said, 'is a fable agreed upon.' 
While the statement is excessive, it is a good example of the 
epithets a military historian must face. A report of an action 
is not the action, and it is reasonably certain that someone 
from Army to squad will label the report inaccurate, biased, 
or say, 'why in hell doesn't he get up here and see for him-
self?' Consider, for example, the communiques the day our 
First and Second Battalions took Miillendorf and Wiirm. 
SHAEF said: 
'The Ninth Army front was quiet .. .' 
Ninth Army said: 
'Local attacks ... ' 
84th Division said: 
'The 334 th Infantry straightened its lines .. .' 
334 th Infantry said: 
'After an intensive artillery preparation our First and 
Second Battalions captured Miillendorf and Wiirm. There 
were few casualties.' 
What the friends of the casualties said is not known; but 
they probably considered the action more important than the 
report handed down from SHAEF. Which of the above state-
ments is true? All are true, none is less true; yet the first 
contradicts the last. Obviously, the historian's choice is dicta-
ted by the audience for whom he is writing. Even a regiment 
is divi-ded into three battalions and five special units, each 
with a different view of an action. The Third Battalion's 
interest in the Wiirm-Miillendorf attack was more cousinly 
than apt. 
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It must be confessed that this history will satisfy only 
those whose point of view is similar to ours. Yet there is a 
sense of belonging, an interest in one's family, which dough-
boys feel about a regiment and do not feel about austere 
echelons such as Corps or Army. Ji is certainly true that the 
actions of a regiment exceed the combined actions of its com-
ponent parts and that there is an ineffable spirit or charac-
teristic about a regiment which distinguishes it from another 
regiment. Ask an infantryman, 'What's your outfit?' and the 
first or second unit he names will be his regiment. 
It is because this spirit exists that we feel a regimental 
history is of interest. Perhaps each company will feel it has 
been slighted for the profit of another, but it is a good idea 
that a History of the 334th Infantry be written while it is 
new in our minds. If the History is no more than a spring-
board into a pool of remembrances, it has done its job. 
P.S.W. 
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TWO YEARS OF PREPARATION 
The 334th Infantry Regiment was activated 15 October 
1942 at Oamp Howze, Texas. For a regiment which Wras later 
to grind i1ts way through the Sliegf'fied Line, dli~organize three 
of Germany',s finest diV'ilstons hi the Ardennes, and spearhead 
the Ninth Army's drive across the Roer anid into. the Getrman 
heartland, the beglinnings were no·t sensaltion!al. In 1942 S.elelc-
tirve Serv'ice began to look more oa·refully into the manpowerr 
pool, and the Army began to develop a fieservo~r of Infantry. 
Many original men of tihe fiegiment had been classti.tfied 4F by 
lenient draft boa1r1ds who subsequently reclassified them when 
the quotas were made more stringent. · 
In October 1942 the War wa·s nine months old, and while 
many men were convinCied it should be fought, few were 
volunteering for the Army, and f•ewer for t:he Inf.antry. The 
Air Forces were called: the A1Jr Corps, a place for gentlemen 
and aldventurers, and the Infantry was coo1ie labor, a tutored 
mob. The :fiks't men to join the regiment had a "raw deal" 
they told themselves around the beer tables in the PX. First, 
they didn't like the Army; second, they weren't physically 
:Bit; third, thei1r talents were niQt befing used. As the men 
looked ruround and listened, they invented a satisfying rumm, 
compensaJtiion for their "mw de'al," a rumoir that was going 
to last until we heard the first sotun:ds of Long Toms and 240's 
outside Gulpen and Wrua1wliiler, Hoillarili•: 
"We',re a repliacement outfit. The 334th isn't godng any-
where. If it does, we're Army of Occupation. Man, they can't 
send this outfit into combat!" 
Although the lines .a,t s'i:ck call were long wLtih misf:its and 
hopefuls, the Regiment started 13 weeks of ba~sic tmining: 
Physical 'Training, the School of the Soldier, Sanitation, First 
Aid, hikeiS, care and cleaning of equipment- a rigid minute-
by-minute traiining designed to turn ouit a uniform soldier 
with a baJSd:c knowledge of htjls a'rms and tasks in the Infantry. 
A few men extended themselves, noting the vacancies for 
non -commi1s'slioneld officers. 
But Ca:mp Howze was a col'lection of tJar shacks on the 
tDeeless htlls otf 1Jhe Texas prlairie, and' during the firslt winter 
of training the temperature dropped to 15 degrees below zero. 
9 
A steady stream o:f arrivals and departures went om, the nor-
mal tmlffic in Army circles. The men spent their evenings in 
Galinesville or Munste1r, Textas, ·and spent weekend passes in 
Dallas and Fort Wmth. Though Lieut•enant General Leslie 
McNair had pointed out that every man in the Army Ground 
Forces Wlas being trained for oversea1s service, fa•scism was 
distant, the training program was immediate, and many men 
doubted if they wou'ld see combat. 
After three months o·f basic trairning, the Regiment had 
lost mosrt physically unfit men. T.rairring p11ogressed from tn-
div:1dual to unit progrrams. An aJttempt wars made to rotate 
men f1rom one job to anort!her. Inereasingly mo:re time was 
spent in the field, culminating in a "D" training series before 
maneuvers. 
Every group has one or tw.o activities which are remem-
bered a1s the peaks of an operation, and it is unique tha't an 
A'rmy rememib1ers most .the moments it suffered, rather than 
the times it completed its mission well. Newcomers to the 
barnad{1s were totld of "D" Series when the weather was par-
tli.cula:rly adverse. "You should have been with us on 'D' 
Series!" gave way in later days •to "When we crossed the 
Srabine during maneuvers ... " and late[", "Back in Camp 
Howze" or "Seven•teen days in the fielld," and "From Pa1en-
berg to Prummerrn and Beeck ... " These were the phrr:ase1s o[ 
the 334th Infantry entiHirng the teller to a respeeit different 
£rom that pa;irl to stripes or bam. The rap~d turnover in per-
sonnel meant the newcomer would have a phrase o[ his own 
in a short time. 
The Regiment left Camp Howze 12 September 1943 forr 
the Lou]s~ana-Texas Maneuver Area. Maneuvers were un-
dergone :fJor sixty days in the :flteld. They corui.s.ted of tact'ical 
problems spaced in five O'r sioc day intervals. Again, weather 
conditions wE!re aJd'\Oerse bu't the ai!tituide Wlas "garrison" 
whJich meant no equipment othelr than author:ized cou<ld be 
used. While maneuvers were d:isliked intensely, they were 
the best possii!ble tmining for combat. The lalter rigors of the 
mud in the SiegfTd:ed Line and the cold in the Ardennes were 
extremes of whaJt the Regiment faced in the Texas-Louisiana 
area. 
Maneuvers and other problems were particularly valuable 
even in light of the turnover in personnel. A few men in key 
posiitiions learned how to handl-e theirr jobs; wire crews, In-
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telligence and Reconnaissance Plat'Oons, Ammunition and 
Pioneer Platoons could learn their work only in the field. 
In the Last evalUJ1l!ti'on, the Infantry's job is in the fteld. The 
In:flantry is not designed fo1r garrison or rearr echelon dluties. 
Maneuvers simulated comba1t; our action around Prummern 
demonstrated that they were the most valuable part of train-
ing in the Zone of the Interior. 
It was during maneuvers that the Regiment was first called 
upon to supply men for overseas duty. This caO.'l, coupled wit<h 
discharges given to physically unfit men, lowered the per-
sonnel of the Regim'ent far below that called for in the Tab'les 
of O:r:ganization. When the Regimen:t a·rrived a't Camp Clai-
borne, Loutsd!ana, its next permanent station, it was fa'!" 
understrength. · 
A:t Claiborne the Regilment was in its sophomOT.e period. 
It had maneuvered without a fuJI complement of anti-tank 
guns, and the AT Company had supplemented its issue with 
wooden g.un:s. The men who didn't want to go overseas were 
certatin thaJt the RegimenJt had not done a good job during 
maneuvers. None o,f the officers had seen combat. To the 
oiUrtJslider it would have seemed that the org,anization o,f the 
Regiment as we'll as its military snap was Sitrong, but to indi-
vidual soldiers, .framed in khaki and unable to see far bayond 
the platoon, it seemed that the tra:in'IDg would go on forever. 
The platoons were at times only squad strength, and squads 
consisted. of thTee oT more in some rifle companlies. The 
framework of the Regiment needed filling out if the 334th 
were to become a combat crutHt. 
It w,as in this period, about 1 Ap11il 1944, that men sepa-
rated from the hrmy Specialized Training PTogra'm were 
senJt to the Regiment a\3 fillers. The advent of these men 
created a mloirale pr'oblem and strain only er1ased when the 
Regiment went into action. The ASTP Trainees had been told 
thart; they were a selected group in the Army, that ther·e was 
a strong pOISsibirity of a commlisssion after graduation, and 
they had been excused from most military training so that the 
rigors of a :Dour year college course oon:densed into eighteen 
manlths would not be too extenu'a1!ing. The press of events 
forced thie Army to discon:tinUie 1fue progJram and send most 
of the trallinees to the Infantry. The Infantry was not yet 
regarded aL<; the Queen of Battle, and the ASTP men lt'hought 
it the drudge and lackey of the Army. Some non-coms 
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viewed the "college boys" suspiciously, :Deeling they were 
after the stripes which represented "D Series and theS1abine." 
When the trainees came, they were treated cu'r'tly and re-
sponded •in an eqUial manner. 'l'hey were "you new men" and 
they banded together with the ASTP cry of "Hahba, habba, 
hiabba!" 
Gar,rison _Life is no:t private. It Wlas oot ~ong before the 
"new men" we1re hi'tchiking to Alexand.rii'a with the old men 
in thetilr squads, or lending nlickels in the company day room 
to o]der members o.f the Regiment. The problem eased down. 
hfter combat tihe'l'e were only the remembrances of college 
]ife, but the siiJtuaUorn was poignantly put when the tartte,red 
reml1Janbs oif K Comp:any puliLed o:ut of the Nne nearVerdlenne, 
Belgium. They had not shaiVed fo'r six days, they were stained 
with combat, wrapped in blankets of many nationalities, and 
numbed wi!th bat1:Jl,e fatigue. One tattereld rifleman saw a 
fri,end and roused himself from his weariness long enough 
to remaTk, "Habha., habba, chum." 
"Damn college boy," growled a squad leader. 
Camp Claiborne was a slightly better garrison than 
Camp Ho:wze, bUit ilt was' none too comfortable. The camp 
WlaJS so large that a whole division, over 15,000 men, wa's only 
a smaH section of the t01tal military popuilJa,tion. Tra.'in:ing 
contimued with emphasis on larger units; battaliion an:d regi-
mental probl,ems were common. 
The Regli.ment was spend'ing more time ·in the field. While 
there was talk of the 3341th being notlhing more than a 
tminin:g regilrnent £rom which •replacements would be drawn, 
the invasion of E1urope on 6 June 1944 and t!he checldng of 
the Allied northwacvd .drive 'in Italy were indications that 
·strong forces of Infantlry woUJltl be needeid be:time the war 
in Europe was over. 
Louisriana wa;s hot in the summer of 1944. In Anny slang, 
the Regiment was "get1Jing hot" - avai~able for overseas 
shipment. Nolbody was certain. On one hand, 1Jhe outfit wa'S 
given new clothing, stored away in duffe1 bags after beling 
maTkeld!, and every:one knew wh1at that meant. On the other 
hand, a group of physically unfit men were kept in the Regi-
ment even t'hou:gh it was obvious they could' not pass the 
Overseas Phy:si:cal. The wive's otf the soldiers in Alexandria 
were adept a!t noting tendencies. In the hotels and restaurants 
there were always rumors to be picked up: 
14 
"They're getting them POM qualified." 
"They haven't haid landing boat training. They'Jl he going 
to Europe." 
"There's a buck sergeant in the 784trh Ordnance who saw 
tWJo warehoiUISeful's of white helmets with 'MP' written on 
them. At least that's, a safe job." 
"My aJu:n)t works wli~th the rlailiroard. She says that pas-
senger trains scheduled to carry a whole reg~.iment are coming 
in on ... " 
Sltay or go, there were rumms substantiating ea.c:h. But 
suddenly the furrlouigh r'a/te went up to 15%. That was the 
tip-off. A new Army dirrectiive hiad been pubhshed providing 
that every man shipped ov,ertSea\S wo!u1d have a furlough s1ioc 
months pri:or to departure. The Alexandr~~a Town Talk was 
fililed wtilth adverttisements od' TOioms to let. The Regiment's 
nadio progti".am, Fatigues anld Leg,gins, went off the air two 
d!ays bed'o['e the 334th entr!alineid. Two hundred wives became 
alarmed and drove to the cam'P ent!'ance, pleading for a last 
look. Church attendance iniCreaseid. S1trict censorship w:as 
clamped an the mail:s:, telephone connections were disoonti-
nued on 5 September, and on 6 September the Regiment 
moved to Oamp Kilmer, New Jersey, its StJaging area. 
Two we.eks were spent at Kilmer and passes were given 
freely. New York City was an hour's ride aw:ay with concerts, 
shoW\S., women, ]tquor, churches: a man could say goodbye 
any way h1iJs experiences haid taught him to act the word. 
We were one of the first regiments to be issued the new 
comfblat jacket. New Ymk, fa1shioned-minded and crowld'ed 
with soldiers, pa:itd more attention to the combat jackets ~than 
to the new fall suits in the windows of Fi,fth A venue. The 
city was fzjiendly, strangerls entert;a!ined aJt most bars, and the 
soldiers were costumed in a 'new attitude - significance. 
:At this time the XXI Group was attempting to flank the 
Siegfried Line atArnhem with theFirstAllied1AirborneArmy. 
As the men waited ·for shipment, Orientation, a subject which 
had been ,tucked away in the training program, ~appeared 
important. Alth'olllgh the men did not know combat, they 
were infantrymen and they could guess. "W e'H be there for 
the bli:g pUJsh" was the most popular statemenlt, said more 
regretfully than miilitantly. R'adio commentators Slaid the 
war WOIU:ld be over in six weeks. The soberE!s:t miliitary com-
mentatio!Ts predicted four months. That was the note of 
1§ 
optimism wh'ich hung in our throats when the Regiment em-
barked from the Brooklyn Na'Vy Ya:rd, 20 September 1944. 
The trip was pleasant, w~th little rough wea:tlher. Long 
periods of letter Wr!iting, augmented by a regimental new:s-
paper named The Daily Duffel.bag, prepared shows, and daily 
spontaneous prlograms all hell.IPed re~ieve tedium. Most 
popuLar were the poker games, one of which continued 
stea!dii:ly for ten days. 'Dhe sihip was the USAT Barry, a 
reconverted luxury liner. 
Although the personnel of theRegimentwas not .informed, 
contact with numerous submarines was rp.ade. The conV'Oy 
changed aourse severtal tilrnes, delaying the crossing by a few 
dla.ys. Near the coaJSt of England the convoy Wlas dispersed. 
A few fasteJ." shliJps, in1cluding ·the Barry, were brought around 
southern England, and the rest of the group .was spread from 
Sco;tland to Southampton. The original plan had been to 
land the 84th Division in Fmnce at Che11bourg, but the harb01r 
Wla;s choked w~tih 1shipping. The 334th debarked a1t Southamp-
ton and preceeded to an assembly area near Wd:nchester on 
10 Oc1Jober 1944. 
Autumn WaJS a few days alWay. The Lanes near Winchester 
had a iharvest orf blackberries which 'the men pLucked as· they 
took ·conditioning hikes. Training Wa'S no ·longer rigo•rous but 
special ca•re Wals taken to tinform the itroops in English customs. 
The Fi,mlt and Second Battali'ons w;ith the Special Units were 
bt]leted in the b3.rmcks of the Royal Winchester Rifles near 
the center of torwn. The Third Ba1ttalion waiS sent to• Tichibome 
Abbey, near ~lresford, and quartered in Niessen huts. Almost 
ev.ery main received one pass to London and .eiVery ot!her: 
evening •off. AmUISements were plenltiiful, from the roaring 
Picadilly Circus in lJondon io the ancient auste:&>ty of Win-
chester Cathed11al. Engl:and was differen1t, no doubt of that ; 
there was weak, warm !beer lilliStead od' Buidwelise'r, bread 
puddling instead of ice cream, andi lefrt; side drhning whiah left 
Service Company in aontinuous apprehension. The people 
w ere shy but friendly. Everyone wore a unliform, and ~-n con-
trast 't•o the States, service seemed neilther dmlmla•tti..c nO'r uni-
que. There were hundreds of difrferences, some of which irked 
the Armericans. Yet thlis interval was the rnost plea,sant 
m onth in the European 'Dheatre. 
The Regiment re-embarked on 31 October, this time foil' 
France. The Channel wa:s smooth but the Regiment was 
16 

packed in seve~ral LCT's and the converted crulilser H. M. S. 
Cheshire. The ·landiing was made at Omahia Beach, neaJ' the 
neck of the Cherbourg peninsula, on the afternoon of 1 No-
vember. The hed:ger:ows had not been cleared of mines, neces-
sitating a ten-mile forced march to 'a bivouac area near Mosle, 
France. Three daY's were spent here awlaiting orders. On 
5 NovEmber 1944 the 334th moved v'ia truJck to another 
bivouac area near Dreaux, France. It was in this move that 
we first saw sli,gns of battle; Carentan and Saint Lo had been 
swept back from the sltreehs where they ha:d lain. Therr:e were 
a few knocked out enemy vehiJCles. The realction of some wa:s, 
"It's just like the movies." B'ult reality wa:s only a few days 
away . 
. The cliimb across northern F.mnce continued. In the next 
day's motor march we passed through Paris; through the Bois 
de Bou1ogne, and along the right bank of the Seine. We 
glimpsed the Champs Elysees and the Eiffel Tower. One of 
the serials in the convoy had lunch beside Le Bourget Airfield 
where IJinrdbergh had landed in hi·s first flight acr;oss lth\a 
Atlantk. SwaybelfJiied C47''s were landing on the airs;trip 
every thirty 'seconds. Thtis day's march finally broug:ht us to 
a l:Yivouruc one mile east of La:on, France. 
Two days were spent in this area. On t'he 7th we entru.cked 
for a cold ride to Wittem, HoHan:d, V'la Charleroi, arriving in 
the mornring hours o;f the 8th. As we stepped :f\rom. the tr'llicks, 
to the east we could hear our artillery firing against the Sieg-
fried Line. The preparatilon was over. We were ready fo1r 
battle. 
2 17' 
THE "BIG PICTURE" 
The 334rth never should have entered combat. The Ger-
mans should ha~e quit before we ar11ived at W~ttem . After 
the disaster in France, the Wehrmacht had fallen back to the 
Sieg!l'ri'ed Line, content to horld ar defensive position. ]t was 
obvtioms that the Germans could not win the war. nt was 
further obvtious that the rest of the flighting was to be, w1th 
the exception of the Ardennes campaign, on German soil. 
The Gen:nans had fallen into a mysticirsm, born of the:ir 
Fuhrer's astrological hunches, in wM·ch they depended on a 
Secret Weapon to defe'art the Allies. The V Bombs were heart-
breakrlng harassments, yet they did not slow the Allied 
advance. Stated simply, there is no weapon to defeat In-
fantry, other than stronger and more s!trongly sUJpported In-
fantry. The German General Starff must have known this. 
Having waged war on other countries they also must have 
known what a mli.tlitary campalign would do to the German 
home1and. Their deCiision to :flight when there was no mathe-
matical chance for victory was not motivated by any loftier 
ideal than that of sraving their necks and soi(Jial positions. 
Roughly, the Siegfried l.Jine ran from a point outside Arn-
hE!m, Holland., to the Swiss border. It varied in depth from 
six to thtirty miles. The pillboxes were permanent forti-
fications, some with steel relinforcing concrete to a depth of 
six feet. Most were mutUJal·ly supporiling, so that if one were 
attacked others coU'ld come to ~Its defense. There wa:s little 
chance o[ br1i1lilant tadical maneuvering. The Line could be 
breached only by frontal pressure; surp:ril.se was impossible 
except in looa:l engagements. The Germans knew exac:t dis- . 
tances from point to pCJiint, enabling rthem to shell road cros-
sings and other tactlically important posdtions without fo:r'W'a'I'Id 
observers. The ter:ra'in wars slightly undularting, offering little 
defilade. The Germans had taken advantage of the undu-
lation, for, as Captain Charles Hliiartrt, the CO of G Company 
put i:t: "The hiUs fit tJhe rtmajectory. We were exposed to 
grazing fire on a ·reverse slope." It was the mosrt highly forti-
fied area in the world, yet it was taken in part by .the "civi-
lians in uniliform" of the 334th. 
ll'he Ninth Army, called in tJhose days a "ghost army'' 
18 
because it had not bee:n reported since it hJad ClaiptUJTed Brest 
iour months previously, was assembled on the left flank of 
the Amerkan First Army, and on 1Jhe right flank of the Br:Hish 
XXX Corps. The 84th Division held the northernmost seotor 
of the Ninth Army front, which meant it was the division 
-on the left flank of the AEF. 
The overall strategy of the British and the American 
Ninth was to setize the commanding groiUllld overloolrrng the 
Cologne-DuJSSeldorf plain by seizing the high ground on the 
west bank of the Roer R'iver. The first step in the 84tlh Divii-
si:on sector waJS the c~pture of the ra:illroad jundtio.n of Geilen-
kirchen, and the h[gh ground 1Jo the north on which the o'irt:y 
<>f Prummern stood. Geilenkirche:n was to be taken frontally 
by the 333d Regiment, while the British on the left were to 
be one w.ing of a double envelopment. The 334th, wi,th the 
m!issi:on of talcing Prummern, was the other wing of thle 
envelopment, as well as a thrreat to Lindern, Brachelen, and 
the Roer River. 'Dhis was the first battle. 
2* 19 
Pfc waggle, F Company, looks over the fiat terrain. 
Wtirm - Leiffarth 
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18 NOVEMBER-18 DECEMBER 
THE SIEGFRIED LINE 
D Day and H Hour were chosen as 0700, 18 November 
1944. The Fd.rst Battalion Wats on the right, the Second Bat-
talion on the le:f1t, and the Third Battalion in reserve. Each 
a'1ltacking battalion had attached one pliatoon of anti-tank 
guns, one-half a mine platoon, and a squadron of British 
tanks, the Sherwood Rangers. The mine fields were cleared 
a few hours before the attack and two gaps were marked 
with tape, one for each attacking battalion. An intensive 
artillery preparation was fired. We were to move through 
the gaps, deploy on the other side in the high ground 
between the front lines and Prumlmern, and move :f1orward 
in a•ssault. The ground wa:s soggy, the weather was aold, and 
the attack, scheduled for sulllrise, pushed off under cloudy 
sk!ies that gave only a gr;ey hint of morn!ing. 
The first dfufficulty was thrut the tanks could not get 
through the .left gap. The stlugg,ish mud was causing them to. 
belly do·wn. The in:fiantry was ordered ili.Tougth the gaps. 
without tank support, and the tanks were .ordered to catch 
up when possible. The lead companies, A and E, went 
through 1Jhe gaps without diffi,culty, the second compan!ies, 
Band F, met some fire, but the reserve companies, C and G, 
met intensdve 88, mortar and Slillall arms fiire when they 
attempted to follow the lead companies. B anrl G Companies. 
s.tamted a slow infirl:trahon tJh:r:ough the gaps by creeping and 
cr.a1wling. In . the mean~time, the first two compames of each 
battalion weTe deploying into their first objectives, the high 
ground before Prummern. A Company ran mto six pillboxes: 
during this deployment. The ass1a:ult company olf the Second 
Battalillon a'1sro ran into the expected heaiVy resirstance. As 
planned, the leaiding letter compaJnies of each battalion were 
left as battalion ·res.eTVe whiile C and G Compand.es which had 
infiltrrated by 1000, took thetir places in the assault. The ad-
vance conbnued. F Company knocked out six machine guns. 
on the rwest flank of Geilenkirrchen. The F j.rst Bratltailion moved 
on Prummern; the Second Battalion moved toward the high 
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ground west of the town, high ground which would command 
both Prurn'mern and Geilenkirchen. 
The Germans could see us comiil!g. They were str10ngly 
emplaced, w€111 armed, and were on'ly slilghtly surprised by 
the attack. It w.as later revealed that they had bee:n expediing 
a push in this sector and had fortified it with two new divi-
sions. The str'ongest partt of these divisiooo were being held 
up at Linnlch by our air s.uppor1t which was keeping the roads 
rea•sonably free of German vehicles. 
By noon, the German piisoners had been started back in 
a steady stream. A Oompany had found 200 in a trench beside 
the railroad be1tween Breil ail!d Prummern. Interrogation 
reveaJled we were meeting the 9th Panzer DiV'is~on, the 15th 
Panzergrenadier Division, and the 343d Regtimeil!t of the 183d 
Volksgrenadier Division. 'Dhey had been forewarned of our 
attack and had made preparations for it. The day before the 
334ith jumped off, the Amer:Ucan 102d Di!vi.s'iiOn and 2d Ar-
mored Division had attrucked on our right. Th1e intensity of 
the altJtacks made the Germans apprehensive in all sectors. 
"We had been told th'at we were to be attacked by green 
troops," saJid 10ne offi1cer at the 343d, "and we though!t it wou1ld 
be easy. I have fought in Africa and Russia, and have n ever 
seen soldiers attack with the ferocity of your division.'' 
The Regiment pushed forward aggressively. The Second 
Ba·ttali!on :fiorced itself on'to the objective, the !high ground 
sou:thwes.t of Prummern, gua·ranteei:ng the 333d's aJttack on 
Geilenki.rchen. At 1510 this ground WaJs seou(Te. On the right, 
the Fivst Battailion moved into Prummern frontally . Band C 
Companies were the first to enter t he town. The sky was 
darkening, and our al:r cover was less useful. 
At 1600 hligher headquarters issued an order for a conti-
nuJation of the aJttack. The First Ba:tltla'lion was to take the 
gr1ound directly nor:th of Prummern; the Secoil!d Ba<ttalion 
was to continue nor,th of its present position. 
We knew little of the strength am1 pos:i.itlions of the Ger-
mans in tihe new objective. We had made plans for a conti-
nuation of t!he attack as far as the Roer, but paslt Prtummern 
the method of act:i!on was more sketchy and not as detaJiJled. 
As the new pl!ans were bein1g put into effect the First Bat-
t1ai1Jion reported !heavier resistance inside Prummern. The 
ruined building1s were excellent hideaways for German 
snipers who were making the streets untenab.le. Enemy arti.l-
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lery was shelling the town. The German reserves, previously 
hindered by our ai1r support, were moving up to counter'-
attack. The F~irst Battalion morved to an area in tJhe southwest 
corner of Prummern, an orchard, and dug irn for the night. 
An oversight was the failure to notify the Chaplain, the Fi!'lst 
BaJttahon Medics, and the attached pliatoon of an1Ji .. Jfnnk guns 
of the move. This weak force constituted the only Americans 
in Prummern that night. The AT guns engaged six German 
tanks morving into Prummern in a column. The. third of the 
six was knocked ou't, hlod{!ing the road. The lead tank r1an 
over one gun, burt; was knocked out by another, and the second 
tank broke through the defense but waG wrecked by a mine 
:Dield on the west edge of town. 
The Second Battalion was at tempting to readh its, new 
area, but was halted by intense mo-rtar and art:ililery fire. A 
concerted ef:Dort was made at 2400, and the Battalion ad-
VIanced perhaps one hundred yards, but it made no sizeable 
dent in the German defense. It Wlas time to use our rese-rves. 
The Third BaJttatlion WaJS in an assembly area near Breil. 
Orde!'ls were issued sending it to Prummern in a column of 
companies. The Third was to deploy on the near side of the 
town, and pass aTound the right flank of the city. The First 
Batta'lion was to move through Prummern, and with the help 
of the Third Battalion take the ground between Beeck and 
Prummern. The attack was to move forward at 1200, 19 No-
vember. We had hit the enemy a strong body blow 1Jhe day 
before; we were trying for a knockout an tlhe 19th. "Morve 
forWia:rd if poosibie" WaJS also· a part of the orders passed down 
to Regtiment, whicih meant that if we took the low ground 
between Prummern and Beeck, we were to continue to the 
hill beyond Beeck. 
At 1145 the Third Ba'ttalion executed its flanking move-
ment and dosed with the .enemy. The First Battalion had 
started its move through the town, and in the face otf heavy 
machine gun fire moved through Prummern and into the 
'fields beyond. The Germans were on ground above them 
watChing thelir mo,vements. When they were approximaitely 
200 yards north of the town, the Germans th-rew in tremen-
dous concentrations and forced 1Jhe Battalion to dig in. The 
Third Batt·alion carried the attack, alone. At 1550 the British 
XXX Corps ArtHlery sheUed the area and rolled the barrage 
toward Beeck. Following closely behind the artillery, the 
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Third Battalion Aid Men help German shot in stomach at Lindern. 
Third Battalion moved into the assigned area between Prum-
mern and Beeck. The ·First Battalion continued to consolidate 
the ground it had taken the day before. 
To comply 1with the order ,move forward if possible, ' ' and 
to ex1ploit the po1tency of the barrage, I and K Oomnmies 
triEid to move from the }ow ground. They m'oved only a short 
distance, but were under perfect German observation, and 
were halted. L Company was commi·tted from batJtal.ion 
rese'r'Ve and swung around the right orf the batta<li:on. The 
mO'Ve helped very little. The German positions on the high 
ground WEre so strong that continuatton Wias impossible. "We 
were looking into their throats•," s•ailld Pf:c P!aiUl Leger of K 
Company, "and their tonJsils were on fire." 'Dhe Third Bat-
talion moved into def:iJlade and dug in for the night. 
We attacked again on 21, 22, 2'3 November, but the story 
was a .carbon copy. We would kill, capture and wound many 
Germans, take a few pillboxes, and meet the same frustra-
ting fire from above. On the 23d the Third Battalion attacked 
with the 405th Infantry on our right. Physically led by 'Major 
Charles R. Murrah, the Third BatJtalion advanced 1000 yards, 
200 yards short of Be€ck, but could not gain the town. The 
Third BattaLion h'ad heavy casualties. We jabbed at the left 
side, right sidE, and cen:ter of the town wiJth combinati-ons of 
battalions. Aifter se'Ven continuoUJs days of combat and attack, 
we were re1lieved by fresh batta'li1ons of other regiments. We 
moved to Pa:lenberg for reorganization. The re,s:t of ilhe month, 
26-30 November, was spent in division reserve. 
What had happened in this firs:t attack? The £irSit day we 
h!ad mo.ve.d_ like a Rose BoiWl football team unti-11600. At 1600 
we hJad losrt; our drive and from 19-26 November our alttacks 
were consistently frustrated in terms of geographic gain. 
Were we jusrt a poor uni·t, as many m E'In had been say~ng? The 
enemy didn't think so. Or had we hit s ::Jmething too large 
for a regiment? 
There is a cL:~ar answer. Lindern Wias taken before Beeck. 
La•ter we took Leiffarth befo.re Wtirm and Mtillendlod. There 
is a ridge r.unn;ing werslt of Gereonsweiler through Beeck. 
Wtir:m and MtiUenJdorf. Thi•s ridge was the s'trongest section 
of the Siegfried Line from the Dutch border at Rimburg to 
the Roer River. In our sector this was the stronges1t part orf 
the s1tnongest bne in the world. In no other engagemEnt did 
the Germans resist as they did our first week in combat, and 
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never again did we have to pay the price per foot thart we 
paid before the evi!l smEJlling debris of Beeck. 
Our next assignment was tJo the east, between Linnich, 
Lindern, and B:uachelen. The area enclosed by this tri,angle 
was tihe objective of our Corps, the XIII. It Wlas the higih 
ground overlooking the Roer River, necessary :Bor any large 
scale crossing of the river. The key to the area was .control 
of a hlar'd surf;a.ce road between Linnich anid Lindern. To 
protect the attack, to flank Wiirm, Mullendonf, and Lindern, 
the First Battalion was ordered tJo take Leiffarrt;h, no.rtlh of 
Beeck and WEl3't of Lindern. The Se.cond BatbalioiD. was to take 
the southwest poi'tion of the Linnioh-Lindern___;Brachelen 
tl'liang.le, and the Third Battalion was to seize tihe balance. 
This attia•ck was airpost as difficult as our last mission. 
It started far less successfully, and met the same German 
units. The Germans were not surprised, and not unprepared. 
The att/ack was to sta·rt at 0730, 30 November. The Second 
Battalion moved from Pa,lenberg to Ap'Weiler where it was 
shelled. From Apweiler it continued to Gereonsweiler. W·e 
were taking over another unit's area, and this unit, the 405th 
Regiment of the 102dDivision, had just finished an exhausting 
attack. Somewhere in the switch, pi'oper liaison and recon-
naissance between the two units was n:o't maid:e. Major (then 
Captain) J·ames Johnston reported that the Second BaUa1lion 
melt resistance 1500 yards farther back than expected. The 
Third B:a.ttalion was engaged in· hea1vy fighting two hours 
before it was due at the line of departure. Heavy fire was 
pouring from en:emy posi1tions in Linnich tOn our right fronJt. 
By H hour we had sustained heavy casualties a:nt.:l some dis-
organization. The First BattalioiD. jumped off at 0730 for 
Leiffarth. It fought i1Js. way from Prummern into an in-
complete tank-tr:ap east-northeast O·f Beeck. The enemy artil-
lery had the trap pinpointed and threw an intensive con:cen-
tmtion at the First Battalion, forcing it to dig in. 
·'I1he First was stopped'; the Second and Third we:re in a 
state of diso-rganizJation which negated a cont'intuance of the 
aHack until later in the afternoon. We htad fought orur way 
to the line of departure, but had :tost contact with the Regi-
menit on our right, the 405th, further delaying the attack. 
Liaison wa·s finally effected, and another attack went forward 
at 1500. We moved to within 200 yards o:f the Linnioh-
Lindern road, but were unable to cross even with an attempt 
29 
This German is attached to a tellermine. Pfc William Farmer, B Companl', 
cuts the wire leading to the booby trap. 

a1t inf'Htration. The fire, principally small arms and mortar, 
w.as coming from the northeast, outside the regimental 
boundary. 'l'he Germans were throwing heavy interdidory 
fire over the mad. This attack Wlas a1lso discontinued. 
Our toughness brought us •a few reluobant gains on 1 De-
cember. Our Second and Thitd Ba1ttaNons CO[ltinued the 
attack with tJhe roughes't sort of reorganJziation. Men were 
oounted of1f, assigned to platoons, squads and companies 
without regard for previous assignments. The Germans were 
counter-attacking on our left flank at Lindern, and to ease 
the pressure against the 335th, which had placed two batta-
lions in the town, we tried again to seize the high ground 
over the Linn'ich-Lin:dern road. We jumped off a't 1500 and 
came within 300 yards of the road before we were halted. 
Both battalions dug in. 
To provide flank protection f01r the Firs<t Battalion as.sault 
on Leiffarth, the Third Battalilon was moved to an area 1000 
yards diue south of Lindern. The Th~rd was to su:ppor.t the 
335th in its defense agains't the German counter-attack. The 
Second Battalion had to take the Corps' objective. The Firsrt 
Battalion, held under orders afte~y its halt in the tank trap 
near Beeck, had yet to take Lei':flfarth. 
We did i't. The Third Ba,ttahon moved into the west edge 
of Lindern at 1300, 7 December. The First Battalion moved 
from its area into LeiffurtJh. At 0400, in a ni!ght advance, the 
Second Battalion move across the Linnich-Lindern road and 
into the hi.gh ground beyond. The Second',s a!divance was s:o 
swi:flt and quiet that the Germans were surprised. H Company 
madhine gunners were amazed to see a German dhow li.ne 
opem:ting in the early morning hours. As the Germans lined 
up for food, the machine guns opened up. 
The FiTst Battalion's advance was equally as rapid. The 
326th Field Artillery, our blnaking back, provided inter-
ference into Le'iffarth with a heavy barmge. The doughboys 
dio:nbed from their holes and sprinted for the objectives. FirSit 
Battalion followed the shells so closely thart it looked as if the 
barrage were falling into the forward elements. The Germ·an 
attempt to defend Leiffarth with small arms fire was quickly · 
overtcome. The town was ours half an hoUtr atfter we had 
asiSiaulted it. We had mopp£d up our sector of Lindern with 
the Third Battalion. 
After the attack phase whiJch las,ted mom 30 November 
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to 3 December the 334th Infantry went into a h()lding phase 
and Colonel (then Lt Col) ChaT'les E. Hoy asSIUmeld command. 
Although it oould not be seen at the time, the Ninlth Army 
drive had put an enormous amorunt of pressure on the Ger-
mans, so much tihat the Ger:mra:ns must !have been rorced to 
pJan their future Ardennes attack to relieve the threat to the 
Roer. The 84th Division had era.s1ed the Geilenkirrchen salient 
in our fines and had sturck a raw finger into the German 
derfell!Se along the Roer. We were not far from the Roer which 
meant we were not far from the end of t'he Siegfried Line. 
If 1Jhe Germans chose to defen~d stDongly the wes't bank of the 
RC)er, there was danger that they would be pushed back 
agains't the river in the Linnirch-Lindern area. In turn, there 
were two things the Germans courld do. The first wa's a coun-
ter-offensli'Ve of such magnitude as to rslieve the pressure 
a'long the Rner. The other w:a;s to contain our salient and 
others whiclh had probed close to the Roer. In our sector they 
were to attempt to retake Leiffarth and regain oontrol of the 
high ground, Lei:ffairth-Wiirm-Miillendorf, while sheUing 
any roads, cws6road or to!Wn!S available to us as supply instru-
ments for the crossing of the river. 
There was !little ra~ tivity until 16 December 1944. The 
units were rotated between the lines anid Palenberg. Pa·len-
berg was a safe place to be, but in the damp, unlit cellars or 
in the settled dust of a three-month old shelling there was 
little connection with the things the men had ledlt in Sep-
tember. Mail call mated a man's eyes and throa~t. Reinforce-
ments were so numerous it seemed a,s if the Regiment had a 
new :flace. Trench foot was common. Yet from the sufferings 
the men hiad undergone in the field, from the danger and 
mu~h they had shared, there began a comradesihip and a 
pride in the units, fr,orrn squad to Divisi,on, whi<ch wa·s later 
to be one of the prime factol's in the hi:stork Ardennes stand. 
Oarll trhe 334th a "replacement outfit," or say "we coruldn't 
fight our way through a pa1per bag," the catoh words of the 
Howze-Olaiborne days, and there was an immedi,ate reaction 
and a hundred tales to illustr'ate how good a unit the 3:~4th 
was. In the P.alrenberg celLars where the exhaus!te:d men lay, 
so quiet that the candleHght was frozen and the dgarette 
smoke hung in punctuating tiers through the room, the men 
talked of the soldiers who didn't make it: Fred Fluty, 
Mercer Yeagar, Ben Goodman, David Powell, Don Smith, 
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Edward Acuna and so many others that the names were a 
poetic rollcaH. The Siegfrried Line seemed interminable. It 
was no longer "if I get it" it was "when I get it." Everyone 
knew the Unilted Natilons were going to win the war, but if 
the Siegfried Line stretched to the Rhine it wo;uld cost us a 
genemtion. Althouglh the Russians were advancing, that was 
a symbol and not a fact. A fa:at w:a's the destruction of a 
Pcmther tank near Lindern, a fact to .be seen, towched, and 
cheered. Wha:t 1Jhe flannel-suited commentators sraid about 
sitx millton Russians wa!S to be heard: attentive'ly, but what 
W 1ats real was the throttled Banther west otf Lindern. 
The Germans counter-attacked in the Leiffarth sector on 
the morning of 16 December 1944. A heavy aTitillery barrage 
wrus laid on our line~ and the German infantry followed none 
too closely to retake our salient in their high ground. The 
First BattaJ.i1on was struck by a Germ:an battalion attempting 
envelopment f~om the no'I1iheast and no'r:thwest. Our artilliery 
was effective in dispersing the enemy's reserve company. The 
atta,cking oompaniels penetrated our lines but were eliminated 
in a sharp fire fiJght. Those that infiltrated were either killied 
or captured. We stood fast . In total 80 Germans were 
klilled, 200 Wlounded, and 73 pri'soners taken, inc:luding those 
casualties inflicted WJh,en they continued their attlack at 1800. 
The evening a~ttruck came from Wiirm, with the strengtih of 
one company. Our artiillery fired eleven batt'a:liilons, and the 
First Battallion 'had been reinforced with a Tank Ass1ault 
Team. The attacking forces we~e unable to tak~e any ground. 
There was plenty of time to plan the next attack. To pro-
tect our Leirffarth salient and to roll up the high g:rtound to 
the west, the next targets were Wiirm and MU]lendorf. The 
CO made exhaustive plans for 1Jhe attack. There were many 
pillboxes in the area, and many choices had to be made in the 
attack. Every poss~ble eventuaHty was considered, and alter-
nate plans were made should the primary plans be frustrated. 
Men wer.e briefed, from battall·ion commanders to squad 
leaders. The houses were numbered, groups were informed 
otf particular targets and shown their line of attack on sand 
tables. 125 guns were to support our attack. The First 
Battalion was to seize Wiirm; the Second, Miillendorf. "D" 
was 18 December 1944. "H" for the 'Second was contingent 
upon the First Battalion's success. 
The 125 guns blew Wiirm arud Mullendorf into history 
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shortly before 0900. At 0900 a red smoke shell was fired and 
the doughs climbed from their foxholes, fol:liow.ing 1Jhe artil-
lery barrage within fifty yards, running at top speed for 
their objectives, disregarding weak fire sent by the Germans. 
Our prisoners were so dazed by the speed and f.erocity of our 
Infantry and Artillery that they were weeping when cap-
tured. Five minutes after the attack began we were in Wiirm, 
silencing the scattered fire earning from a few strong p[aces. 
The in:iiantry broke through to the fieLds beyoTIJd the 001wn 
and dug in, awaiting :flurtlher orders. We had very light oasu-
alties: tw,o men slightly burned. 
After Wiirm was attacked, the Second Battalion assaulted 
Miillendorf. Jumping off from the direction of Beeck, the 
Second folllowed ~ts supporting artillery as closely as had the 
First. Thirty minutes after the attack started, the town was 
secure. In the attack phase we taok 114 PW's and had only 
four wounded. The operation was wen planned and weLl exe-
cuted. The tmops advanced with marching fire. The Germans 
were caught off-.balance. No counter-attack was met e~cept 
a mortar barr~age thTown into the newly captured towns. 
The firS't and la:st days olf our first month in combat were 
our most spectacular. Between them we become a combat 
outfit. We had learned how to kill Germans most efficiently 
withoUJt being killed ourselves. We had carved througih the 
Siegfried Line untill we sltood a few thousand yards from the 
R!oer River, which was to be the last natural boundary in the 
west. We had bled and won. It is f.or other\S to say hiow signi-
ficant our actions were, but it is true that we had ripped a 
holle in Germany's strongest defense. Now it was time to 
bLock her last offensive. 
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The draw is under observation and fire from Wtirm. The doughboys sprint 
for safety, one at a time. 
Coming from foxholes K Company assaults Beeck. A few moments later 
enemy artillery halted the advance. 
WINTER IN BELGIUM 
DEFENSE 
It is only in retrospect, or at a safe distance from the front, 
that ruction seems dramattc. Engaged in an ~actilon, tJhere is 
only roOJm for fear and planning; drama comes lin re-telling 
or remembering. :If !the soldier comes out safe!ly, the ex-
perience of dianger achieves lustre and hue. The action in Bel-
gium which threatened at four times to disorganize the 
Regiiment, became the most talked-of crumpa1ign rumong the 
veterans of the Regiment. As Major James Johl1Siton said, "I 
wouid never go 'tlhrough the fighting again, but I IWiould not 
give up my experiences for 'the staff's payroll." 
Marsha1l Gerd von Rundstedt had thrown siXity dii'visions 
agailrust ten Armerican divi:sions in an attack whicfu commenced 
16 December. 1Rundstedt's intention \\nas to drive ,thr!ough the 
hiilly Ardennes •to the Meuse and cut our main supply r1oute 
between Liege and Namur. W:hat the further objectiv.es were 
would depend upon the success of ·th'e attack. Another prime 
reason for the drive Wia:s the intense pr esSu'!"e being put on the 
Siegfried Line by 'the 'concerted British an·d American drive 
in the North. He did not cut the Liege-Namur road nor 
reach the Meuse, pa.rttally because 'our Marche-Hotlton sltand 
blocked his northward movement, but he did achieve time £or 
his defense od' the Siegfried Line. 
There was li·ttle warning of our m:ission in the defense of 
the Marohe-Hotton sector. After the Wiirm-Miillendorf 
a1ttack we shifted battalions in the lines. Everyone ta.lked of 
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two ·week's rest in 'Hoilland. The Stars ,a,nd Stmpes we received 
were three days old ~and gave no hint of the Gerrnan drive. 
SHAEF had put a dlamp on radio news, and all that was 
he:ard was ·a report of smalll 's.cale counter-attacks lin the F!irst 
Arttny sector. 
r,t WCliS in this atmosphere of speculation that the Regiment 
received its orders. The fi:rst orders were simple. " Go to Ver-
viers, Belgium," At Verviers an Army representative met 
Oolonel Hoy and told hJiJm to proceed to Marche, Begium. 
"Ciheck at some poinJt near there before entering to see if the 
town is clear 'Of Germans. You may hiave <to filght your way in." 
On 20 December we moved a:s 1a combat team to Marche, 
v:iJa Aachen and Verviers. "You may have to fight your way 
into the town." Colonel Hoy led the convoy in the Jead jeep. 
Darkness oame early bUit speed was essential. The v~h1icles 
turned on their head!ligh:ts after half the fifty-mDe trip was 
accomplished. As far as we knew, the only safe grorund was 
that before our headlights. 
The Regiment moved int:o MaTche and set up a perimeter 
defense, a circle of riflemen 360 degrees 'around the city. M0!3:t 
of the Regiment was billeted in and around a central s'chooll-
house while the sta:fif opened the n ew maps to see what t hey 
were up against. 
It was a bewildering picture. Where were the Germans? 
No one knew. A report came in that the Germans weTe in 
Hatton, a town abou!t six miles northeast, and through which 
our convoy, lights blazing, had passed an hour before. Service 
Company heard burp guns iaJS they passed through ~the town. 
What was the ter11ain? Unlike the Siegfried Uine: h eavily 
wood~d half-mountains, deep cuts and wooded gor1ges thr.ough 
wlhich an enemy force coUJld \infirtrate withollllt observation. 
The weather was cold, the ground frozen. The men around the 
periphery of Marche reported, "45 minutes to dig a foxhole 
near Prummern. Fi!Ve hours here." Where were ·our forces? 
Simply, there were none, excluding a company of combat 
engineers who had built few road blocks between Marcihe 
and La Ro_che. Some cooks and bakers of the 3d Armored 
Divison had belied their rear-echelon status and with a pla-
toon ofF Company under Lt. Cliifton L. Ma1c La1chlan fought 
off an armored attack 'across the Ourthe in Hatton after we 
passed. As far as we knew, we had no unit on the flanks . The 
only thing certain was that we would defend Marche. 
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The first pmblem was to estimate the direction from which 
the Germans would attack. We could assume :the 'locail. attack 
would come in the same direction as the major attack, east 
to west. It was equany probable that the Regiment was on 
one ft~ank of the German salient which meant the line should 
be established against a drive from the south. The latter 
was chosen as tihe most probable directton of attack. Our line 
was set on a ridge a mile and a half southeast of the Marche-
Hotton road. The line was six miles long, more than three 
times the length of the line we bJad left in Germany. The left 
anchor was the Ourtihe River. The right anchor was esta-
blished the next day when another regiment of the Division 
moved into the west end of Mar,che. A series of small villages 
were between Pidges: Verdenne, Marenne, Menil, Ha·mpteau, 
Ho:tton. Oniginally, the 'Dhird Battalion held the line from 
the right anchor to Meni,l and the Second from Meni'l to 
Hampteau and along tfu.e Ourthe River to Hotton. When 
the fight began, it wa's necessary to shift units 1into these 
areas and to oommit the First Battalion, which was the Regi-
ment's reS'erve. 
A glance :at the map wi11 show that the principal problem 
in the defense of Marche was t'he control 01f the Marche-
Bourdon~Hotton road. Should the Germans cut the road at 
Bourdon the Second Battalion would have no route of with-
dmwal, other than ·over the Ourthe or tlhmugh bad secondary 
roads to the N or,th. While Marohe was our primary point 
of defense, the Marche-Hotton rood was Hs key. 
We took up the line in the morning hours of 21 December 
1944. The Second Battalinn sent a platoon ofF Co:m1pany to 
this area, in 'light of previous reports telling of German 
s~trength in Hotton and Hampteau. In Hotton, Company F 
met seven Mark V tanks, a half-track, and 20 infantrymen. 
In a sharp fight two tanks w ere knocked out and the Germans 
withdrew. A patrol from E Company found Hampteau swar-
ming with Germans. E Company drove the Germans from 
the town and took up defensive positions. The Third Battarl.ion 
went 'into line with less diffi.Jculty. C Company had been 
posted in an Outpo,st Line, 2000 yards ~ahead 'Of our main 
line of resistance. 
The r egiment 'was far understrength. Foxholes were 
150 yards apart over a six mile line. As 1!he men Wlai1:ed for 
the inevitable ·attack there was an understandable loneliness, 
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accentuated by the overpower·ing silence of tall hills and 
thick pine forests. The tirst snows o[ winter bung in some 
crevices, a beautifUl treachery revealing marks of patrols 
an:d foretelling 1:Jhe gigantic drifts s·oon to fall. 
On the 22d there was a trickle orf information. The In-
telligence and Reconnaissance Plat·oon was sent out to make 
contact with the enemy. It found him at Hamoulrand enga·ged 
in a fire fight. A large enemy patrol engaged F Company 
at Hotton but withdrew aifter suffering casualties. We cap-
tured a German o.fficer motoncycling to Verdenne as an ad-
vance billeting detail. A·t 1Jh[s time it was revealed we were 
in the sector of the 116th P 1anzergrenadier Divis~on, a tough 
outfit composed principally of young men. AT Company laid 
hundreds of mines throughout the area, .constructed road-
blocks, and !helped prepare demo'lilli:on charges in the br·idge 
at Hotton. There w1as not as yet any indication of the enemy's 
strength, nor the area hom which his attack would come. 
The 23d was also spent on the razor's edge. The repor•ts 
from other sections of the ·A·rdennes front showed that the 
German's drive to the east had been halted at the tip. The 
stand of the lOlst Airborne at Bastogne slowed the southern 
expansion of the df;ive. The Germans were to force north-
ward and we stood in their way. By the 23d, enemy recon-
naissance had increased in our sector: a stgn of attack. 
On the night 23-24 December the Germans shelled Bour-
don on the Marche-Hotton road. Simultaneouslly, 120 Ger-
man infantry infiltr-ated throu•gh an uncovered dmw into a 
small woods between Mar;che and Bourdon. Although they 
were lbehind our lines, for a few hours there was no indi-
cation of their presence. At 0630 the Germans captured a 
platoon lea:der, 'and a pl·a'toon S'ergeant of I Company. An 
I Company patrol followed the footprints from th:e foxholes 
occupied by the men. Strangely, the tracks led to the rear, 
into the woods where the Germans had infiltrated. The patrol 
was fired on. At the same time, a PW reported the position 
to the Int'errog·ation Team. Li·ttle 'time was lost. K Company, 
which had been in Third Battalion reserve, was brought to 
the northeast edge of the woods, while A Company and a 
platoon of tanks moved up from Marche to the southwest 
portion. The enemy waJS to attack at the same time we 
attacked him, according to a captured document. He wa.s late 
organizing, and our companies were attacking the woods in 
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a bayonet ·and small arms a<ction. Whlile the woods were 
being flushed, the Germans complicated matters by attacking 
V erdenne, in the center of our ML'R and in the area covered 
by K Company before it had been pulled out to flush the 
pocket. It is thought that both German forces, the one in 
the woods and the one which attacked Verdenne, were co-
ordinated in a si.ng1le drive to out the Marche-Hotton road 
at Bourdon and between Bourdon and Marche. Our attack. in 
the woods was successful and the Germans plans were upset. 
,At 1550 the other tine ofGermans attackedVerdenne. The 
First and Second Platoons of I Company, vastly outnumbered 
.and without support from K Company which had been moved 
to the right, were overrun. The remainder of I Company with-
drew to the vkinity of Bourdon for reorganization. K Oom-
pany, back from the attack, was put on a ridlge behind Ver-
denne to limit the enemy's penetration. 
The situation was tense. There were no reserves between 
our lines and Bourdon. Contra[ 1of Verdenne, the •center of 
our lines, meant the enemy had improved his chances to cut 
the Marche-Hotton road. Marenne could be easily flanked, 
and our ridge along the Marenne-Menil-Hampteau line 
coulld be mad:e untenable, if the enemy had enough force. 
It was either retake Verd:enne or retreat. The decisi'on w1as 
to attack. 
From the shallow trenches outside Verdenne where our 
Third BattaLion lay, the doughboys could hear the Germans 
•Ceil,ebrating Christmas Eve. The Nazis had ·a merry Christmas 
Eve. Hitler had promised them that N~w Year's Day would 
find them standing at the English Channel. All that lay 
before them were a few Americans, a few inf,antrymen from 
the 334th Regiment. S·ome of the Germans we11e happi[y 
drunk. A few doughboys from I Comp.any's Second Platoon, 
hidden in a chickencoop in Verdenne, heard the laughter. 
The Americans outside the town were co'ld and apprehensive. 
German tanks were prob'ing the woods around Verdenne. 
L Company, 333d, and K Company, 334th, were designated 
to retake Verdenne. L Company, 333d, part of division 
reserve, was brought up through Bourdon, but the guide took 
an incorrect turning and brought the support too far to the 
left. They engaged in a fire fight with an enemy group 
moving through the woods toward Bourdon. 
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In the meantime, the A.rtillery had promised us all pos-
sible support. All available .artillery, including 'the chemical 
mortars, were mustered for the bauage. 
K Company jumped at 0100 Christmas Day 1944. ':Dhe 
artillery preparation had been so heavy and so thorough that 
the Germans were stunned. K Company's first wave, 13 men, 
overran the town, and its second wave mopped up Verdenne. 1 305 PW's were taken Christmas Day, all from the 116th 
Panzergrenadier. Many Germans were wearing American 
equipment taken when Rundstedt's divisions had captured 
American supply dumps. 
In the slow J.ight of Christmas day it was discovered that 
another threat to the Marche-Hotton road remained. Some-
time before the artillery preparation on Verdenne, another 
large force o:f Germans had moved behind our lines into the 
same wooded area between Bourdon, Verdenne, and Marche. 
The size of this pocket was not known. Parts of A and B 
Companies were sent to engage the enemy forces and report 
their strength. These small groups ran into heavy fire from 
armo.,r and infantry. Reinforcements were needed. 
Again, part .of the Division reserve was committed. A and 
B Companies, 333d, were to move on the pocket at 0300 
26 December in a night attack. These compani•es were 
repulsed and the pocket was further strengthened by German 
tanks which engaged our A Company the next morning and 
joined the pocket. 
This pocktet behind our lines was now a greater threat 
than the attack at Verdenne had been. German strength in 
this area totaled ove:c thirty armored vehicles and more than 
two hundred infantry. This group, had it wished, aould have 
seized MaDche 'lying a few thousand yards heilow, defended 
by parts of AT Company and ·Headquarters Company. It 
couM have taken Bourdon, severing the all-important 
Manche~Hotton road. For some reason, never explained, 
the Germans sat in the woods. This error killed the ma,jority. 
From a bare farmhouse on a treeless ridge across the road, 
the Third Battalion Headquarters was able to observe the 
exact position of the enemy. 
That day, 26 December 1944, was the wHdest day in ou1 
action in the European T1reatre. We beat off German attacks 
all day and an night. In the morning of the 26th ala troops 
were cleared from the area above Bourdon and an emergency 
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concentration was fired into the pocket. A ten millJUte barrage 
was fired in our support by 4.2 mortars, the 326th F'A Bat-
talion and our Cannon Company, a battalion of 155 mm 
howitzers, and a battalion of 240 howitzers. Tree !bursts, 
time fire, high explosive and armor piercing sheHs left 
wreckage never since equalled in .the regimental areas. The 
few Germans still alive tried frantically to regain their !lines. 
When our patrols went into the area at midnight, 200 Ger-
mans were dead, and 25 armored vehicles . were destroyed. 
The artillery was shi!fted to the threat on the left flank 
of the Third Battalion where Germans were engaging L Com-
pany, 333d. The art1llery dispersed this attack. When the 
artiHery stopped firing, the 3216th had only six rounds of 
ammunition left. 
'I'he defeat at Verdenne and the fiasco in the Bourdon 
pocket •Cost the Germans mor·e vehicles and men than they 
cou]d afford. Twke they had been within 2000 yards of 
their 'objectives, and twice numerically in!ferior American 
forces had stopped them. The German cry "Too much quan-
tity beat us" was not supported by faclls. The Regiment had 
met them understrength and had thrown them baJck. This 
was not all. Our third victory in four days took p!lace a few 
hours after the Bourdon pocket had been cleared. 
During the afternoon hours of the 26th the Germans 
struck at G Company in Hampteau, using a full battalion. 
Hampteau was in a valley. The Germans seized control oif 
one slope and a road leading into the town along the river. 
G Company fought back, driving the Germans off the ridge 
and to the r~ght. In the meanwhile F Company was brought 
from its reserve position in Hotton to iblotck a road leading 
from the hills to Hotton. The Germans s;lid off to the right 
and engaged F Company. Stecond Battalion Headquarters 
Company was the only reser·ve left to the Batta'lion. l t threw 
up a horseshoe defense at the juncbon of the road from the 
hills and the Marche-Hotton road. The Germans struck 
E Company shortly after hitting F Company. The Second 
Battalion was completely engaged along its ·MLR. The Ger-
mans penetrated the lines far enough to cut the Menil-
Hamptearu road. 
Meanwhiie another large force o'f German armor and 
infantry sudde:nily swung from the hills to the road between 
Verdenne and Marenne. This force swung into Marenne, 
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defended by a few L ComiJany men. It was useless to fight. 
The men hid 1in the houses when it became apparent the 
Germans were not going to stop in the town. These two 
forces had radio ,communication and were aiming to strike 
at Menil simultaneously from the right and front. Our 
forces in Menil ~were radioed to be prepared. E Company, 
a platoon of Anti-Tank Company, and I Company, 333d, 
were in town. 
In the tim:e it took for the German armor to trav·erse 
the distance to Menil "daisy chains" were set out, and a few 
riflemen moved to foxholes along the road. AiT Company had 
sown the area a·round Menil with mines, but the firmness of 
the frozen earth had made it imposs~ble to bury the charges. 
'Dhe only communication open wan a sma'll SCR 300 set 
manned by P:flc Raymond Beauchamp, and after the initial 
warning every set in the regiment and many in the division 
tried to pikk him up. A real fight was coming. 
Our meager plan was to allow the first tank to come into 
town where a bazooka team headed by Pfc William Ivler 
would knock it out. The second tank was to be "daisy 
chained" by a crew h1idden in a cellar. From then on it was 
anybody's fight. In the mearrwhile, the artillery had fired 
an emergency concentration of the Menil---<Hampteau road, 
forcing the Germans to come into Menil frontarlly. 
Beauchamp reported that the head of the cdlutmn was in 
sight. 1A motorcycle led the rco1umn, blinking a green 
headlight. When the column closed near the town the motor-
cycle allowed the first tank to pass. The first tank, earmarked 
for a bazooka sheH, tri·ed to make a small turn in the stveet 
and slammed against eleven anti-tank mines piled against 
the building. Sixty-six pounds of TNT went off. r:I'he tank 
was destroyed. 
,The German column began to depaoy. The few American 
rifleman opened up. Beauchamp went off the air "to catch 
himself a couple of Krauts." Led by the German ·infantry, 
the deployed ~tanks came to a mine field on the south edge 
of town. Their 1infantry did not warn them or did not see 
the mines. The first tank hit a mine and was knocked out. 
The second vehicle, a half-track, echeloned slightly to the 
rear, struck a mine a moment later and was knocked out. 
In qui·ck succession the rest of the column found mines on 
which to destroy themselves. Panic stricken, three halftracks 
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swung beyond the minefield only to destroy themselves 
in a secondary field in the southwest corner of town. As the 
balance fled, our artillery continued destroying more vehicles'. 
EXJcept for the mopping up, the battle was over. We had 
knocked out four Panther tanks, 13 half-tracks, and eight 
motorcycles and had captured over 100 prisoners. Argain 
Cannon Company and the 326th FA supported us so fully 
that only forty rounds were left when the battle was over. 
'I'hat was the last defensive action in the sector. We held 
Marche, ,even though the war map at SHAEF and in the 
Stars and Stripes had given it to the Germans on 22 Decem-
ber 1944. We were now ready to attack. 
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WINTER IN BELGIUM ATTACK 
The Germans had failed to reach the Meuse, out the 
Liege-Namur road, or take Marche. A slo·w withdrawal from 
the tip of the Bulge had begun by 1 January 1945 when the 
334th was moved from the Marche-Hotton sector aicross the 
Ourthe River. In the attack to i£oll01W, a coordinated drive by 
the 84th Division and the 2d iA.rmored Division, the 334th 
was initially in division reserve. 
The fight to drive the Germans from our sector in Belgium 
was a puzzling, difficult job. The fight was more often up and 
down than in a cOiffipass direction. Steep mountains were 
wooded so heavily ·that a fighter could not see ten ·feet ahead 
of his path. Fields o'f fire were correspondingly short and 
frustrated. Roads were icy and almost impossible to use. In 
many cases supplies were carried by hand. As the Germans 
retreated they had time to strew many anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines. The weather was the climax of hardship: 
thick snow lay over the countryside, masking the ground and 
freezing any unwary soldier who slept. From the infantry-
man's point of view it ·was an unsolvable problem. The fight-
ing called for a clear head and continuous use of intelligence, 
but ther·e was little chance for sleep. The tactiiCian had to 
think constantly in terms of ground ~levation and in a series 
of interlocking actions which would dislodge the enemy from 
positions of advantage. There is a popular saying that war is 
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like chess. If it is, we were playing three dimensional chess 
in the Ardennes. 
Our first objective was Consy Ridge overlooking Marcourt, 
a village due west of Marcouray. The second objective was 
Marcouray. If these two objectives were taken, the Germans 
would be tforced to cross the Ourthe at Marcourt under direct 
observation. There was also a chance to seal enemy forces 
against the Ourthe, north of Marcourt. The Second Battalion 
moved for Consy Ridge at daylight 7 January. 
Great amount of mortar, nebelwerfer, and sman arms fire 
from the objective and the ridge before it caused the attack 
to be delayed. It was here the Second Battalion lost several 
of its medical personnel, who, although plainly marked and 
in open ground, were shot do.wn by German mach1ine gunners. 
Consy Ridge was a key point in the German defense 
between the Aisne and the Ourthe, and the enemy was not 
disposed to withdraw without a fight. The ridge had held up 
the 84th's attack for several days. In an open field one ridge 
short CifConsytheSecondBattalion was met byfirefrom twelve 
machine guns on three sides. A ·courageous atta.ck was made 
across the open field into the woods from which the fire was 
coming, and the Batta!Jion overran the machine gun positions. 
Consy ridge was attacked the next day from the south, over 
an "1impossiblle" rear slope. On the 7th the Second was unable 
to secure the ridge because of tough opposition, exhausting 
terrain, and early darkness. The fire fight had lelft the Batta-
lion short of ammunition. 
At 1500 the same day the First Battalion moved from 
Daventave to Marcouray through 1a tick forest, assauLting 
Marcour·ay from the northeast at 1500. Captains Sam Adams 
and ·Earl Jackson led A and C Companies which came into 
the town against scattered and surprised resistance. The 
two companies used marching fire and entered the town 
a short time after the artillery 'lifted, capturing 36 vehicles 
and kUling 40 Germans. 
The road [eading into Marcouray was a driver's nightmare. 
The final vehicles of the First Battalion's convoy, ·two anti-
tank guns, slid off the road blocking traff.ic until morning. 
There was a sliver of an intermittent moon, otherwise the 
night was completely unlit. Sand on the road was partially 
helpful but two prime mov·ers and two tanks went over the 
side. Enemy artiilery was interd~ctory. 
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But the capture of Marco.uray eased the Second Battalion's 
prol)lem, for Marcouray flanked the fire which the Second 
was Deceiving. A continuation of the attack was succes•sfuL 
We had perfect observation into Marcourt and the bridge over 
the Ourthe. Occupation ·of Marcourt was not necessary but 
the Second Battalion sent a patrol into the town the next 
morning. 
The next objective was Cielle, a First Battalion target. 
Lt Ool Roland L Ko1b led the First Battalion from Marcouray 
to Cielle, and the Second Battalion moved into Marcouray. 
B and C Companies went ~nto the assault on Cieltle, with A 
Company in reserve. The men came through the 'WOods north-
west of Cielle, scrambling through the snow. SmaU arms fire 
was met, but the town fell witholtlt too mUlch trooble. A Com-
pany, in reserve, followed close1y behind to secure billets for 
the night. ,Immediately after Cieme was captured, the Second 
moved down the Marcouray-cielle road. The road was 
m·ined. Eleven vehicles passed over the miilles, one returned 
and was destroyed. Later the 309th Engineers removed fif-
teen mines from the road; several had the paint scratched by 
the tire chains on our vehicles. During the a>fternoon we lost 
the Regimental Commander, Colonel Chades E. Hoy, the 
Second Battalion Commander, Lt Col Joseph E. Williams, and 
the S-2, Major John J. Will'iams; all wounded. 
In spite of tremendous difficulties, plans were lbeing car-
ried out with continuous success. The attack was going for-
ward i.n a column of battalions; the First at Marcouray, the 
Second at Marcourt. The F•irst at Cielile, the Second at Hez 
de IHarze. We were like a fighter with two right hands. The 
enemy's retreat was constantly oU balance. We were pressing 
him faster than he liked: our efficiency in the attack was 
evidenced by the disproportionate amounts of mater•ial we 
were capturing. In the rear, our reserve battalion, the Third, 
was ready to take over after Hez de Harze. 
Hez de Harze was a mountain overlooking LaRoche. High 
ground is valuable because it allows observaticn into objec-
tives and because it decreases defilade for the enemy. Hez 
de Harze, three hundred feet albove LaRoche and 150 feet 
above CieUe had to be ·taken. '11he enemy knew we had to 
take it, and they knew the way we had to come. !They dug iri 
one hundred infantry on a carefully chosen position and 
waited for theSecondBattalion to swing around the road from 
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Cielle, left top. The directional arrow is over Hez de Harze. 
Bottom right, La Roche. 
5 
Christmas is a month late for Cpl Bob Reilly, Pfc Raymond Collarini and 
Cpl William C. Arnold of Cannon Company. 
Samree. 
Cielle. We called for artillery. H Company mortars and 
machine guns went to work. The doughboys belHed down ,in 
the snow and moved against the mountain, leaving grey-white 
trails where they slid in the snow. Meanwhile, the water-
cooled heavy ma·chine guns from CieHe went to work on the 
dug- in German .infantry and the supporting tanks. It was 
like a · fight between two skyscrapers: on one level, G Com-
pany crawLed up the mountain; above them in overhead fire 
went the bullets of the supporting machine guns. The Ger-
mans, even though on a higher level, could not stand the 
attack and pulled out. The Second occupied Hez de Harze 
which was so heavily wooded that LaRoche could not be seen. 
The men watched their sweat generated by the climb turn to 
ice, but at 1600 we he1d the mountain. 
The I and R platoon of Headquarters Company plus a 
squad from F Company reconnoitered LaRoche on the lOth 
of January. · 
By taking this high ground we had pinched ourselves 
against the Ourthe. The First Battalion remained 'in Cielle, 
the Second went to !Biron, and the Third relieved two batta-
lions of another regiment near Samree. Our positions were 
taken over by a Cavalry Group. 
It was felt that the Germans were holding a hard peri-
phery over a vacuum, ·consequently the next attack !Was aimed 
at breaking this crust. We wanted to take as much ground as 
possible in an attempt to meet the Third United States Army · 
driving from the south. Our two~battalion team was the First 
and Third. On our left, however, the "Hel!l on 1Wheels" 2d 
Armored Division was heM up at Wibrin and our attack was 
extended to two small towns on the south 1flank orf Wilbrin, 
Petite-Mormont and Grande-Mormont. 
We were not sure of what resistance lay before us. Divi-
sion Reconnarssance troops were assigned Berismenil, but 
could not get near the town. A patrol from the First Batta-
lion was sent forward to reduce a roadblock !but was caught 
in an anti--personnel minefield. The ·Third Battalion was 
ordered to take the roadblock the next morning and found it 
undefended. The Third Battalion moved through the woods 
while the First Battalion took high ground overlooking Beris-
menil. When the Third emerged from the woods., it was hit 
by a heavy concentration of artillery. The 'First was ordered 
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to take another high area closer to Berismenil while the Thir d 
attacked N adrin. 
The First Battalion took its objective on schedule, but 
enemy fire was heavier in the woods where the Third Batta-
lion was moving toward Nadrin. Naclrin was therefore assig-
ned to the First Battalion which took it the next day [ rom the 
northeast, while the Third bypassed through a creek bed to 
F-illy. The First drove through Nadrin to Ollomont and 
secured both towns while taking 150 PW's. Meanwhile, the 
Third was wading through snow waist high, forming a salient 
pointed at Filly . The 2d Armored again failed to take Wibrin, 
and had the First Battalion failed at Nadrin, the Third would 
have been in danger of encirclement. To make matters m ore 
complicated, hi:gher headquarters issued an order for the 
Third to split up and take Petite--Mormont and Grande-Mar-
mont in the 2d Armored's sector. L Company took Filly arlone 
while the rest O!f the Battalion veered for the Mormonts. 
It was dusk and the Third Battalion made a lucky error. 
It captured a small collection of houses north of the Mormonts 
and was forced to strike due south to capture its ·objective. 
The Germans had been expecting an attack from direction of 
Filly, west of the Mormonts. They were caught with their 
machine guns down the wrong road. The towns were s111bdued 
shortly before midnight. It was a record haul, five towns in 
a single day: Nadrin, Ol'lomont, Filly, Petite-Mormont and 
Grande:-Mormont, taken in bitter cold and deep snow. 
A 33-man volunteer patrol Ieft Filly in the morning of 
15 January 1945 to make contact with the Third Army. The 
Ourthe was crossed in rubber boats dragged over the snow 
covered approa·ches. Originally intending to meet the Third 
Army's patrol in an old barn near Grinvet, the patrol changed 
its plans because of the severely cold night. There w.as no 
reason not to investigate Engreux to see about the possibility 
of warm billets. When the town was found clear oif Germans 
(indicating that the Regiment could have pushed farther 
south had it been ordered), Lt Byron Blankenship bedded 
his patrol down for the night. Contact was finally made 
17 January 1945 while press correspondents and photo-
graphers, fully as numerous as the patrol members, spent the 
afternoon recording the meeting. 
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WINTER IN BELGIUM 
BEHO 
Armor was not too effective in the First Army counter-
attack on the north rflank of the Bulge. We had come to the 
aid of the 2d Armored in the previous campaign, and in our 
final action in Belgium, at Beho, we aided the 3d Armored. 
Roads were too s'lick, temperatUires too low, and forests too 
thick for tanks. ·A Sherman tank at a standstill is at best a 
dubious pillbox, and at worst draws enemy fire. The 3d Ar-
mored needed assistance in its drive agains,t the southern 
flank of St.Vith, the last German strongpoint in the Ardennes. 
We passed through the 83d Division. 
The 334th was moved irito position on 21 January. Beho 
was to be taken by a fairly complicated maneuver in which 
the Second Battalion was to swing .from Halconreux through 
the woods southwest of Beho, while the Third Battalion 
moved parallel to the Bovigny-~Beho road. The 333d Infantry 
also had Beho as an o:bjective in a drive starting farther north. 
The southern flank was cleared by the 335th Infantry, nucleus 
of Task For·ce Church. 
The weather was as bad as it had been in the previous 
phase of the campaign. It was an impossible problem for the 
intfantryman. Even with the best of care he stood a good 
chance 01f frostbite. Too much clothing would restrict him in 
an attack; too little would freeze him in the preparation. 
Physical exertion would make him sweat; rest would freeze 
the perspiration. Dry socks were passed out in chow lines and 
men wore a pair around the neck to keep them dry with body 
heat. Overcoats were discarded for many layers of clothing. 
Typically, a man wore two ·Or three wool undershirts, a wool 
sweater, two shirts, and a combat jacket. Some men precferred 
two combat jackets, one to wear normally, the other to be 
wrapped around the feet in stationary positions. Men let their 
hair grow long and slept with helmets on to gain the last 
possible heat. 
Both battalions moved out at dawn, 22 January. The 
Second ran through Halconreux with little difificulty, but in 
the woods between Halconreux and Beho the enemy had set 
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a defensive line of tanks and infantry which delayed the 
attack. This resistance seemed to be the right flank of a defen-
sive line established against the 335th Infantry. Although the 
Second was halted in its attack, it flanked this line by moving 
to the left, thus opening the defense and relieving pressure 
on the 335th. The Third Battalion had less trouble. By 1600 
it was prepared to attack Beho. It had moved along a road 
parallel to the Bovigny~Beho road and had found the enemy 
prepared to defend the primary road, but .flanked by the 
Battalion's line of march. The Battalion reduced the oppo-
sition and waited lfor the Second Battalion. The Second was 
late and the Third was ordered to take Beho alone. The Third 
BattaHon attacked at 1715 after a heavy artillery preparation. 
The town was captured and clear by 2000. The Second Batta-
lion moved into the southern portion of the town. 
The next mornin:g found the Second Battalion moving out 
to the high ground east of Beho. E Company had occupied a 
stone farmhouse when an enemy counter-attack moved 
against it. Tanks, 200 SS infantry, and artiller:v menaced the 
position. It seemed as if the company would be overrun. An 
artillery barrage was called when the German tanks were 
only seventy--'five yards away. E Company was totally com-
mitted; F and K Companies were on the way to assist when 
fire power turned the Germans back. This was the last action 
in Belgium, except for a holding action in the 75th Division's 
sector by our Second Battalion. We were the first to enter and 
the last to leave, an indication of our fighting ability. 
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OVER THE ROER 
After the Ardennes campaign the 84th Division turned 
north, back to the Ninth Army Sector. There was an old 
score to settle near Lind ern and Linnich. We had paid a ter ·-
rible price for the six miles between Palenberg and the Rocr; 
now it was time the Germans reached for the check. Beyond 
the Roer lay the Cologne plain; fiat ground with a road net 
which invited tank action. This plain was the initial objective 
of the Ninth Army's XIII Corps. It stretched for thirty miles 
1between the Roer and the Rhine, transversed by small 
streams. 
To protect the Roer, the Germans had blown several 
upstream dams which inundated the valley and forced us to 
put our plans aside for a few weeks. The dams were blown 
12 hours b efore our assault was to begin. During this time 
the Regiment established an assembly area in the vicinity o,f 
Waubach-Eygelshoven, Holland. It was the first rest the 
men had received since combat began on November 18th. Two 
theatres were maintained in Eygelshoven and one in Wau-
bach. Beer and Coca-Cola were trucked from Belgium. 
Although the move was m ade under secrecy-all shoulder 
patches and unit insignia removed-we were in the same area 
as that occupied by our r ear echelon t roops during the first 
month of combat. Old .friends billeted the men in neat Dutch 
houses. Many men felt as if they had acquired a second 
family, so friendly were the civilians. Ho'lland was starving 
and only half-liberated. Many straight-faced soldiers went 
through the mess lin~s two or three times each m eal, feeding 
79 
~ 
MILE S 
o 5 io 2 0 30 
PvRO'.-'?I"Yh'; ~.,~ 
I 
the family with whom they were billeted. The Dutch were 
friendly because we were Americans, infantry, and had been 
through their towns before. They ·were "Mama" and "Papa", 
and we were the "Vier und Achtsig Diviz." 
Thi:s friendliness had the effect of unveiling the secrecy 
with which the move had been made. "Berlin !Sally", the 
adenoidal traitor broadcasting from Radio Arnhem, welcomed 
us back to the Ninth Army front the day after our arrival 
and gave us the night's password. She had also ascertained 
our code name and joked about it. When the attack came, 
however, the Germans were surprised at its time, strength, 
and position. 
The 333d Infantry maintained the river line and we kept 
one battalion in reserve. Cannon Company took position and 
rotated its crews. 
Plans were laid carefully. Again, as in the Wiirm-MUl-
lendorf attack, the openin:g phases o>f the Prummern attack, 
and the offensive in the Ardennes, every possibility was an-
alyzed and every precaution taken. Boat drills were held on 
the Wiirm and Meuse rivers. 
The First Battalion crossed the R01er at 0330, 23 February 
with the 335th Infantry secure the Corps front, after which 
the 333d would pass thi'ough our positions. The artillery fein-
ted each night for two nights preceding the attack. Smoke 
was generated to mask the work of our combat engineers who 
prepared the bank for crossing. The enemy responded with 
nebelwerfer fire. 
The First Battalion crosse d the Roer at 0330 23 F ebruary 
1945 after the most intensive barrage of the war. C Company 
was on the left, A on the right, and Bin reserve. The artillery 
barrage was so violent that the enemy was unable to respond 
against the leading elements of the First Battalion. The 
crossing was smooth. Behind the leading elements TOW 
on row of weapons fired overhead support, from AA 50-
81 !nm mortars pounding the beach to knock out mines, 
through the 'l05 's, 155 howitzers and rifles, and our largest 
field pieces, the 240's. The artillery numbered 27 battalions 
in support of the Regiment. By 1400 the AA guns had fired 
three hundred thousand rounds from their positions. 
A and C Companies scrambled ashore and regrouped along 
a railroad parallel to the river. B Company, in reserve, met 
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stronger fire when it came across, but the leading companies 
were moving from the track by this time. The combat engi-
neers were unable to build footbridges for the Third Battalion. 
The right boundary of the First Battalion was Glimbach, 
an objective of the 102d Division. Glimbach was a risk. To 
assault Korrenzig from the south meant a chance that the 
First would !he flanked if the 102d did not reach Glimbach in 
time. As soon as B Company was across it was deployed 
around the town to protect the flank. At 0720 Korrenzig was 
taken against moderate resistance. By this time the enemy 
had discovered our crossing site and was shelling it heavily. 
The ·Third Battalion was crossing, to 'be followed 'by the 
Second, but there was no bridge as yet. 
Rurich was next. The attack went odif without artillery 
preparation. The First Battalion met small arms fire in the 
town, ibut secured it by 1415, a few minutes before the final 
elements of the Third Battalion were across the river. A foot-
bridge had been secured and a bridge for heavier equipment 
was under construction. The attack continued in inverse 
order of Battalions.: ·Third, Second, and First in reserve. We 
had secured the Corps bridgehead and were to widen the 
base by seizing Baal. 
The expected counter-attack was started by the Germans 
about 1500 in the 102d Division's area. We caught bits of 
a·ction, particularly stratfing from enemy air·craft who were 
after the heavy bridge near our area. The Third moved into 
Baal against light resistance 'but was met by three or four 
strong counter-attacks. The Rurich-Baal road was made 
untenable by German artillery and sniper fire, causing the 
Second to swing off into a wooded area on the right where 
they encountered and dispersed small forces orf infantry 
and tanks. 
The Third Battalion was heavily counter-attacked again, 
shortly before midnight. Baal crackled with small arms fire, 
as the Third Battalion's outposts were driven in. The Germans 
drove into the city, forcing the Third to fall back behind rail-
road tracks which bisected the town. There were a few b~ocks 
of disputed territory in which the Germans held one house 
and the Americans the next. In other instances, the Germans 
held the bottom floor and the Americans the top floors. They 
shot through the ceiling and we fired down. The Second Bat-
84 
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talion supported the Third. The fight continued into morning. 
Resistance was overcome. 
Throughout the first four days of combat we moved 
against spotty resistance to Granterath, Hetzerath and Mat-
zerath. Hetzerath was taken by the First Battalion. A com-
mand post twas established in a schoolhouse near the town. 
Suddenly six German TD's appeared, supported by infantry. 
Communications were poor but the radio attempted to reach 
the supporting artillery. 'The Battalion headquarters was 
reduced to Ml fire until artillery support arrived. The Third 
iBattalion again had its outposts in Granterath driven in, but 
the Germans were blocked. 
These counterattacks could not disguise the effectiveness 
of our position. All German resistance was uncoordinated 
and their attacks became weaker. Resistance to the front 
had ceased. We had :broken through. 
To exploit the breakthrough, Task Force Church, led by 
Brigadier General John H. Church, was formed. The Task 
Force which spearheaded the drive into the Cologne plain 
consisted of the 334th Infantry, the 771st Tank Battalion, the 
84th Reconnaissance Troops, with Anti-Aircraft and Service 
units attached. As Captain Charles Willson, S-3 of the Second 
Battalion, put it, "It was a new kind of front, twenty miles 
deep and one tank wide." 
ilt was hard for the doughboys of A Company to under-
stand their part in the action. Previously tanks hald been 
helpful, but it was an unwritten axiom to stay a respectful 
distance from them because they drew enemy fire. "My heart 
was in my mouth," said Pfc Royce MacDougal of A Company, 
"when they told us to get on the tanks. I reckoned we would 
go about three hundred yards before we dismounted. I felt 
like a movable day duck in a shooting gallery." 
1A Company went ten miles the first day of the break-
through. Behind the tanks stretched twenty miles of trucks 
carrying equipment and personnel. This was strange warfare. 
!'t hatd taken us d'our days to move 1100 yards across the 
Linnich-Lindern road; we were now covering the same 
distance in four minutes. It was a comfortable war, towns 
were taken which had electric light and dry rooms. One Ger-
man major was interrupted at breakfast by doughboys who 
took him and his staff just as they were sitting down. The 
hungry infantrymen finished the German breakfast. Com-
87 
This railroad station was a hotspot at Korrenzig, but L Company took over. 
These Germans are glad to quit at Hetzerath. 
30
9t
h 
E
ng
in
ee
rs
 m
o
v
e
 t
hr
ou
gh
 E
rk
el
en
z.
 
T
he
 t
w
ig
s 
o
n
 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
 a
n
d 
th
e 
to
rn
 
u
p 
tr
ee
s 
a
re
 
th
e 
re
s
u
lt
 o
f 
th
e 
a
rt
il
le
ry
 p
re
pa
ra
ti
on
. 
munications were in with the German rear, and a few men 
were calling Berlin to inform the German General Staff that 
the 334th was on its way. 
Our prisoners were of all classes: Air Force, Service, even 
a ifew sailors of the German Navy. They were searched and 
sent on foot to the rear of the convoy in a continuous stream. 
There was varying resistance to the front. The column was 
cut in half at one point when a bridge was blown. At Waldneil 
stronger resistance was met, necessitating the deployment of 
the First Battalion. 
The area around Waldneil was a refitting place for a Ger-
man paratroop army. We bypassed Waldneil a,gainst resi-
stance and took a few towns to form a perimeter defense for 
the night 27-28 February. The Germans were attempting to 
make a stand in this area for we found continually stronger 
resistance and a Nazi artillery unit moving up. We were not 
equipped to fight a night action, and this delay allowed the 
Germans to build strong defenses east of Waldneil. IT'he key 
to this defense was the position Eicken-Berg, two small 
towns straddling our route of advance. In the most brutal 
small arms fight oif the campaign, G Company kiHed 49 otf 50 
Germans in an assault which developed into a bayonet and 
hand to hand fight. 
All three battalions were committed in the perimeter 
defence near Waldneil, but after the Berg-Eicken fight there 
Wias little TesiS'tance. We had been advancing continually 
for six days without rest under the unduplicated tension of 
infantry attack. Nerves were raw, tempers immediately appa-
rent, but the combat efficiency built of previous battles did 
not depart. 
After the Waldneil fight the Third Battalion, led by K 
Company, moved to the f:pont of the column. iAt one po:int 
near BoiS'heim, when it was import&nt the enemy knew 
nothing of our approach, the Third Battalion used silent 
"commando" .tactics. Here 197 PW's were disarmed 1with<out 
a shot being fired. Communications to Boisheim were cut so 
the ala-rm would not be sp:r<ead. 
The Third Battalion raced in to Boishei'rn, completely sur-
prising the garrison. Resistance was haphazard and an artil-
lery unit was captured moving into position. We were so far 
front that it was necessary to halt and wait for the rest of 
the Division to catch up. Also, Task Force Church was dis-
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solved and the change of command required a shift in organi-
zation. We kept one company of our tanks. 
At 1400 2 March 1945 the First Battalion again mounted 
tanks, drove east, and took St Tonis. Strong antitank resi-
stance in the town kept our tanks buttoned up and the 
infantry hugging the ground. The tanks pulled into defilade 
but could not move. German infantrv went after our vehicles. 
T~e infantry riding the tanks fought off the Germans. C 
Company walked from St Tonis to Rolz. In the meantime, 
higher headquarters ordered a 90 degree turn to the north. 
We swung around the outskirts of Krefeld and made for 
Romberg, opposite Duisburg on the Rhine. From Krefeld to 
Moers was a slow task. 
The Germans were attempting to hold an area on the west 
bank of the Rhine at Wesel and our advance struck the flank 
of this "bridgehead". At daylight the Third Battalion passed 
through the First. The enemy defense around Moers took 
time for us to solve. 
On the southern outskirts of Moers the Second Battalion 
passed through the Third. Parts of both Battalions were 
resting in a large chateau near the town when the Germans 
counter-attacked strongly with artillery. It was a dark night 
and little could (be seen. The attack was principally mortar 
fire, but enough small arms was intermingled to signify a 
large force. Artillery support was called and fire dispersed 
over the area from which the attack was thought to be 
coming. The enemy pulled out in the direction of Moers. Our 
attack moved forward agarn. 
!The enemy made a strong fight near the outskirts: of 
Moers, holding up the Third Battalion. 'The Second Battalion 
was sent around the left of the force, but it was held. The 
First Battalion moved between the other two, artillery was 
used, and the enemy fell back from the southwest ·corner of 
Moers. In the southeast portion of Moers the Firs,t Battalion 
was halted by emplaced riflemen and machine guns in a 
skirmish line along the crest of a railroad. The \battalion 
flanked the opposition and continued. It was completely dark 
and the individual riflemen of the attacking battalions were 
in danger of losing flank contact. Every noise had become an 
enemy, and sleepless doughboys identified the shuttling black 
shadows of 1Moers and Romberg as hostile strangers. Moving 
across a deserted railroad net in darkness was a difficult job-
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The reserves close up to the Rhine. The Germans had a stiff 
defense along this railroad embankment. 
Resistance to the front has slowed up Task Force Church. 
and when the report came down that the First Battalion had 
encountered mines, even the earth seemed unfriendly. 
The infantrymen did not worry much about who would 
have the credit for reaching the Rhine. We had spearheaded 
the XHI Corps for 42 miles, collected 8500 prisoners and had 
fought continuously since 23 February. K and I Companies 
reached the Rhine 'abreast at 0100, 5 March 1945. F and G 
Companies, with a First Battalion patrol, came to the Rhine 
at 0420. The important thing was that we had reached our 
objective. The bridge was out, discontinuing our attack. 
The 334th had done all it had been asked. 
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THE RHINE TO THE ELBE 
Romberg was our first taste 01f military occupation. A 
.strict non-fraternization policy was in force, but the stay was 
r.elatively pleasant, for we had clean sheets, warm water, and 
long sleeping hours. We maintained 50% of two battalions 
on the Rhine River line, but there was only scattered action; 
a few shells, and scattered patrols. It was a difficult job 
Dccupying and holding the line. It was, as one soldier put it, 
"Get in ·the foxhole, but keep your shoes shined." The Ger-
mans were attempting to find out about us and they stared 
as often as we stared back. One thing was. obvious: ther·e 
were no Nazis in Germany. Every German told us he had 
hated Hitler for years, was glad the war was over, and had 
.several relatives in the States. There was no reason why the 
Germans and Americans could not get along, the war was 
going to be over soon, and i'f the Americans would only 
understand how baribaric Russia was, it would be easier for 
the Germans and Yanks to be friends. Their talk 'had little 
oeffect. 
A movie theatre was put into operation 400 yards from 
the Rhine but the friendly Germans found a way to com-
municate the position to their artillery across the river, and 
the theatre was bracketed. There were no casualties. Some 
friendly young German males were caught signaling a 
.strafing plane, pointing out the location of the Regimental 
Command Post. The Germans were terribly glad we were 
there instead of the barbaric Russians, but they lodged 
hundreds of complaints against the American soldiers at the 
local Military Government office. They fawned: be friendly , 
oean we do your washing, will you have a beer? 'But the men 
in F and G Companies remembered the plainly marked 
medics whom the Germans had kil1ed at Devantave. If a man 
wanted to remember, there were plenty of reasons to keep 
.away from the Germans. We carried out the non-fraterni-
zation program. 
The training also seemed incongruous to the men. They 
were taken from the front lines to class1es in familiarization 
with new weapons, hikes, :ballfields, showers, and critiques 
tOf past actions. Road mar·ches, calisthentics and organized 
] 01 
Liberated Italians, Russians, Poles and French start home from Lohne, Germany 
T fSgt Henry S. Yarborough, M3 under arm, rides herd on PW's in Moers. 
athletics were also conducted. We fired at targets of oppor-
tunity, generated smoke as a feint and sent patrols across 
the Rhine. 
German civilians were stopped and their papers examined. 
We took erght hundred prisoners in March, many of whom 
were soldiers hiding in civilian clothes. Everybody was wil-
ling to talk about German positions and arms, but it all added 
to the same thing: Germany "kaput," there are no detf.enses 
in Duisburg. One day the troops could see white tflags waving 
from the houses in Duisiburg, across the river. The next day 
the flags were gone. They appeared and disappeared through-
out the month. On the day three armies, the Ninth, British 
Second, and Allied Airborne, seized a bridgehead near Wesel 
the flags reappeared again and a daylight patrol 1from F Com-
pany was told by citizens of Duisburg that they would be 
happy to surrender. Within a short ti:me the 75th Division 
reported friendly troops across the Rhine, and Ruh:rort was 
taken by troops of the XVI Corps, pinching out the Second 
Battalion. 
In the last week of our stay, the Ninth Army crossed the 
Rhine at a point ·farther north in a movement which was later 
to envelop the Ruhr by meeting the First Army. Our Corps 
was. in reserve, to be committed when the XVI Corps swung 
south for the encirclement. ll'he British were across north of 
the Ninth Army bridgehead, and the 17th Airborne Division 
had been committed near Wesel to secure the bridgehead. 
The play was around another end. We could see only the 
interference: artillery and constant swarms of fighters and 
bombers. 
We were to move on 1 April, twenty-five days after 
arriving in Moers. The 335th was on the north, the 333d on 
the south, and we were the middle, behind the 5th Armored 
Division, the latter engaged in a slashing tank mov·e which 
prepared the way for the Infantry. Our job was to mop up 
scattered pockets otf resistance behind the leading elements 
and to preVJent the Germans from reforming after the tanks had 
moved through their positions. We crossed the Rhine 1 April 
and reached the Elbe 14 April, an advance of 250 miles in a 
fortnight. The Roer-Rhine advance had been a preparation 
for this move. 
The 334th Infantry became Regimental Combat Team 334 
when the 326th !FA., D Battery 557 AA1A, lst Platoon Co. B 
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H Company machine gunners walk 
unconcernedly through Hannover. 
The Jerries had this road zeroed in. 
A TD is knocked out, and a recon car 
of the 638th TD's moves ahead. 
309th Engineers, Co. B 638th TD Battalion, and Co. B 309th 
Medics were attached. 
We waited for one day in the vicinity of Erle, Germany, 
for the leading elements to clear Munster. Local security twas 
sent out and a captured hospital was guarded. On 3 April we 
made a move to another as1sem'bly area near Appelhausen, 
waiting for clear roads ahead. In the previous day's move we 
passed wreckage of the gliders which had 'Carried the 17th 
Airborne, part of the Allied Airborne Army. Gliders were 
strewn in every position and at every angle among the trees 
and fields of the assembly area. This was a spectacular sight. 
As we moved, the shiny 'brass lid over the German cess-
pool was taken away. Lining the streets in our path !were 
thousands of liberated Allies, prisoners of war and slave 
laJborers. This was the day for which they had been waiting. 
Many, including the 'Russians and the Poles, were headed 
west. Some stood on a street corner saluting every vehicle 
in a thirty mile ·convoy. They had saved their uniforms for 
this day, and although the weather was in a slow tu:rn to; 
German spring, they stood in full uniform including overcoat. 
When we halted they came to our trucks, telling us unbelie-
vable stories of suffering, of thousands killed and millions 
starved, of unm'entiona'ble cruelties. A !British soldier cap-
tured at El Alemein in Africa asked how we had ever built 
as much might as he had seen passing through. Sniffing the 
warm "C" rations and noting the frightened Germans around 
him, he begged us to take him along. "I'm still a fighter." 
·Munster was completely destroyed as we passed through, 
so puiverized that a mist o~f rubtble hung in the air. On the 
walls, punctured by shrapnel and small arms fire were the 
impo'tent German mottoes: "Our Victory is Adolf Hitler," 
"Germany Saves Europe from Bolshevism,' and later the 
explanatory "Germany is all Europe." The Germans stood in 
the streets or peered from windows from which a white rag 
was displayed. The white rags and the smell oif battle were 
good indications of how far away the front was. When we 
were dose the streets were deserted, a window would fly 
open allowing a white flag to be thrust out, and then be 
slammed. The smell of battle which we had learned so wc:ll 
at Prummern hung over the towns where there had been 
resistance. The usual procedure was to roll up to the town, 
announce over the loudspeaker that resistance was hopeless 
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The Rhine separates Romberg and Duisburg. 
L Company deploys at Buckburg. 
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and talk to the burgomeister. If the town resisted, it was 
flattened. If a sniper shot from a house, the house was 
burned down. 
We moved to Bad Oeynhausen 4 tApril1945 and found the 
bridges over the Weser blown. We were to cross at a :bridge 
in the 335th sector and take the north flank, which would 
put us on the north flank of the AEF. 
The Third Battalion 'led. The river crossing took all night 
5-6 April because of the steep approach on the opposite side 
of the river. The 'Germans had dug in on a wooded ridge 
and constructed a familiar type of road block near 
Buckburg. The Third Battalion flanked the block and the 
Combat Engineers removed the obstacle. ,Farther up the line 
of advance the Third Battalion ran into a strong enemy force, 
dug in and supported by self-propelled guns. L Company, 
leading the convoy, deployed. The resistance was very sti.if'f 
frontally, there were a few casualties, and the rest of the 
Battalion was thrown into the fight. This was the first action 
since we 'had crossed the Rhine. 
As the fight continued, it was apparent that the Germans 
had about 800-1000 men in prepared positions around the 
town. If we were to force Buckburg it meant that we would 
have to commit the major portion of the Regiment. Our 
mission at the time was to secure the bridges across the Leine 
River. The Regimental Commander decided to bypass Buck-
burg. 'Reconnaissance elements and tanks were sent around 
the left flank to discover resistance. There was little to be 
found. The First Battalion moved to the north with the rest 
of the Regiment following. Deinsen held up the tanks and the 
:First Battalion for a short while, but the town was cleared. 
The Third Battalion was ordered to disengage and follow the 
Second Battalion. This move prevented a delay of our forward 
movement, which meant the Germans would not have time 
for a stand elsewhere, and flanked Buckburg for the 335th 
which cleared it the following day. 
So completely disorganized were the Germans, and so 
dark was the night that enemy units attached vehicles to our 
,convoy. We did not see them nor they us , but a few were 
recognized when they attempted to pass through the convoy. 
Six or eight of them were riddled by pointblank fire .as they 
m oved through l()ur line. In the Tear of the convoy Cannon 
Company had converted an empty two and a half ton truck 
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into a PW cage. As we flushed Germans and motioned them 
to the rear, the men of Cannon Company put the Nazis in 
the truck. When the truck became too full it was unloaded 
at the nearest MP post. 
Th'e First Bat>tahon cleared Stadthagen by 0215, 8 April 
1945. We had been moving eontinuously all nig.h!t, 1an'd' the 
armor leading the column was manned by quiet soldiers. As 
the Germans slept behind blackout shutters they hea_rd the 
sound of our armor and did not hear any noises of battle. It 
was natural for them to believe the sounds they heard were 
their Panzer divisions moving about to meet the American 
offensive. The next mo.rning the civilians opened their 
shutters amazed1y . to find American soldiers building fires 
along the road and cooking emergency rations. A few 
soldiers knocked on the door and asked for warm water for 
coffee and shaving. Wehrmacht rear echelon troops wer·e 
awakened with varying gentleness from their lbeds, told to 
dress, and sent to PW cages at the rear of the convoy. Every 
house held a few soldiers, some of whom displayed discharges 
issued the day before. 
The Regiment was approaching Hannover. Originally the 
Germans had intended to defend Hannover strongly. The 
oute.r defense was to be conducted in the circle of small 
villages which surrounded the town. 
The defensive preparations were in varying depths, but 
our sector started twenty miles from the center of town. The 
enemy used every poss~ble weapon in the outer defenses in-
cluding batteries of flak guns. At one point A and C Com-
panies deployed over flat terrain against four batteries of flak 
guns. Cannon Company and the 326th FA were used in 
counterbattery fire. Although men were dropping, A and C 
Companies did not hesitate in the advance. The guns, manned 
by Italians commanded by German officers, were finally 
abandoned. At this time the Second Battalion was fighting 
slowly through Meyenfeld, BerenbostEll, and Stalingen. 
'At 2300 the Second Battalion was ordered to secure the 
bridges into Hannover. The German O!PiL had Engelbostel as 
one anchor, and it was through this town that F Company 
moved to take the bridges over the Weser-Elbe Canal. The 
tankswe.resent to the rear of the column becausetheyweretoo 
noisy for a night movement. The First and Second followed 
F Company at an hour's interval. The move was quiet. A 
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Duisburg, foreground. Romberg, background. 
771st Tankers found some resistance in Bielefield. 

German soldier approached the column and asked "Was ist 
das Companie?" "I'll be a crock .. .. !" shouted an E Company 
man. The German ran away. F Company bypassed several 
tanks and took the objectives. 
Hanno.ver was taken by all combat units of the Division, 
but our night work and drive the next morning made the 
jab easier than was expected. 'Second and Third •Battalions 
mounted tanks and trucks after the 309th Engineers had 
removed demolition charges. We tore into Hannover in the 
early morning hours of 10 ·April 1945. The Second Battalion 
trucks zig-zagged through the streets searching for resistance. 
The speed O'f our 'move flanked many German positions in 
the town. 
The streets were lined with refugees and Germans 
cheering our troops. The SS had organized the Volkssturm 
resistance, and then pulled out otf town, realizing the position 
was hopeless. The departure of the SS and the speedy drive 
of our 'Second and Third Battalions were signals to burn the 
Volkssturm armband, get rid of the panzerfaust, and hang 
the white flag from the window. We drove through the streets 
between five story tenement houses, alternately watching the 
civilians and the top story windows .which were excellent 
places for snipers. The First Battalion moved through the 
city and secured bridges for the next day's advance. RCT 334 
billeted in Hannover for one night. 
On 11 April 1945 we moved forward to Burgdorf a.lfter a 
short fight at :Altwarmbuchen. 
The fall of Burgdorf was a signal to change our tactics. 
The separate Battalions were sent on roughly parallel routes 
through the entire area oJ our advance. There was no danger 
in spreading the Regiment more thinly because resistance to 
the front had become little more than roadblocks, destroyed 
bridges and small bands of infantry. The terrain had !become 
wooded and hilly, offering more chance of concealment for 
the enemy. 
All the to.wns we passed through looked alike to the men 
on the trucks. Our casualties after Hannover did not exceed 
two figures. Near Flettmar the Third Battalion met a strong 
force of infantry, haltf-tracks, and self-propelled guns which 
veered off to the area where Service Company was billeted. 
This was part of Division von Clausewitz which operated in 
our rear for several days. Its attack was headed off by our 
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Third Battalion and the Third Battalion, 333d Infantry. The 
First Battalion had been ordered to the Elbe, attached to the 
5th Armored Division, to secure a bridgehead. When the Bat-
talion arrived at the Elbe, reeonnaissance sihow.ed that the 
Germans we had been chasing for 250 miles were across the 
river, prepared to fight. It would take more than a battalion 
of infantry to establish a bridgehead. At 2100 14 April, two 
weeks after crossing the Rhine, the Regiment was deployed 
near the banks of the Elbe River. We had made our last 
advance in the European Theatre. 
Generally, the Elbe front was quiet. The Germans attemp-
ted one counter-attack in the Third Battalion area but it was 
stamped down with artillery fire. We were dug in on the 
west side of the river. Our patrols showed that the Germans 
were along the levee on the east side of the river. We main-
tained outposts, laid trip 'flares and conducted all defensive 
measures. Behind us were few Allied troops. Our supply 
columns were attacked by a few German units which were 
later bottled in the Harz Mountains. A fully loaded mail 
truck was lost. 
The >Russian offensive near Berlin, ·only 50 miles away, 
sent a backwash of refugees to the German side of the Elbe. 
A few civilians and soldiers came across the river to us, 
seared, they said, by the hot breath of the Russians. We knew 
it would not be long before we met the Soviet forces. 
The prisoners came across in increasing numbers. A 
hospital on barges floated ,from Berlin by canal and tied 
at a wharf in the Third Battalion area. At first we took 
all who wanted to come across, but soon the far bank of the 
river was filled with frightened Germans. We could not 
permit civilians to cross, nor had we facilities for the wounded. 
Thousands of able-bodied German soldiers wanted to sur-
render. Whole German divisions marched to the river bank 
and obediently waited for boats to transport them. At times 
the Regimental PW cages held prisoners numbering three 
times the strength of the Regiment. When we ran short of 
diesel fuel .for the barges, the Germans drained the vehicles 
with which they had driven to the bank. Hysterical men and 
women stripped to swim the Elbe. Nazi propaganda had 
invented a ridiculous rumor that the British and Americans 
had declared war on Russia. Many asked if they would have 
to continue fighting the Soviets. 
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Several patrols were sent across the River to make contact 
with the Reds, but all returned unsuccesfully. First contact 
was made by the 69th Division farther south. At 1810 21VIay 
1945 contact was made in the Third Battalion sector when a 
Russian captain rowed across to make liaison with American 
Headquarters. Later in the day the Russians closed up along 
the Elbe, ending our campaign in the European Theatre of 
Operations. 
VE day was announced five days later, an ·official end to 
the fight. We had gone seven thousand miles lfrom Claiborne 
and Howze, and had changed a mindful of ideas in seven 
months of com!bat. It was over, and many of our friends were 
dead. That was the principal feeling when VE was announced. 
The men had gone into battle as tutored civilians, and had 
come out as succesful veterans in a crack regimer..t. ·We had 
done a good job. We were glad it was over. 
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Twentq separate units make up a regimen.f. 
Consequently twenty separate histories make 
up a regiment's history. In the process of 
selection and compilation many episodes 
were regretfully put aside because of tech-
nical limitations. To compensate, each com-
pang has submitted one story it believes 
should be told, taken from the mass of 
incidents which make its history. 

WALDNIEL 
Our second day of the spearhead from the .Roer to the 
Rhine was almost as eventful as the first. Company A men 
won't forget W aldniel. 
After our first day on tanks we stopped at what we called 
the "Model Village." We spent the night under shelling from 
Jerry. We were all pretty fagged out after the day we had 
just gone through, but Jerry didn't want us to get any rest at 
all. We stuck it out okay. 
The ,following day we were to push off again through 
W aldniel and towards the Rhine. The town of W aldniel was 
supposedly in friendly hands. 
·We approached the town through a low cut in the road . 
Hell cut loose. The heavy boom of a panzerfaust soundEd and 
the Jerries scored a direct hit on the lead tank ridden by 
S /Sgt Charles 'Slifco, Sgt Paul M. Vasington and P'fc Rober t 
L. Curtis. 
Another tank had tried to break through and was knocked 
out farther down the road. Three tankers were wounded and 
had takEn cover beneath the tank. Between us and the tankers 
was approximately 150 yards of open road covered by deadly 
machine gun fire. The tankers needed help badly and A Com-
pany had to get to Waldniel and knock out the opposition. 
T /Sgt James W. Kuykendall, acting first platoon leader, 
Lt Myron Henitzman and T/Sgt James A. Strodel, platoon 
leader and platoon sergeant of the second platoon, quickly 
deployed their men on each side of the road. The third 
platoon, led by Lt Richard K. Hawkins, was rushed forward 
to give help. 
A dugout just at the edge of the clearing was manned by 
several Krauts with bazookas and ri'fles. Sgt Kuykendall and 
Sgt Mack L. Morris went after it with guns blazing and 
grenades flying. Six Germans surrendered; three died. 
Sgt Kuykendall and Sgt Morris advanced to the burning 
tank for temporary co.ver. Sgt Kuykendall called for iSgt 
Morris to take up a firing position to relieve some of the 
pressure on the tankers. Sgt Vasington and Pfc Otha G. Smith 
rea·ched the wounded tankers and dragged them to the 
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comparative safety of a nearby ditch where ,they gave 
them first aid. 
The attack on the buildings and trenches was launched. 
Pfc Curtis slammed a bazooka shell into the building from 
which the most fire was coming. Some Germans retreated to 
the trenches in the rear, some chose to stay and hold out. Pfcs 
Thomas Fabiano; Elrey Phaup, and Fred R. Pritchard assaul-
ted thos,e remaining in the house with grenades and rifle fire, 
capturing several Germans. Sgt Strodel brought his platoon 
around to the right. A machine gun burst wounded him. 
Sgt James H. iFoster took his squad around to the side of a 
building and ran into another machine gun. Before the gunner 
could collect his wits, one of the boys in Foster's squad shot 
him. The other gunner surrendered. 
By now we had all the houses, but most of the J erries had 
retreated to the trenches behind and were pouring it on us. 
Sgt Morris after an effective banage of grenades and small 
arms fire from the house led an attack against the trenches. 
When he reached the head of the trench he lobbed a grenade, 
killed sev,eral Krauts, and everyone cut loose. It was then 
that Jerry started to get wise. 125 Germans were in the 
trench when we started. When we finished about half came 
out with their hands up screaming "Kamerad". The rest were 
in the trench to stay. 
We then dug in and secured the town. Jerry loihbed 
in a lot of shells and pulled a counter-attack, but it failed 
and our lines held. We were ready to push on again for 
our next objective. 
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S/Sgt Manuel De Ferreire - Cpl Jack Ecroyd - Sgt Raymond L . Gould 
Lt Richard K. Hawkins - Lt Myron H. Heintzman 
THE BATTLE FOR LEIFF ARTH 
Every campaign can be broken down into many stories. 
Stories of regiment, battalions, companies, platoons and 
individual soldiers. The story that stands out prominently 
in the minds of the men of B Company is the battle f.or the 
town of Leiffarth. In pre-war Germany the small town was a 
whistle stop but during the Siegfried battle it was a link that 
the enemy gave up only after a fanatical defense. 
The original plan was for B Company to assault, take, 
and hold ,the high ground in fmnt of Leiffarth. This ac-
complished, A and C Companies were to move .through and 
take the town. Capt AlC!ee L. Peters, Jr led the company 
out of the tank trap IP at 0700 the morning of 1 December 
with the fi'rS't platoon on the right, the third on the left 
and the second in reserve. Adv,aneing only four or five 
hundred yards after a five minute artillery preparation, the 
entire company was checked by murderous machine gun and 
88 fire from six dug-in German tanks and two pillboxes. 
Supporting the enemy tanks were mortars and artillery. 
Casualties were very heavy in this encounter and the 
attack was momentarily halted. The light machine guns 
manned by Sgt Raymond S. Stahler, Pfc Charles W. Black, 
Sgt James G. Watson and Pfc Charles W. Chambers returned 
fire effectively until a direct hit k:illed Pfc Stahler and 
wrecked the gun. Mortarmen Sgt Delbert A. Sloan and Pfcs 
Harold A. M. Shock and Enoch J. Sellars badly damaged one 
of t he enemy tanks. 
The men rapidly dug in and by noon the sector was pretty 
quiet until it was decided to advance again to take the high 
ground. Under the leadership o.f T/Sgt Clyde W. Montgomery, 
the first platoon set out at the appointed time to accomplish 
the mission but the fire was so intense that Capt Peters 
called them back. 
In v:iew of the heavy casualties and the apparent strength 
of the enemy, the attack was delayed until 3 December after 
two nights and one day in the foxholes. On 1300 of D-Day 
the first and second platoon assaulted while the third was in 
reserve. A five minute preparation preceded our advance into 
the town, and we followed the artillery barrage by seventy-
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five yards. We so surprised the enemy that our entrance into 
the town did not prove too difficult. 
The mopping up was accomplished quickly under the 
platoon leaders., S/iSgt Ira D. Munday, Lt H oward Buchanan, 
Lt Tomlinson C. Ulbricht, and T/Sgt John Simco. T/Sgt 
Addison Me Clung led a small group into the neighbming 
village of Wiirm, captured fifteen prisoners and a mortar, 
but withdrew. 
As soon as Leiffarth was taken, a defensive line was dug 
at the edge of the town and buildings were selected for the 
Company CP and aid station. S /Sgt Robert O'Horo was killed 
at this time as he was preparing the defenses. By the time 
the reorganization was complete, the enemy was shelling the 
town heavily and any movement was extremely hazardous. 
It was not until after dark that communications could be 
established and contact maintained between all units of the 
company. Runners Pfcs Leslie 0. ·Fulton, Delbert A. Gwi.nnup, 
Walter H. Mitton and Arthur W. Jacob, Jr were kept busy 
throughout ,the operation. In the meantime, C Company 
moved into the town and helped to strengthen the defens.e 
by filling in the gaps in the line. 
During the night it was impossible to bring in ra·tions or 
water and at 0400 the enemy launched the first of several 
counter-attacks. Throughout the night tanks were hear d 
rumbling in the distance and as the sound grew closer. the 
men grew more alert. ·Aided by the "artificial moonlight" 
provided by mammoth searchlights, we finally spotted the 
tanks some hundred yards away. Backing up the tanks were 
about one hundred riflemen. Our men fired at the attackers 
but the direct fire from the tanks' guns proved to b·2 too much 
for the doughs and the majority of the third platoon with 
several men from the first and fourth platoons were taken 
prisoner. This left open our entire left flank. The enemy was 
stopped, however, by very effective artillery and mortar fir e. 
Pfcs Walter R. Davis and Howard Rasmussen, the two radio 
operators, played a most important part in stopping this 
attack by staying at their radio throughout the night. Davis 
had received a face wound during the attack but refused 
treatment until saf·ety was assured for the company. 
The next morning TfSgt Addison McClung and Sgt Lewis 
F. Newsom took the remnants of the third platoon and, with 
a machine gun section from D Company, filled in the gap 
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T /5 Terrell Teuts ch 
Sgt Charles Chambers - S jSgt Hughart Stump - Sgt Cecil Brown -
Pfc Walter Mitton 
Pfc Walter Davis - Sgt George Johnson - Pfc Arthur Jacob 
Pfc Edwin Rosenthaler - Sgt Joseph Vierra - Pfc Charles Carter 
T jSgt Addison McClung 
created by the capture of the men. Th:at night Sgt George N. 
Johnson, Jr made two perilous journeys back into our lines 
to obtain reinforcements; ·an armored infantry company from 
the 7th Armored Division. 
Except for enemy patrols, the next few days were rela-
tively quiet. Lt Buchanan led one our own patrols ·into 
Wiirm but heavy machine gun fire forced them to return. 
Fortunately, the supplies of foodstuff were sufficient and 
they supplemented the C :and K rations brought by Htter 
bearers and mortarmen. Pfc Joseph P. Vierra, utilizing 
available supplies of food in the town, kept the men from 
hunger with at least one hot meal a day. Pfcs William L. Des-
marais, Ford 0. 'Roan, Samuel C. Carone and CleonA. Nelson 
came up from the kitchen and supply area to act as litter 
bearers. 
The following night under mortar fire, we withdrew from 
Leiffarth to return to Geilenkirchen for a much needed rest. 
We all thought that the Leiffarth incident was closed, but 
after three days in Geilenikirchen, we again headed for the 
dreaded town. The heavy losses inflicted on us were reflected 
by the handfull of men who embarked on our second trip to 
Leiffarth. We started back with visions of a terrible stay in 
the town, and we were right. The next night the enemy 
launched the most vicious counter-attack we had eve.r seen. 
At 0400 S/Sgt Munday and Pfc Richard C. YoungbLood 
were standing guard at a listening post on the edge of the 
town when a movement was heard coming from WiiTm. It 
proved to be a company of Germans, and the two guards 
immediately woke an ·AT crew in the basement. The enemy 
stopped near the listening post after setting off a trip flare. 
Pfc Youngblood threw a grenad€ in their midst causing many 
casualties. Using all the weapons available, the two men 
completely confused the attacking force. Only after the 
enemy had damaged the house, were they finally repulsed. 
In another part of town the attackers gained entrance into 
CharLey Company's CP but they were also frorced to with-
draw after having caused many casualties. 
All this time Capt Peters was directing artillery on the 
German force. The results of the attack were disastrous to 
the Germans who lost 70 percent of their force. After daylight 
Pfc Gerald E. Rosenfeld and Pvt Fred A. Lesser, under a 
white flag, went into a mine field to remove enemy wounded. 
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Medics T /5 Terrell Teutsch, Pfc Samuel Gionourakos, and 
Pvt Virgil L. Parker worked tirelessly troughout the entire 
action, oa·ring for their wounded comrades. Several · times they 
ventured to the dug-in posHions through merciless artillery 
poundings to carry litter patients to safety. 
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T/0 strength for a ri'fie company is 193 men, including 
officers. When Charley Company counted off after the nqn-
stop ride to Belgium, there were only 67 men to answer 
"here" to roll call. 
No one knew anything about the disposition of the enemy 
or the direction from which his attack would come. Tactically, 
we were blind. To give the Regiment eyes and to warn of the 
German's approach, Charley Company, one third strength, 
was chosen to be the outpost company. We were sent 2000 
yards ahead of our main line of resistance to build and man 
on outpost line on the f,orward slope of a ridge running parall-
el to , the lines. There were five outposts, commanded by 
Lt Henry C. deGrummond, Jr. Each observation post was 
placed before a town. Communications were installed on 
22 December and we waited for Jerry to show up. 
We didn't have to, wait long. At Outpost Two on the 23d 
appeared a German lieutenant on a motorcycle. S/Sgt Am-
brose Cerrito's crew covered him with rifles and forced him 
to surrender. The documents we secured from him gave us 
our first information as to the units and direction of the 
German attack. Shortly after we had taken the German, we 
were warned of the approach of an enemy armored column 
and Outposts One and Two withdrew to Verdenne. 
On the 24th we were at Outpost Two when the Germans 
shelled us heavily. Again, an armored column, part of the 
force which took Verdenne, swung up to the outpost. S/Sgt 
Al.'bert F. Goetze reported the enemy to higher headquarters 
and moved the personnel back. We were cut off from Verdenne 
and somewhat confused. A truck from Anti-Tank Company 
was taking off like a big, fast bird, but the driver stopped 
long enough for us to crawl on. About a mile farther we were 
stopped by an officer whlQ. told us to dig in. We helped K Com-
pany seal off the German penetration. 
So far •the attacks had lbeen at the right flank. On the 25th 
the Jerries hit our other flank, guarded by Outposts Three, 
Four and Five. Seven Kraut tanks and supporting infantry 
overran Three, capturing S!Sgt Maxie Horner and Burt L. 
Giese. OP 'Three was in touch with Regiment by radio. We 
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could hear him: '''There are German vehicles approaching, 
blinking lights. They are supported by infantry, but I can't 
tell how many. They are past me on the left. They have 
flanked me on the right and are opening fire. We are sur-
rounded and their fire is getting heavier. Shutting down." 
Outpost Three was captured. 
Outpost Four spoUed a heavy reconnaissance patrol, 
complete with vehides. Our elements in Hampteau were 
notified :and the patrol •withdrew. 
On the 26th T /Sgt Walter C. Erickson and his crew at 
Outpost Four again spotted a heavy German attack. Simul-
taneously Outpost Five, commanded by Sgt George H. HalL 
was !hit by heavy forces. Lt deGrummond was heading 
a patrol to regain contact with Outpost Three. Later we were 
told that we had sent back warning of an attack of battalion 
strength. Outpost Four knocked out a Jerry jeep and armored 
recon car. It was too hot to handle and we again withdrew, 
to Hotton and later to Bourdon. The Regiment had been 
prepared for every German attack by the work of Charley 
Company, the eyes of the 334th. 
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SjSgt Ambrose A. Cerrito - Pfc James A. Corr, Jr. - S jSgt Anthony De Andrea 
Pfc James M. Jennings- T /5 Eugene c. Peckham - Sgt Glenn E. Slusser 
Lt Layton Smith- TjSgt George H. Hall - T /4 Elro-y Homuth 
Sgt Joseph G. Curtis Pfc William H. Corwin - T jSgt Curtis C. Robirds -
Sgt Norbert C. Burlinsky 
RED-LETTER DAY 
OBJECTIVE: Hetzerath 
D Company, under command of Capt Theo E. Kerhulas, 
red-lettered 26 •Febr uary 1945 for the battalion ass1au1t on that 
German town. 
With the first platoon attached to A Company, the second 
platoon to C Company and the mortar platoon in battalion 
support, Capt Kerhulas moved into. the attack with the for-
ward command group. From this position they directed the 
deplo.yment of the company and effectively established the 
perimeter defense later set up by the weapons. 
lfhe first platoon moved with A Company north along 
the main road to the town. <Receiving small arms fire from 
the right flank, the platoon cut across a gully toward the 
town cemetery. •Pfc James F . Maloney was killed by small 
arms fire in this action. From a position to the right of the 
cemetery, •the platoon emplaced its ·three guns and offered 
direct fire on Germans and on two strong points. 
Lt Varnum scouted the approach and located a strong 
point on the right. The platoon then moved forward to the 
center of the town, one squad at a time. SgtRobertW.Staples 
took the first squad through an open field to the left flank. 
S /Sgt Joseph J. Barron led the remaining section while being 
covered by S/Sgt Clifford •D. Leguin and Pfc newey L. Crisp. 
Leguin, while giving this covering ·fire, received a burst of 
enemy fire and was wounded. 
In the town Pfc Loren V. Richardson was wounded in 
attempting to fire on ·the German strong point on the right. 
1The platoon set up northeast of Hetzerath in perimeter 
defense after the complete capture of the town. 
Under T/Sg·t Vints E. Shumate, the second platoon moved· 
to thigh ground before Hetzerath in support of C 'Company. 
From this position, under the direction of S/Sgt Joseph L. 
McCarthy, two guns opened fire on entrenched Germans. 
Overhead fire was laid until the progress of C Company 
masked the support. 
In the evening Pfc Roger R. Yeatter was wounded by 
concussion during a shelling prior to a German counter-
aHack. Pfc Samuel M. Brandli led ·the opening of fire on the 
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attacking German infantry and the machine guns were effec-
tive in the stopping of the attack in this sector. 
'The 8lmm mortar platoon was in position in Baal. 
Until the final phase of the assault on the objective they 
had done very little firing. As the line companies prepared 
to jump off, S/Sgt Michael L . Kordeleski, forward observer, 
called a barrage from all six guns on the near side of Hetzer-
ath. The weapons were being used at extreme range. The 
quota of ammunition to be used was to have been thirty 
rounds per gun. However, the second section, under S/Sgt 
Ernest A. Trowbridge, was limitlessly supplied by H Com-
pany and continued to fire until the cease fire order which 
was given fifteen minutes ad'ter the barrage started. 
<Lt Williams S. Miller, Jr, Lt Lester C. Kendig, and Cpl 
James H. Schaub had moved forward before the barrage 
started to investigate a route of approach to Hetzerath. 
A route was found which necessitated hand-carrying the 
weapons. Cpl Schaub was sent to the Baal position 1to guide 
the platoon forward. 
The mortar platoon moved into positions on the southeast 
side of Hetzerath while under small arms fire from a German 
strongpoint on the right. In this position they were rejoined 
by forward observer team of iS/Sgt Kondeleski and Pfc Wil-
liam R. Huber. The weapons were then set up for a perimeter 
defense of the town. Our fight was over. 
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"' ROER CROSSING 
At the time of the crossing of the Roer River, ·Head-
quarters Company, First Battalion, played a large role in the 
initial waves. Close coordinaHon with the rifle companies 
was essential, and each man was throughly rehearsed on the 
part he was to play in. the op·eration. Sand tables prepared 
by the Ba'ttaliton S-2 Section under the guidance of 1st Lt 
Robert H. King, assisted by S/Sgt Arthur Bouret and Pvt 
Kenneth Rowan, clearly showed the terrain and. enemy in-
stallations of the east bank of the Roer. From 'the Battalion 
OP on the west bank of the river, S-2 personnel noted· each 
detail and movement of the enemy forces and installations. 
No details were le:H to chance. Each building in both 
Korrenzig and Rurich, the initial towns to be assaulted, 
were numbered to aid in hasty identification and to faC'ilitate 
movement. 
Just after dark on 22 February, a detail from the Am-
munition and Pioneer Platoon under ' the command of 2nd 
Lt Clarence F. Rhea and consisting of T/Sgt Woodrow W . 
Arceneau, Sgt J:..ewie A. Burner, T/5 Thomas B. Weaver, Pvt 
Roy C. Call and several men from the AT platoon set out 
for Linnich to sandbag the second floor o.f the old slaughter-
houS'e on the bank of the river. They piled 317 sandbags 
during four enemy mortar barrages, which on one occasion 
came so close as to dislodge the piled :bags and cause a 
temporary halt in the operation. But the crew completed 
the task in just under three ;and a half hours. 
The rest of the company, which was billeted in Leiffarth, 
made last minute checks of equipment and tried to snatch 
a few hours .sleep. At 2300 S/Sgt Miguel R. Nieves and his 
kitchen crew put aut hot coffee, doughnuts and hot cakes 
as the last hot meal that the boys would get for a long time. 
Shortly after ch01w each man made the final check of his 
equipment and prepared t'O move up to the river. . 
At 0245 the artillery shattered the night with a 45 minute 
barrage which plastered the river bank and swept over the 
surrounding area and into the towns of Korrenzig and Rurich. 
The first wave of the "Fightin First" piled into the assault 
boats promptly at 0330 and started through the smokey dark-
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ness to the other shore. Headquarters Company had its boats 
mixed with the boats of the rifle companies. AT had two 
bazooka teams in the first wave commanded by Lt Richard 
M. 'Deasy, consisting of S/Sgt Baldwin T. Cecchini, and Elra 
L. Faulkner, Pfcs John J. Flynn, Ralph A. Gaeta, James B. 
Smith, Douglas J. Harvey, Norman T. Haskins, Fidele 
Marinone and Robert N. Gessner. Each of the ammunition 
bearers carried four rounds of ammunition to make 12 rounds 
for each bazooka. The second Headquarters boat carried 
the wire teams whose task was to pick up the lines at the 
rivers edge and string them from the boats to the other side. 
Two wire teams were made up of S/Sgt Clinton R. Caudill, 
Sgts Byron McAllister and Charles H. Spencer, T/4 John P. 
Dzuray, T/5 George P. Morley, Pfcs Robert J. Herman, Law-
rence H. Carter, Henry A. Darrah, and Charles F. Rockford. 
The wire crews quickly spliced the line and successfully laid 
it across the river from the assault boat while under enemy 
fire. Upon reaching the other bank, Sgt Spencer's crew 
remained nea:r the water's edge to repair severances. 
The second wave brought two more bazooka teams from 
the ·A1T platoon led by TfSgt Joseph Cosari, Jr., and consisting 
of S/Sgt Larren B. Davis, Cpl Sid L. Conrad, Pfcs Elmer G. 
Webb, William H. Rogers, Robert E. Anderson, Edward R. 
Mello, Robert M. Newbill, Alejandro Zamora, William G. 
Williams and Billy A. Ford. The second crew carried 
antitank mines in ·addition to their ammunition. On the 
other side, both teams united and followed along behind 
Baker Company, skirmishing along the way and blasting 
enemy dugouts. Once in the town of Korrenzig, they set up 
the anti-tank defense of the town in conjunction with the 
rifle companies. 
The radio section of the company was posted in the 
slaughterhouse by the river and as soon as the assault troops 
were aaross and the foot bridge in, the men carried their 
300 radios to join the assault of the t!'oops dr:iving on 
}(iorrenzig. T/4 Glen 0. Odman crossed over and set up a 
relay with the CP in Linnich ·and later went on into 
Korrenzig after the town was taken. ·T/ 4 William A. Keller, 
Pfcs Thomas H. Stone, Jr., and Edward T. Ledd hand-carried 
the command 284 to the other side of the river over the foot 
bridge and set up operations along with the command group. 
S/Sgt B. F. Lancaster handled the radio jeep with the other 
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284, and_set out across the treadway with the first vehicles to 
race up the road through Rurich and join the attack. 
The remainder of the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon 
handcarried mortar ammunition across with the second wave 
and followed closely over the shell swept terrain to turn the 
ammunition over to Dog Company in Korrenzig. rThe group 
consisted of Sgts George S. Hutchison, Marvin C. Halloway, 
Pfcs Clarence Breaux, Guadelupe V. Arredo.rido, Tillman W. 
Dean, Howard Allgeier, Jr., Lawrence H. Finley, Nelson B. 
Marcy, Leroy E. 'Barnette, Roy IT. Dunn, Elo A. Mueller, 
R. A. Alvin Camp, Emerson J. Haug, JosephS. Polinsky, Jr., 
and Lloyd Straub. Eeach man was burdened with six 
rounds of 81mm Mortar HE light and any fragment could 
have touched off these rounds. 'All the men reached Korrenzig 
saifely, turned o.ver their ammunition, and set up an ammuni-
tton dump in the .town while waiting for T /Sgt A:rceneau 
to come across the treadway with the ammunition trucks. 
Thus Headquarters Company and their specialized' pla-
toons played a large part in the operation and aided mate-
rially in assaulting the Nazi river stronghold. The '"Fightin 
First" with a highly coordinated attack had secured initial 
objectives and was on the move again. 
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BATTLE OF BEHO 
From a wooded assembly area deep within the h eart of 
the Ardennes on 22 January, Easy Company moved out in a 
night attack. Although the men were veterans of many battles 
and knew well the enemy they were about to engage, they 
were g.lad to be moving after spending cold, miserable hours 
in foxholes. 
We had gone only a short distance when our supporting 
tanks were forced to fall back because of icy roads and deep 
snow drifts. Easy Company men then realized that this next 
battle would 1be typical of the Belgian battles: thick woods 
with the Jerries holding inme favorable positions. It was 
snowing much harder now and the infantry continued· the 
attack down each side of a iheavily mined road. 
rFrom distant high ground we drew artillery fire, and the 
battalion commander decided on an alternate route. This 
route afforded us excellent concealment but carried us 
through heavy woods and deep snow. Sixteen hours after 
our jump-off we found our way into Beho, arriving at 0100 
on 23 January. 
We barely had time to eat a "K" ration and get partially 
thawed out before we pushed off again at 0500. Weary, cold, 
and hungry doughs were ordered to continue •the attack 
after spending over 20 hours exposed to the elements of 
an Ardennes winter. 
Our orders were to dig in on the high ground about a 
1000 yards outside of Beho but before we re~ched this ridge, 
we were fired upo.n by German outposts. Lt James V. Morgia, 
th~ executive officer and acting company commander, ordered 
an immed.iate attack. The Germans were completely sur-
prised and were unable to man their previously dug positions. 
The second platoon actually bypassed some Germans who 
were s.leeping in ·the buildings of the Mansion Neuve Mona-
stery. These were easy prey for our riflemen, although in the 
darkness it was difficult to distinguish them from our own 
men. Everyone was shouting and orders could be heard in 
Doth English and German. 
We ran into machine gun fire from tanks and infantry 
forcing us to withdraw into a barn. About twenty Germans 
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in the barn fired at us, but our surprise and superior po.wer 
forced them to retreat via the near door toward some tanks. 
Even though these Jerries were armed with automatic 
weapons, in the confusion that followed they were afraid to 
fire, and chose to follow their tanks. Meanwhile S/Sgt Walt·2r 
E. Wright crawled into the barn after neatly disposing olf a 
well concealed machine gun nest firing only thirty feet from 
were he was lying. He scored a tree burst directly over 
this enemy position 'with a rifle grenade. Small arms fire 
came into the barn from three sides. S/Sgt William H. Lump-
kin Jr. had his steel h elmet shot fr;om his head while placing 
his 1BAR man at an upstair window. We won the first phase of 
the battle by occupying the enemy's positions; however, our 
company was disorganized. The second and •third platoons 
had lost their platoon leaders, Lt Marvin W . Jamison and 
Lt Clyde S. Laurant Jr. 
Sergeants resumed command and we reorganized, treated 
our wounded, and set up a defense for an expected counter-
attack. The Germans counter-attacked twice, firs•t with in-
fantry and then with tanks. The first attack was repulsed 
with rifle and BAR fire. As BAR's barked from the second 
story windo,ws, enemy tanks begain using their 20mm high 
explosive shells in the second attack on the stone buildingS\. 
The intense small arms fire proved ineffective, and we re-
ceived a terrific shelling. Three enemy tanks were f.orced to 
retreat because of our accurately observed 105mm fire. 
· The situation was so precarious .at one time that the fm-
ward observer destroyed his radio. Pfc Robert E. Epley ran 
back to Beho to get the badly needed artillery support which 
. came just in time to 'force the r etreat of the battered German 
units. These numbered between 200 and 400 infantry troops 
and three tanks before the retreat. 
We dug in on the ridge and manned outposts until dark. 
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A PERFECT OPERATION 
During the long and bitter history O·f World War II the 
t erm "perfect operation" has been applied to a few important 
battles, but to the men of F Company only one action can 
ever bear the term "perfect": the capture of Mullendorf, Ger-
many on 18 December 1944. In the words of a crack officer, 
"That was the day this outfit came into its own as an 
attacking force. That day we really demonstrated the' use 
. of marching fire." 
Two days before the jump off the Second Battalion had 
been relieved at Leiffarth, and was sent to Geilenkirchen •to 
prEpare for the Mullendorf battle. On 16 December each 
platoon leader in Fox Company was informed of the coming 
operation. We were to coordinate with the First Battalion's 
attack on Wurm. The platoon leaders received many maps 
and aerial photographs delineating the terrain features, pill-
boxes and communication trenches. The men were told, "This 
wiH be a tough and speedy operation." Due to the closeness 
of th0 fighting, mm 1were equipped with M3 machine pistols, 
additional bazookas, grenade launchers, and BAR's. 
With all preparations completed, the company moved to 
an assembly area in Beeck early in the morning of 18 Decem-
ber. Each man was given rations and additional ammunition. 
Bazooka teams carried from nine to twelve rounds. As Pfc 
Edward Rosol said, "If the Jerries had hit me, I would have 
gone off like an ammunition dump." Rifle grenadiers carried 
six grenades. M3 men and "ordinary" rifleman were armed 
with extra magazines (as were BA:R teams) and additional 
bandoliers, plus six grenades per man. It was obvious that 
this attacking force meant business. 
The company was scheduled to leave the assembly area 
at 1000 and move into a draw outside of Mullendorf which 
was fr·ee from ;observation. Here they waited for the terrific 
artillery barrage to lift before opening their attack. Two 
assault engineers were assigned to the second platoon, desig-
nated by Lt Edward Gedrich, company commander, as the 
leading attack element. Each of the engineers carried a 
"satchel" charge, in case it became necessary to blast the pill-
boxes. Before the attack one of the engineers told T/Sgt Harry 
C. Kelly, "I just want your boys to keep the embrasures 
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buttoned up wHh rifle fire, while we move in toward the 
pillbox." As it later turned out, the engineers never had to use 
their charges, but did some · fancy firing ,with their Ml's 
instead. 
A red flare suddenly shot up indicating the last round of 
the barrage had been 'fired. Kelly moved his platoon forward 
on the double and across a .railroad track. The third, led by 
Lt George M. Hardy, and the first , led by T/Sgt Clarence E. 
Stephens, followed close behind. As the company poured 
through the gap, they encountered small arms and sniper fire 
from nearby shattered houses and pilliboxes. Sgt Kelly, firing . 
his Ml with one hand and carrying a 536 radio in the other, 
ordered his men to return the fire and they immediately cut 
loose with terrific bursts from all weapons. Sgt Kelly and 
S/Sgt John Greslick Jr., second squad leader, ·each attacked 
enemy pillboxes, tossing smoke bombs down the ventilators. 
When enemy fire was discovered coming from a pillbox on 
the left flanks, Pfcs Raymond Fusselman Jr. and. Charles 
Danajovits ·fired two W:P ·rounds into the position and con-
tinued moving forward with their platoon. StlSgt Irvin K. 
Pierce followed behind th first wave and captured 16 J ·erries 
in a shattered pillbox. 
By keeping up a continuous fire the company reached the 
last objective, a well-covered pillbox, listed on aerial photo-
graphs as a "doubtful hays tack." The J erries poured out of 
the pillbox and .attempted t o set up a defense in a n earby 
trench. One Kraut came out with a MG 42 and beltfull of 
ammunition, but was immediately cut down by a long burst 
fr.om Pvt Steve W·ozenski's BAR. A Jerry captain drew a bead 
on Pfc Frederick Nock with a Schmeisser, but a burst fr·om 
Pfc Fusselman's M3 caused the "Hauptmann" to toss away 
his weapon and give up. A steel bayonet, ably handled by 
Pfc Marion J. Fuchs aided in this C?pture. 
Suddenly the men discovered "it was all over" as Major 
James V. Johnston, Battalion CO, rushed to the last trench · 
and told the men, "You did a great job. We've got Mullen-
dorf. Set up for a counter-attack." 
The rest was anti-climatic. Everyone felt "great", especi-
ally after learning that their company had cleared out 16 pill-
boxes had taken 84 prisoners, and b est of all, suffered NO 
casualties in the entire operation. 
The "post-mortem" lectures gave deserved credit to the 
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brilliant planning and coordination, the devastating artillery 
fire, which drove the Jerries out o'f the trenches and into the 
pillbocxes, and the able way many dangerous mines were 
cleaned out. But greatest praise was given to the men, who 
double timed through mine-laden orchards and fired like 
hell to teach the vaunted W ehrmacht what "perfect operation" 
means. 
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DEATH IN TWO CITIES 
This is the story of Company G and its title is "Death in 
'Dwo Cities." 
It is also the story ·of the 334th's Roer River breakthrough. 
Company G learned at a terrific price that the dash to the 
Rhine was a costly thing. 
The night of the first day of the Task Force Church drive 
found the regiment fanned out in de'£ense positions north of 
the ~traffic hub of W egberg. While the men dug in for the 
night and waited for a counter-attack, word came do:wn that 
the attack would be resumed the following day. The Second 
Battalion would lead off. Immediate objectives were the 
towns of ,Berg and Eicken, later termed by Company G 
infantrymen the "Cities of Death." 
Company G jumped off hom a WPA-like German settle-
ment, known as the "model village," which lay near a road 
junction not far from the town of Waldniel. The company, 
operating with the reduced strength of 125 men, led the Se-
cond Battalion's drive. To reach the road leading to the two 
towns it was necessary to cross an open field for 300 yards. 
When the company reached the toad, the doughboys pushed 
f·orward, the third platoon swinging up the left side of the 
highway, the first on the right, and the second in support. 
The ·light machine gun section moved with the third platoon, 
and the mortars stayed behind in the village to provide 
suppo'I"t ·for the advancing troops. 
Company G had gone about 300 yards toward the to;wn 
of Berg 1when they ran into the first of their troubles. They 
were trapped in :the cross-fire of four machine guns. One lay 
off to the right and nor.th of the highway. The other three 
were firing from b ehind a slope t o the immediate front. A 
rifleman pumped lead into the machine gun on the right. He 
crawled for a while, got up on his knees to fire, crawled 
some more, raised himself up again to fiTe. A machine gun 
bullet killed him. 
A recent Company G battlefiel'd commission, Lt Harold L. 
Howdieshell, was about 25 yardS' ahead of the company. Both 
of his scouts were with him. The lieutenant spotted the 
machine gun that was hitting the first platoon. H 'Was the 
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one off to the right of the main road. He pushed his scouts 
down into the ditch by the road and then pegged about four 
hand grenades into the gun position. Just as he was starting 
to pull the pin from ·the fifth grenade, •the machine gun cut 
loose and killed him outright. 
The two scouts were saved :by Lt Howdieshell's quick 
thinking. (Later in the day, when there were only two Ger-
man prisoners taken fr·om th~ pitched battle that followed 
down ·the road, one of the scouts, Pfc Lemon ·R. Burrows, 
rushed toward the two Germans in an attempt to compensate 
for the death of his lieutenant. He was restained by the other 
scout, Pfc Lonnie J. Davis, who grabbed him and quietly 
declared: "No., 1we've got to take them prisoners to stop this 
bloodshed.") 
The dead •lieutenant's bravery removed one obstacle from 
the direct path of the first platoon. A second machine gun 
w,as spotted. It was firing from a building at the front otnd 
to the left of the r.oad. The continuous spatter of bullets 
kept the first platoon hugging the road. But about half the 
platoon managed to crawl up to a sugar beet mound. The 
mound atbsorbed some of the machine gun fire and afforded 
tempoTary p.rotection. The platoon leader, Lt JackF.Schaper, 
and his platoon sergeant both made their way to the shelter. 
Lt Schaper snaked his 'way to one of the mounds to observe 
the position of the gun. 
The lieutenant was hit just as soon as his head was far 
enough around the end of the mound to observe. Fortunately 
he was only wounded. Then one of Company H's lieutenants 
- Lt Daniel Fochesato - ran to aid the wounded lieute-
nant. He was killed outright by the same machine gun. Then 
the platoon sergeant took o.ver. Just as he raised his head 
the machine gunner hit him between the eyes. 
It was the most accurate shooting that Company G had 
ever run into. The accuracy of the German machine gunners 
was unoanny. They couldn't miss. Almost all of the dead and 
wounded suffered direct head hits. 
Lt Milton Rabinowitz, in charge of the company's light 
machine guns, ran back to report to the company commande.r, 
Capt Charles E. ·Hiatt. He told 'the captain of the "slaughter" 
that was taking place. Capt Hi.att went up to the road, 
pressed himself against the embankment, and crawled up to 
the bend of the highway. He then sent his second platoon 
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on a flanking movement to the far left. They were to go 
through a patch of woods, circle around, and knock out -the 
deadly gun from the flank. Lt Rabinowitz was to reorganize 
the third platoon. 
The second platoon picked up 15 prisoners in the woods 
- every one an NCO or officer - and continued on to knock 
out the gun. Advancing cautiously, the sec'Ond finally reached 
the house where the machine gun was firing. It was a low, 
one-story affair. The gun was rattling fr·om the windo.w. 
The second platoon assaulted with marching fire and charged 
right into the "house of death." Their catch amazed them: 
a full Nazi colonel at the trigger .of a doublebarreled 
machine gun. 
The colonel had hit some of Company G's best men. Some 
one wanted to murder him. 
But the catch was too important to kill. Company G's 
idea was to take as many prisoners as possible, get the 
Germans out of their holes, thereby reducing the company's 
casualties. Still full of arrogance and hatred for his Yankee 
captors, the colonel 'Was sent off to the rear. 
The platoon looked out of the building and in a minute 
they understo·od the German plan. The colonel's double-
barreled gun had covered the crest of the slop,e behind which 
the Germans were dug in. 
It was a perfect reverse slope defense. The Germans had 
every avenue of approach thoroughly covered by machine 
gun fire. With the colonel's gun immobilized, the third 
platoon could vault the crest of the slope and stab at the 
Jerries dug in behind it." H was decided to rush them. Com-
pany G didn't make much dis1ance on the first effort. The 
German£ replied with a barrage of lead. Another machine 
gun cut aU around the soldiers. Burp guns and small arms 
fire increased the German counter-attack. 
George Company hugged their side of the slope after a 
few yards and waited for the fire to quiet down. The Germans 
had to be uprooted from their trenches. It w.as a risky 
business. Every ·on e took a turn at the enemy, raising himself 
up, letting go with a slug, and then ducking back to the 
ground. The Germans replied again and again. They w eren 't 
the ordinary run-off-the-mill soldiers the company had en-
countered in previous action. Company G later found out 
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that they were special paratroopers that were flown in to 
stop the Yanks at any price. 
The Germans were determined fanatics. The wouldn't 
come out of their holes to surrender. ;rhey wanted to fight 
to the last man and hold the slope until kingdom come. Some 
one said: '"To hell with this j.ack-in-the-box game. Let's 
rush them." 
Company G rushed the Germans and charged the crest o·f 
the slope with fixed bayonets. They dived into the trenches 
and pushed their bayonets into the stomachs of the Germans. 
When they couldn't get at the Krauts with bayonets they 
used hand grenades. The Germans fought back with hull's 
eye small a·rms fire, dying one by one as' they hit back. They 
were no match for the infuriated soldiers ·of Company G, 
who bayoneted and grenaded every German in sight until 
finally only two remained. They were the only prisoners taken. 
The company felt physically whipped after the wild fight. 
But they had to continue on to take the town of Berg. The 
first platoon reached the road. There was no opposition now. 
Going from house to house in Berg they rounded up 75 Ger-
mans. Most of them had changed into civilian clothes, but the 
battle-wise soldiers were not fooled. 
The •company reported by radio to battalion: "Objective 
taken. We're moving on to our next objective." 
The morta•rs laid down a small barrage in preparation. 
The plan w.as for the second platoon to lead off to the left 
of the road, with the third moving abreast on the right of the 
h:ighway. The second platoon was within 150 yards of Eicken 
when it had to stop. It was the bitter Berg experience again. 
The Germans had the route of approach perfectly covered 
with the cr'O·ss fire of three machine guns, For good measure 
the Jerries had an 88 dug in with the two machine guns Ito 
the front. 
·The German fire was murderous. The second platoon 
assaulted with 25 men and soon was hit hard. One by one 
the men were cut down by the rapid fire of the machine guns. 
The 88 was firing flat trajectory point-blank fire. The shells 
were exploding a few inches from the ground. There wasn't 
a sliver of pi'd·tection. 
When the Ge.rrrian fire eased up, six men remained in the 
second platoon. Two of the company's medics were casualties. 
Pfc Victor W. King braved heavy machine gun fire to .ad-
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minister first aid to the rwounded. He tried to reach more, 
but it was suicide. S/Sgt Artis C. Britton realized to remain 
in ;the open ground was certain death. He jumped up from 
his prone position and dashed toward the 88 and machine 
gun, side by side. 
When the sergeant was in range he hurled two hand 
grenades at the weapons. The Germans threw back two 
potato mashers. Britton threw two more grenades. The 
Germans didn't throw anything back. He had scored direct 
hits. Both weapons were knocked out. Their crews were 
dead. But the heroic sergeant was wounded. 
The guns knocked out, the surviving six exhausted men 
of the second platoon stayed to guard the positions. One of 
the six, Pfc Cleatus W. Ewton, ·returned across the field 
under withering machine gun fire to report the success. When 
he reached the CO, he was i:?·O exhausted that he fell down 
right where he stopped. He managed to utter: "We got them. 
The road is open,"' before losing consciousness. 
Capt Hiatt then sent the third platoon up the right side 
of •the road toward Eicken. The platoon traveled about 
200 yards ' when a machine gun, snuggled in a haystack, 
opened up on the advancing column. The platoon took cover 
in a drainage ditch along side of the road. All along the ditch 
were culverts. The pla:toon slowly made its way through the 
ditch, but the cmlv.erts, spaced .25 yards apart, barred pro-
gress. It was impossible to get through. Some jumped . up 
on the road, ran across the culverts, and hopped back into 
the ditch. But the machine gun caught them every time they 
put their heads above the ditch. 
The column halted. The CO wo·rked his way up to the 
ditch. He asked the lead man what was holding them up. 
":Sir," he said, "we can't move. That machine gun has 
our number." ' 
"Well, we can't stay here," the captain replied, "We've 
got to get into that town. Follow. me." 
Capt Hiatt jumped up and made a dive for the next 
opening. The platoon followed at his heels. The machine gun 
sniper never let up far a minute. He was perfectly zeroed in. 
The platoon lost nine men. The wounded lay sprawling in 
the ditch. There wasn't an aid man available. 
The last ·culvert led to the first house in Eicken. By 
constantly leap-frogging and "hoping the bastard wasn't 
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I 
looking when 
he jumped," 
the platoon 
finally made 
it into t01wn. 
Company G 
had made the 
second "City 
ofDeath."The 
day's work 
was finished-
almost. The 
men wanted 
that last ma-
chine gun out 
of the way. 
The CO sent 
Lt Char les C. 
Baker and a 
patrol of four 
men to wipe 
out the m a-
chine gun un-
der the hays-
tack. 
The patrol 
worked its 
way back to 
the haystack. Major Charles E. Hiatt 
They reached 
a position in front o-f the gun. While the remainder of 
the patro1 kEpt the gunner busy with small arms fire, Pfc 
Max L. Slater worked around to the left of the haystack and 
approached it from the rea-r. Slater moved a little and re-
moved a match from his pocket. Then, as calmly as though 
he· were lighting a cigarette, he struck the match and set 
the hay afire. The gun w.as wiped out. The battalion could 
pass through safely. 
In Eicken 'the weary soldiers of Oompany G tried to get 
some rest. The breakthr10ugh 'would go on. 
For this action G Company was later awarded the Pre-
sidential Unit Citation. 
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HOW HIGHLIGHTS 
H Company's combat diary reveals the active part that 
unit played in the story of the 334th. Here are some day-
by-day highlights: 
18 November 1944. Unit jumps off against the Siegfried 
Line at Breil, Germany. Members of H Company take the 
first enemy prisoners from a dugout by the railroad just 
outs1ide Breil. The 81mm mortar platoon learns to use battery 
fire and the 300 radio in preference to dispersed gun positions 
and sound-power telephones. 
28 November 1944. Gereonsweiler Germany. Moving up 
to Gereonsweiler, unit nearly walks through enemy lines at 
one point because of faulty information. T/4 Robert E. Ward, 
company aid man, establishes his name throughout the Regi-
ment as "Doc" Ward. The tireless, efficient work that he is 
performing in combat has given him Associated Press recog-
nition and his name is becoming a legend in this battalion. 
20 December 1944. Regiment pulls out of Siegfried Line 
and moves to Marche, Belgium, to meet the German counter-
attack. Afiter assuring the Marche civilians that the enemy 
was "beaucoup" miles away, members of the company move 
out with other companies of the battalion to establish posi-
tions of contact with the enemy in Hotton and Hampteau. 
The night of 23 December the battalion is alerted for an enemy 
attack of an approximate strength o;f a corps. When Lt Daniel · 
L. Fochesato goes ~to one of the gun positions of his machine 
gun platnon to inform his men of the situation and asks if 
they can hold the line, the immediate reply is, "Hell, yes!" 
24 December 1944. Fi<rst section of the mortar platoon 
under 6 /Sgt James E. Bush is exposed and attacked by the 
enemy at Hampteau, Belgium. At one time, firing at a range 
of less than 400 yards, they drove the enemy back to a range 
of 1800 yards by their efficient concentrations. On this same 
day a section of machine guns under S/Sgt Thomas R. Clutter 
breaks up an enemy combat patrol firing almost point-blank 
into the enemy. 
7 January 1945. Having moved fTom their positions around 
Marche, the regiment prepares to attack Marcouray, Belgium, 
with the Second Battalion jumping off at Devantave. Belgium. 
During this attack Cpl Ralph M. Rogers, radio operator for the 
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TjSgt James Roberts - SjSgt George Johnson - Capt Dale C. Lawrence 
Lt Ogle Pieper - Lt Joseph Schul 
morta'r observer, voluntarily charges and - knocks out an 
enemy machine gun position with his M3 while carrying the 
300 radio. 
9 January 1945. On high ground above LaRoche, Belgium, 
machine gunners have a "field day." One machine gun under 
Sgt Edward G. Martinez drives an enemy force directly into 
tihe line of fire of another machine gun of Sgt Cecil Hayes. 
The ·enemy force was completely annihilated. 
At Cielle, Belgium, the entire H Company organic trans-
portation paS!ses over a mine field of approximately 50 mines 
in the road without mishap. When the mine field is uncovered 
a few hours later, some of the mines are found to have the 
paint w01rn on them and some of them have even been turned 
up on an angle by the weight of the vehicles passing over. 
16 January 1945. 'A regimental patrol led by .Lt Byron 
Blankenship of H Company meets General Patton's Army. 
22 January 1945. In the battalion attack on Beho, Belgium, 
Cpl Jerome P. Wohlstadter pieces together one workable 
radio out of his own radio and that of the Company F 
radio operator, both sets having been knocked out. Having 
accomplished this under heavy enemy fire, he then conti-
nues to observe, direct fire, and maintain comrpunications 
for both companies. 
On this same day a section ·o·f machine guns under the 
command of T/Sgt Clifton R Dasson enters a courtyard on 
the 'Outskirts of Beho, Belgium, and his m en become mixed 
with a group of SS Germans who are wearing the same type 
of snowsuits as the H Company men. AHer Sgt Dasson has 
succeeded in separating his men and taking cover, the SS 
men counter-attack. As the H Company men are out-
numbered, their only means of breaking up the attack is to 
call their own artillery on their position. They are forced to 
break up two such attacks in this manner. 
23 February 1945. In the crossing of the Roer River, H 
Company's weapons fire in support of the First Batta-
lion. In this 'One operation the mortar platoon fires 312'00 
rounds, and the two machine gun platoons fire approxi-
mately 50,000 rounds, burning out an average of two barrels 
per machine gun. 
27 February 1945. Having broken through the main 
enEmy resistance on the east side of the Roer, the H Company 
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forces become a part of the motorized column of the 334th 
that breaks through to the Rhine. 
2 April 1945. The unit becomes part of the motorized 
operatiop to continue the drive into the heart of Germany. 
9 ,April1945. Because of the darkness and fog which pre-
vent tank operations, the Second Battalion spearheads on foot 
part of the coordinated regimental drive on Hannover. Under 
the cover of darkness, H Company, preceded only by part of 
one rifle ~ompany, walks through the enemy's lines and 
esta"Qlishes positions on the outskirts of Hannover. At one time 
during this move we are. within a few yards of .an enemy 
tank covering an underpas\S. At daylight the men are suddenly 
startled by a loudspeaker announcing to the Germans that 
it is the best for them to surrender. Immediately Germans 
begin · to come from several directions with their hands over 
their heads. With the inf•antry holding its strategic positions, 
the tanks are able to move through and the motorized column 
is 'resumed. 
_, During a temporary halt of the column in the heart of 
Hahno~e'r, a party from H Company is sent out to clear houses 
of enemy personnel. Pfc Homer R. Boissonneault, along with 
Pfc George W. Gross and others, gets ahead of the party, 
stops an enemy command car, and is in the prncess of taking 
its occupants prisoners when a German armored column pulls 
up and fires upon them. Gross and the others are able to elude 
the' enemy and make it back to the company, but Bois~ 
sonneault is cut off and is forced to take cover in a nearby 
church. Though the enemy searches for him, he later escapes 
and rejoins his outfit. 
14 April 1945. After taking Hannover on April 9, the 
regiment resumes its motorized advance into Germany and 
continues without serious res.istance until it reaches the Elbe 
River. The 'Second Battalion is pulled back from its position 
a few miles from the river to occupy Salzwedel, and to take 
over several displaced persons camps and local ·targets. 
H Company's mission consists of guarding targets and con-
ducting motor patrols. 
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HEADQUARTERS SECOND REMEMBERS 
We remember the time we were shelled at Gereonsweiler 
and the Krauts hit an ammunition dump in the front yard. 
The dump went off, sounding like hell's belches. Somebody 
yelled, "Let's get out!" but the front door was just a few 
feet away from the exploding ammunition. We piled up the 
steps leading from the cella·r and out the back doo.r. There was 
a convenient trench nearby. We sweated out the aummuni-
tion pile and the target it made for the Kraut artillery. 
We remember 28 February 1945 when the call came 
down that the Krauts were dug in around Waldneil, sup-
po;rted by tanks. 2nd Lt Winthrop P. Murray invented 
"Murray's scurry" .as he whipped the third squad of his 
Anti-Tank platoon into action. S/Sgt Novbert H.Bockerstette 
and Cpl William R. Haskin swung into the fight. The gun 
was brought up to a position outside Eiken and set up. 
Meanwhile the tank had spotted the crew and was firing at 
them, attempting to knock the gun out before it could 
get into action. It was no time to be orthodox. The book 
says to bracket the target, but if the crew followed the book, 
tthe medics would have followed them. They fired one shot 
and knocked out the, tank setting it on fire. 
While this was going on, up ahe,ad G Company was 
engaging in a horrible small arms and hand-to-hand fight 
with Germans paratroopers. Casualties were so. heavy that 
the medics could not handle all the wounded properly. The 
Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon went forward 'to assist 
the medics. Lt Sheldon L. Palmer led litter parties to the 
culverts and ·open fields wlhere the G Company wounded lay. 
Under intense enemy fire the litter bearers moved thei·r 
comrades to safety. Pfcs Claud Bark, Fred Nance and 
Robert E.Russell made trip after trip to the evacuationareas. 
We remember Capt Seymour B. Stone, Pfcs Edmund J. 
Brown and Douglas N. Jennings in a billeting team which 
took on more than twice their strength in Engelbostel during 
the drive for Hannover. Capt Stone, our company com-
mander, moved into Engelbostel directly behind the front 
lines to secure billets for the Battalion CP, thus insuring an 
efficient position from which to work. As the jeep containing 
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Stone, his diriver, Jennings, and his interpreter, Hr:own, 
moved down the street they noticed a house filled with 
Germans. Capt Stone immediately dismounted, slung his 
carbine f.rom the shoulder and· pumped lead into the house 
which later we discovered held seven Nazis. 
The Nazis were preparing a machine gun nest to ambush 
the next troops moving down the streets. They were not 
quite prepared when the three men moved in on them. The 
Germans in the f.ront yard ducked into the house and our 
men moved in on them. 
The three Amerioans cleared the ground floor of· the 
house. Jennings went to the cellar door and jerked it open. 
In the cellar below, traversing a machine gun to meet him, 
was a German soldier. Jennings reacted instantly. He drove 
down the stairs, kicked the machine gun to one side and 
fired a burst that killed the German. 
During the encounter Capt Stone was killed from a Ger-
man automatic weapon's 'burst. 
All in all, the three men of Headquarters Second killed, 
captured, or wounded the seven Germans, and averted a 
posssible ambush for the troops following behind. 
'Dhese are some things that Headquarters Second re-
members .... 
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CHRISTMAS PATROL 
Lines were thin and foxholes were pretty far apart in the 
Item company sector o·f the line before Verdenne, Belgium. 
It was little wonder that on the morning before Christmas, 
men of the second platoon discovered two foxholes empty. 
Jerries had been infiltrating through the lines all night, and 
there was little our men could do about it but shoot at any-
thing they heard, or at shadowy figures they might chance 
to see. ·Second plato·on's leader, Lt Norman Seidensticker, 
T/Sgt Ray Owen, and Pfcs Edward Prince and Os,car Delgado 
were gone, and their empty foxholes meant a wide breach in 
the single front line of the company. 
It wasn't hard to guess what had happened to them. The 
Jerries were up to all their tricks to pierce the Marchc-
Hotton line, and footprints ·on the frosty ground showed that 
the I Company men had been overpowered and captured. 
Strangely, however, all the footprints leading away from the 
emptied foxholes led to the rear of the I Company lines. 
As soon as it was light enough to be able to follow the 
trail in the snow, two of Lt Seidensticker's men, Sgt William 
Emmons and Pfc William Neil started on their own private 
recJnnaissance. They were soon joined by Sgt Unah G. 
Lucas and Pfc Glenn Whitfield. The tracks led on and 
on, down the road, across an open field. The men knew 
the risk involved in becoming separated ·from their outfit in 
the Battle of the Bulge. They went back for a little more 
support. 
By 0900 a volunteer patrol of thirteen men was ready to 
look for the missing men. They were Lucas, Emmons, Whit-
field and Neil, and T/Sgt Frank Telesz, S/Sgt Carl Wilson, 
S 'Sgt Albie Jarvis, S/Sgt John Heath, Sgt Ralph Zindel, 
and Pfcs Jose Bonney, John Alejo, Benjamin River.a and 
Michael Balash. 
Again following the footprints in the snow, the patrol 
took off. When they reached the open field they formed a 
skirmish line and proceeded toward the woods. Several of 
the men got fleeting glimpses of Jerries sneaking through the 
underbrush. They opened fire . However, instead of being 
greeted by the return fire of a few rifles, which they fully 
expected, machine guns and burp guns opened up on them. 
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German troops, they discovered, had set themselves up 
for the winter in the woods. 'They had prepared defences, 
cut fields of fire, and channelized the approaches to the woods. 
The patrol had only one recourse. Covering each other as 
best they could, they beat a hasty r etreat across the open 
field. Expecting t'O be mowed down at any moment by Jerry 
fire, they were relieved when they made it back without the 
enemy opening up on them. They returned quickly to the 
Company CP to report their experience. 
At the Company CP, it was obvious that something would 
hav·e to be done immediately to relieve ·the threat to the 
rear of the I Company lines. Already over-extended, and 
expecting an attack at any moment, the company's situation 
was perilous. Calling back to battalion for some support, I 
Company prepared to defend both front and rear from attack. 
Fifteen hundred was the jumping-off time for K company 
to clean up the pocket discovered by the I Company patrol. 
At the same time, Jerry made a frontal attack on I Company, 
expecting the two companies of German troops which had 
infiltrated behind the I Company lines to attack from the 
rear. But they were otherwise occupied with K Company 
and three attached tanks. The attack stalemated, the line 
held, and after a see-saw battle on Christmas Eve, the line 
was thoroughly secured. ' 
'The patrol, which had been sent behind their own lines 
to find four of their own men, discovered instead the well-
concealed Jerry plans to effect a breakthrough, and made 
possible the timely liquidation of the attack. It might be 
added, too, that K company found Lt Seidenstioker and his 
men who had been taken prisoner. They had been treated 
well, they were lightly gua·rded, and were none the worse 
for their experience, but glad to be out of the hands of 
their captors. 
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VERDENNE 
K Company's "toughest battle" began on 21 December 
1944. On that date, K Company moved into a defensive 
position around the grand chateau north .of Verdenne, Bel-
gium. There were no reports as to enemy position or strength; 
just the information that the Germans might and probably 
would attack somewhere on this Verdenne-Marenne~ 
Bourdon triangle. 
The digging was tough, the cold ate Tight through one's 
bones, and the tension mounted. For greatly needed in-
formation, on 24 December a four man patrol, S/Sgt Jose 
S. Correa, Pfc Thomas A. Weiss, Sgt Joseph E. Beaudin, and 
Pvt Jack A. Reynolds, was sent out to reconnoiter and make 
contact with the enemy in the woods to the east of Verdenne. 
'Then the expectancy and tension was shattered like glass 
when word came that the German had infiltrated two recon 
·companies behind our lines into the woods to the west of the 
town. At approximately 1500, 24 December, the company, 
with all excess equipment left behind, attacked and cleaned 
out this, area with a loss to the enemy of 67 prisoners and a 
large amount of German and American equipment. 
The patrol of four men returned to the chateau after 
compl'eting their mission to find 1/Sgt Paul Z. Long 1and four 
men there. Around 1600 the German attack started with a 
concentrated shelling of the chateau. As the nine men 
prepared to defend the position, the order was given to with-
dr:aw from the building. The four man patrol, with Pfc 
Anthony F. Guerra, moved to the Wo·ods to the northwest 
and dug in to defend the strategic crosS'r·oads. Just as they 
were settled, they were forced to withdraw with :the 84th 
Recon Troop when warned by the approach of firing enemy 
tanks. 
In the meantime, one platoon, led by Lt BruceC.Chapman 
and Sgt Anton T. Milosevich, moved out to lay barbed wiTe 
in front of the town. When the enemy attack started, Lt 
Chapman led a patrol back into the town, and returned 
with sixteen prisoners and the information that the town 
was full of the enemy. With no other route open, they made 
their way back t·o Marche with the information and prisoners. 
!Back in the woods, the company was foTced to dig in 
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along the ridge to the west of the town and await further 
orders. The enemy had overrun the chateau and captured 
all equipment. Due to the rapid action of 1/Sgt Long, the 
company records and all important papers were saved!. 
Now came the ChriS'tmas present that everyone expected; 
attack the town, take it, and hold it at all costs. With half 
a K ration per man, and freezing from the persistent cold, 
the men tried to adjust themselves, and prepare for the 
attack. A little later the order \Was cancelled, and with frozen 
sighs of relief, the men walked back to their holes. But then 
it came again, this time for keeps take Verdenne. 
Fo:r almost twenty minutes-supporting mtillery laid the 
most concentrated, and if possible to say, the most beautiful 
barrage ever seen; the sky was continuously lit up almost 
like daylight. At 0100, K Company, composed of approxi-
mately forty men with Lt Richard S. Bullens in command, 
and L Company of 335th moved ahead to carry out the diffi-
cult mission given them. 
In the attack across the open field on the approach to 
town, Lt Kenneth D. Macinnis•, platoon leader, was lost to 
the company when a shell hit near him. Just as we entered 
the town, both Lt Bullens and Lt William C. Himburg were 
shot down by enemy rifle fire. The company was now !Without 
an officer, and left with only a handful of men. 
While the company fought through the rest of the town, 
thirteen men, under TJ1Sgt Cha·rles Termine and Sgt John 
M. Siegel, moved through the place to dig in on the east and 
prepare a defense. They steeled themselves for the strong 
enemycounter-attackthatwas inevitable. Thirteen men dug in. 
Pfc Raymond Guiducci was standing in a doorway 
with Pfc Oharles :L. Stepanick when he noticed someone 
walking down the stveet into town. It looked like a GI so h e 
let him go by. But when another, followed by fifteen more 
came, he explaimed, "Damn it, those guys aren't GI's," and 
they both opened fire. 
For three hours they fought off the enemy counter-attack, 
which grew in force as reinforcements were thrown in. 
Finally, after a bitter battle, this small vanguard of defenders 
beat the enemy back, and the first phase ·of "hold at all 
costs" was completed. 
The next day, 25 December, the company, commanded by 
Sgt Sieg·el, sta·rted out to flush the town. •In this operation 
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a large number of prisoners was taken. Then at 1000 that day 
iLt Chapman arrived with seven tanks of the 771st Tank 
Battalion. Pfcs Alexander M. Intrator and Dudley T. Briggs 
had gone to lead them up. With this group as reinforcements, 
the small gr•oup of men commenced to flush out the town 
again, this time with more ease. For two days, twice a day, 
it became necessary to flush every house and cellar for the 
enemy, who had infiltrated into the town during the night. 
The grand ·total after two day's of cleaning up was 472 pri-
soners for K Company alone. 
All during the attack and defense, for five consecutive 
days, Sgt Warren N. Pedersen, assisted by S/Sgt Carol L. 
Nutter and Pfcs Guerra, Intrator, and Thomas L. (Farmer, 
were forced to walk the wire lines continuously to keep .com-
munications intact. Without thes;e communications, this small 
vanguard of fighters, still classed as a T AO Company, would 
never have been able to ·"hold at all costs." 
Finally, as the backbone of the last effort in the German 
counter-offensive was broken, events took place with more 
calm and ease, and the company settled down to reorgani-
Z'ation. During this time, a number of less effective counter-
attacks were launched by the enemy, but supporting artillery 
Was the greatest aid in stopping them. On one occasion Lt 
Wood, attached FO, directed fire of Cannon Company, 
M Company's 81mm m'ortars, Division and Corps artillery 
all at one time by sound alone. Through his effective fire 
direction, a large number of enemy tanks and half tracks 
were effectively destroyed and chalked up as a .loss to the 
weakening enemy. 
On 1 January 1945, the exhausted men of K Company 
were relieved by the British, after a job well done. Final 
score was 472 prisoners, countless dead, and a large number 
of enemy tanks and half tracks and other equipment cap-
tured, including large stores of American equipment being 
used by the enemy. 
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COUNTER-ATTACK 
Korrenzig and Rurich had been taken in the swift rush of 
the initial attack over the Roer, and L Company, was poised 
on the edge of Rurich to smash forward to Baal. 
Held in reserve in the initial stages of this action, L Com-
pany had moved up through heavy artillery fire following 
the First Battalion's river crossing. Since the footbridges 
could not be maintained during the enemy barrage, · the 
company had crossed the Roer in assault boats. !Moving 
swiftly into defensive positions on the edge of Korrenzig, 
they discovered a strong enemy defense line along the rail-
road to Rurich. 
Between Rurich and Baal was a large chateau surr.ounded 
by pillboxes and tanks. Rocket-firing Typhoons hammered 
and slammed the chateau as the doughs ran into fire ,from 
tanks and a pillbox concealed beneath a haystack. Fighting 
hard, the third platoon, aided by the mortar section, managed 
tQ set the hay camouflage ablaze. 
Silhouetted in the glare of the burning pillbox, the second 
platoon, with a machine gun squad attached, moved through 
the lowering darkness toward the objective. They had gone 
only a few hundred yards when they were flattened by bursts 
from an enemy machine gun. Quickly grasping the situation, 
Lt Frederick M. McConnell swung his third platoon to the 
left, found concealment for his men in an anti~tank ditch, and 
moved to the flank ·of the enemy. This action forced the Ger-
mans from their bunkers and freed the second platoon under 
Lt William L. Nelson to strike foward again. Moving u'p as 
close as possible, they awaited the artillery preparation iWhich 
enabled them to strike a dazed and confused enemy. 
Initially, opposition was light. However, when L Company 
moved toward the main street of the town where coordination 
was to be eUected with I and K Companies, Jerry burp guns 
opened up. Despite this interruption, two p1a.toons kept 
moving, the second platoon continuing to the juncture point, 
while the third platoon set up a defensive position near the 
center. More than 30 prisoners were taken ;by the leading 
platoon as they moved toward the railroad underpass which 
marked the limits of their advance. In the meantime, the 
182 
S jSgt Russel Hamner - TfSgt Harold L. Sweeney - Pfc Charles Stine -
Sgt Joseph wasserman 
Pfc Roy B. Turner - Pfc Daniel G. Smith - Sgt Bob A. Trilton 
Lt Fredrick McConnel Lt William Nelson 
Pfc Paske! H. Ashmore - Pfc Jessie J. Gerardo 
first platoon had swung right to clear its sector. The town, 
we thought, was ours. 
But the Germans thought otherwise, and in the hours 
which followed, the enemy challenged every yesource of the 
fighting men of L Company. Striking 'without warning from 
the rear, three enemy tanks came rumbling .out of their hiding 
place in the nearby woods. They blasted the Company CP 
with point-'blank fire, and moved on to the center of town, 
surprising and confusing our elements on every hand. With 
guns blazing at the slightest evidence of opposition, the three 
t·anks mo.ved on up the street over the same path recently 
cleared by the L Company platoons. 
At the far end of the town these disquieting sounds were 
heard by the second platoon, which was beginning to have 
plenty of trouble of its own. German machine guns had 
opened fire along the Tailroad embankment cutting off those 
men who were deployed beyond the underpass. Then, just 
before the tanks came roaring along the street with head-
lights blazing, someone reported that they were friendly. 
Waving and shouting, several men attempted to waTn the 
tankers of the machine gun fire. For their trouble, the GI's 
received a guttural challenge and a sudden burst of lead from 
the tanks. Raking the buildings as they went, the tanks con-
tinued through the underpass and out of town. With them 
went Pfc Harry Kuchmanich Jr, taken as prisoner. 
Lt Nelson hastened to reorganize his scattered platoon, 
but before he could do so, the enemy began a counter-attack 
in strength. From the 30-foot railroad embankment and con-
crete recesses in the underpass itself, machine guns and riifles 
opened up on the battered building in which the defense of 
the vital underpass and road junction had been set up. Two 
breathless men from the first platoon dashed in to report that 
their platoon had been completely surrounded and only a 
small group had been able to escape. 
The ;enemy bullets began pounding the rear of the build-
ing. Germans seemed to be everywhere, but in the darkness 
they could not be spotted. Concentrated rapid fire from the 
attached heavy machine gun and from the BAR's held the 
attackers back, but the ammunition was running very low. 
The situa·tion became so critical that the only solution was 
to call down artillery fi:re on the spot. 
The decision made, runners were dispatched on the 
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hazardous mission. Though these men never reached the CP, 
Captain Garland did receive a report that the position had 
been broken through and called for artillery at the underpass. 
While the artillery crashed and pounded around them 
intermittently for an hour, the men of the second platoon 
stuck to their position-only 25 yards from the underpass 
target. Only a minimum number of men could be kept 
above the ground, but these had to be there, for the Ger-
mans resumed sniping during any brief cessation of the 
artillery's shelling. 
Sgt John R. Murillo, who continued to fire a BAR from 
the rear entranoe of the 'building, was hit by our own shell 
fragments as was T)Sgt Wilmer D. Haley, who was firing at 
the enemy on the railroad and in the underpass. 
Finally beaten and dazed, the Germans called' out, 
pleading to surrender and 1begging fo·r the shelling to be 
lifted. Fearing ·a ruse, Pfc 'Charles M. Stine told the Germans 
that they would have to surrender under fire. In .small groups 
they charged across the road to surrender, some of them 
dragging or carrying wounded comrades with them. Soon 23 
were jammed in the already packed cellar. 
These troops claimed to be all that remained of more 
than 200 men who had begun the attack. Two runners, 
Pfcs 1Roy B. Turner and Daniel G. Smith, attempted then 
to get back to the OP to have the artillery fire lifted. 
They stepped out and were cut down by sh eH fragments . Two 
more men, ·Pfc >Russell N. Hamner and S/Sgt Harry L. 
Sweeney Jr tried again. Both twere wounded but managed to 
make the long trip back to the CP. In the meantime, T/4 
Joseph T. Stark worked feverishly in the crowded basement 
to treat the wounds of the injured Americans and Germans. 
The second platoon did not have all the fight that 
night. The Germans introduced themselves to the second 
squad of ·the first platoon with a hand grenade and surrender 
demand. Pfc John L. Purdy J r 's answer was a withering 
burst of BAR fire, while the rest of the squad pulled out and 
barely missed being surrounded. 
The third squad of the first platoon was not so fortunate. 
Togeth er with Pfc Jesse L. Hailey and Pfc Robert A. Tilton 
of the second platoon, they were surrounded in a house. When 
the Germans told them to surrender, their answer ·Was a 
well-placed hand gr.enade. Bazooka fire opened up and 
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forced them to the second and third floors. They couldn't 
see what was going on outside, but shouting and thr.owing 
grenades was their solution. The Germans couldn't get in 
and they couldn't get out. Finally, the artillery began 
removing the top floor so the men again returned to the 
ground floor. 
To top the night in which the company had already 
·repulsed •three enemy companies, three German tanks ac-
companied ·by some infantry appeared just before the dawn, 
heading :toward the underpass. Taking stock, L t Nelson found 
that he had no machine gun ammunition, only one bazooka 
round, and no grenades. There was nothing to do but sweat 
it out. After the platoon waited t ensely for an hour, the 
tanks moved away. 
The long night was over. Casualties were heavy. Of the 
38 second platoon men who had crossed the Roer the morning 
before, only 16 remained. But Baal was ours and a major 
threat to the Roer crossing had been decisively beaten back 
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THROUGH GRANTERATH 
The time was set at 22130 hours, 22 February 1945. 
Company M, commanded by Capt Edward Latta, assembled 
in .the battered town of Wurm, Germany. ·At 0040 hours, 
23 February, we were underway with two platoons of 
heavy weapons, leaving the third· platoon, consisting of 
81mm mortars, in the rear. 'They were to follow the company 
a few hours later. 
After a march of three miles to the outskirts of Linnich, 
Company M dug in and awaited the "go" signal to make 
the crossing. 
Our artillery barrage began at 0245 hours and continued 
for 45 minutes while A and C Companies made a night 
crossing. 
Daylight appeared, and Company M, under observation 
of the enemy at all times and ,receiving heavy artillery fire 
and long range machine gun fire, approached the banks of 
the Roer River. There they were driven back by the most 
intense enemy artillery barrage since the days otf the Sieg-
fried Line. 
A·t this point, Lt Richard W. Lindquist took charge of the 
operation and brought order out of the confusion. He gave the 
command to secure equipment and move forward. Double 
timing under heavy loads and through heavy fire, the doughs 
reached the bank of the river and found only 11 riddled boats 
remaning from the original fifty. 
Due to the rapid cur.rent of the river and the excitement 
of the task before them, doughs of Mike Company landed on 
the opposite shore in many different ways. Squad leader Sgt 
Fr.ank Wallar, · Pfcs John M. Koniowski, James B. Reyno.lds, 
Richard M. Donnelly, Pvts James Ryan and Gyles H. Walker 
were caught in an entanglement of barbed· wire placed by the 
enemy to slow the crossing. After a futile effort to free the 
boat, they were forced to go overboard and swim to shore 
with all equipment. 
After finding shell holes for protection, they awaited the 
crossing of the third platoon. This turned out to be only a 
short break before going on into the attack on Korrenzig, 
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their first objective before Granterath. All platoons were 
quickly -reorganized and set off to the attack. They found 
little resistance in Korrenzig, except for small arms and some 
artillery fire. 
After the capture of Korrenzig, headquarters platoon 
established its CP with the mortar platoon and defended 
the town. 
The machine gun platoons were ordered to advance on 
their next objective. As they neared the town, they met 
srtrong fire and were ordered to dig in once more. After esta-
blishing positions, the machine gunners immediately went 
into action. Sighting a small force of Ge-rmans two hundred 
yards distant, S/Sgt Harvey R. Stewart, Pvts Cherry K. 
Whisenhunt, Donald L. Shinskey, Irvin H. Schaber and Pfc 
Ray 0. Lindsey opened fire, inflicting 100 per cent casualties 
on the g['oup. The town was captured in one hour and at 1430 
was cleared of all enemy tr.oops. 
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COMBAT STORY 
On 4 March 1945, the Third Battalion was approaching 
Moers and Romberg. They had started early in the morning 
in trucks, but had been forced to detruck and fight, and then 
continue on fo·ot. The Nazis apparently had had a little 
time to set up some kind of defense on the west bank of 
the Rhine. 
·In the afternoon the battalion traveled north, parallel to 
the German lines, then suddenly turned and headed directly 
into the German positions. For a brief time there was a sharp 
fire fight, which ended with the coming of darkness. The 
Battalion pulled into a chateau just outside of Moers to spend 
the night. At 2300Headquarters Company set u!p the Battalion 
CP. Part of the Battalion, about one-fourth of it, dug in 
around the chateau while the remainder found some plaee to 
sleep, either in the cellar or the barns. Most of Headquarters 
Company was in the main building. 
It was thought that the enemy forces which we attacked 
in the evening were a covering force for twops retreating 
across the Rhine, and that we had dispersed them. We were 
wrong. At 0330 a curtain of enemy fire was laid upon the 
chateau from every kind of weapon that the Germans had 
on hand. Under its cover, infantry attacked simultaneously 
from the left rear and the right front. They made their way 
easily through the foxhole outposts and .approached the walls 
of the buildings. Everyone, groggy from the lack of rest, 
-we had attacked practically without sleep for nine days-
staggered to his feet once again and manned the defense. 
Dog-tired, the men found it hard to reg·ain their senses, even 
with t1he sounds of battle about them and streams of tracers 
flying in the windows. 
Capt John W. Busby, Battalion :S-3, hastily .organized 
the defense of the chateau. Our tanks were outside and 
the crews could not get out through the fir·e. Two were 
severely damaged by mortar fire. Men were being hastily 
assembled in the courtyard ·when the Germans began a mortar 
barrage. ·Many casualties were sustained. Room after room 
was taken .for an aid station as casualties multiplied. 
The men took up firing positions at the windows, firing 
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Pfc Basilio Salazar - Pfc Harry Bartlebaugh 
Pfc Walter C. Frydryk - S j Sgt John L. Sherman 
into the fire-spitting darkness 'OUtside, although every window 
was intermittently covered with German small arms fire. 
Communication was completely out. All radio jeeps were 
almost immediately destroyed. The telephone which con-
nected to units of the battalion worked for a time, but no Dne 
could get near it because of a stream of 50 caliber slugs that 
were whizzing in ·the window and over the table on which it 
was placed. A barn caught fire and in its glare our men were 
firing at the roofs of the buildings to keep the Germans from 
climbing up. Cooks, bakers, clerks, and drivers, took up 
weapons and joined in the fray that night. 
Many riflemen had been asleep in the cellar. ·They s·eized 
their weapons and dashed up the cellar stairs, frequently to 
be blo.wn back by the concussion of shells landing near 
the stairs. The stairs to the upper part of the house, from 
which we were doing the defending, were mos1ly uncovered 
by shell fire which b1ew down part of the outer wall. To 
reach the upper floors it was necessary to jump and dodge 
over the shattered, debris-piled stairs in dire.ct exposure to 
enemy fi're. 
The night was punctuated by hundreds of stabs of flames 
as the enemy was gradually driven back from the walls of the 
chateau. At 0400 the tempo of the counter-attack had s1owed. 
At 0500 the battle had ceased and by 0630 the Third Battalion 
was ready to resume its attack on :Moers and Romberg. 
Particular credit is due to 'First Sergeant Joseph B. Eis€n-
hauer. In the midst of the confusion, he dashed about, S1etting 
up firing positions and outposts, and organizing the men into 
an effective core of resistance. It was while he was engaged 
in this task ·that he was killed. 
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HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 
COWHIDE OPERATOR 
The soldier grabbed the field phone and .spun the crank. 
He waited a full five seconds and then turned to h1s buddy, 
"Those operators! Probably asleep in a chair with a magazine, 
a drink ... " Meanwhile the operator was pulling cord after 
cord, arguing wi·th the GI who wasn't sure where his Platoon 
Leader was, but would he mind putting in a circuit call to 
all units immediately? 
If Operations is a regiment's brain, Communications is its 
nervous system. Esp ecially under fire , Communications is 
essential. F·or instance, the crossing of the Roer .... 
We had laid fifty miles of wire in preparation for the 
crossing. A good deal of it was laid under fire and by hand. 
We had improvised a communications system over the Jerry 
connections in pillboxes we had captured .. Many lines were 
dragged by hand through tunnels from basement to bas1ement. 
Two wiremen, 'T /5 CarlS. Leonard and Pfc Lester S. 'Regillo, 
were fired on so vigorously by enemy machine guns while 
laying wire that it took the combined efforts of the 326th iFA 
and H Company, 333d to extricate them. ' 
While the Third Battalion was crossing, the wiTemen were 
forced to work standing upright in the middle of a barrage. 
It was at this point that S!Bgt Howard V. Isbell was killed. 
He had brought the wire to the water's edge and was awaiting 
a boat when a mortar exploded near him. The wire was finally 
taken by hand across a footbridge by T/5 ·Afredo G. Contreras 
and Pfc Rice Ratliff, Pfcs Milford B. Davis and Lawrence G. 
Swanguarim, switchboard operators who v•olunteered for the 
d etail. On the night 22-23 February Pfc Jim Leverett con-
structed twelve new lines from the switchboard to the radio 
s·ection, a distance of only 250 yards. Several times Leverett 
would start up the street with the end of the wire, only to 
find when he arrived at the destination that the line had been 
cut by shell fire bhind him. During the next night a 170mm 
shell crashed into m essage center, severely wounding stix of 
eight men in the room, and blowing ·the Communications 
Officer through the wall into the next room. But messages 
and communications were kept in by wire, radio, or mes-
senger. That is our job and our story. 
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HOT SPOT 
A patrol mission near Marche was 'the ·assignment of the 
Intelli'gence and Reconnaissance Platoon rm 22 December 
1944. This mission consisted of a series of small patrols, 
connecting several towns and keeping a motorized eye on the 
surrounding country and adjacent roads. This seemed to be, 
from all outward appearances, the simplest of mis·s'ions, for on 
that morning the whole route was travelled by two jeeps and 
eight men without the slightest mishap. 
On the afternoon of that day three jeeps and nine men 
took off at about 1300 on the 'same route. One jeep, which was 
led by Sgt ·Edward C. Podzinski, mounted a 50 caliber flexible 
machine gun. The patrol proceeded according to plan until it 
reached the village of Hamoui, where the jeeps continued 
do1wn the main street and s·topped a short way from the 
Ourthe River. At the end of this street was a blind spot 
around which, several moments later, came two German 
moturcycles and an American jeep. Upon s·eeing the parked 
·reconnaissance v.ehicles the Germans opened up with a 
30 caliber machine gun. The street being straight as a die, 
it was impossible to escape the fire except by taking refuge 
in the surrounding houses. An attempt was made by Cpl 
Robert R. Willett to fire back with the 50 caliber machine 
gun, but the gun failed to fire after two rounds. Willett was 
forced to give in and take refuge with the rest of the men. 
At ·this point the patrol was split up, and no more than 
two or three men were together at a time. These small groups 
managed, with the help df the Belgian civilians, to make their 
way from house to house and barn to barn until ·they had 
extricated themselvt!!> from the town. During the scramble, 
Pvt Leon Eisenberg, who had never driven a car before, 
realized the necessity for transportation and rushed into the 
street amid the flying lead, turned a jeep around, and drove 
it to the edge of town, where one of the other jeeps had been 
left originally. It was there that the men met and took to the 
road again. One jeep had been captured by the Germans, 
who had forced the civilians to roll it to them at the point 
of a gun. 
One jeep managed to escape some time before the other, 
as the second had been hit three times. The second jeep had 
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was almost back to the American lines when the occupants 
dis:covered that a bridge had been blown in their path. Artil-
lery was falling in the area. The men took to the r·oad on foot 
and 'waded across the stream on the ruins of the !bridge. 
Once on the opposite bank the men saw one of their jeeps 
unoccupied and shot to pieces by small arms fire. Upon 
approaching it, they heard a call for help in a neighboring 
field and upon investigation found their friends, all badly 
wounded and Willett dead. 
The wounded men, Sgt :Podzinski, :Pfc Oliver :P. Wimmer, 
and :Pvt Jimmie L. Smith, told how they had, been ambushed 
by a German tank and raked with fire from its machine guns·. 
They asked for a man to remain with them, while the rest 
ventured to get medical aid. :Pfc Broda H. Webb, Jr volun-
teered to stay. The remaining men, Lt Charles W. Jermy, 
:Pfc George C. Armstrong, T/5 Edgar B. Adams and :Pvt Eisen-
berg than sought out our own lines, and after two hours of 
infiltr·ating through enemy positions, Tan into a .335th In-
fantry outpost. It was four hours later that a group of 309th 
aid men and a small group od' guards found the wounded men 
under the guidance of Lt Jermy. They found that Webb, in 
a vain effo.rt to comfOTt ·the wounded, had all but stripped 
himself ·of his clothing to keep them .warm and was himself 
on the verge of pass•ing out from the sub-zero cold. 
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COWHIDE COPS REPORT 
The many duties of the MP platoon make it impossible to 
remember any one incident in which all men participated at 
once. But all the men had their share of thrills and excite-
ment, oiften alone or with two or three of their buddies. Even 
a routine job like posting a road f.or a convoy often became 
an exciting adventure. There were snipers at night or artillery 
barrages on CI"ossroads, and more than once the MP's have 
waved on the trucks from foxholes at the side of the road. 
They remember the night they posted the wad to Marche, 
and didn't get back for three days. Jerry cut the road after 
the troops got through and it was necessary to make a huge 
circle tour to get to them. 'S/Sgt Bruce R. Burton had his 
troubles in Marche keeping the CP properly guarded. The 
men s'tood seven hour shifts and that was .a long time to 
stand in the cold. ·Alerts every night kept the men from 
enjoying comforts of theiT billets very often. We lived in a 
fine jail. It w.as very handy too. We just put the prisoners 
in tile cells and locked the doors. 
Sgt Willard :Meadows, Pfcs Harold Mono~son, Horace 
Humphries, Richard ·DeLeo and Richard Crumpley rememlber 
trying to evacuate a cellar full of civilians from a house 400 
yards from the enemy in Hotton one night. They had gotten 
five out of the house when a Jerry patrol was discovered 
outside. That ended the evacuation. 
Yes, all the towns bring back exciting memories. Each 
man has his own ideas of the worst and best experiences. !But 
all will agree ·that Linnich was a hot little town. No one 
walked or strolled the streets. When they went anywhere it 
was on the double, and V·ia the shortest route. The Cowhide 
Cops did not have to break up gT>oups of soldiers hanging 
around corners. Those rockets broke up everything. Still the 
CP had to be guarded and the men stood against the building, 
behind a semicircular sand bag wall, 24 hours a day. 
T /5 John Robas, Pfcs Ian Turner and Richard Turner 
spent more time in Linnich than most men. 'l'hey moved into 
town some 10 days ahead of the C'P to secuTe and hold the 
buildings. They worked by d.ay when the town was quiet . 
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By night they sat locked in the cellar, listening to bursts of 
mortar shells and rockets. 
The climax of the MP's woTk came in Lichterfe1d when 
they handled 8,000 PW's in the period of 24 hours. It took a 
lot of hard work by all 34 men to search, count and evacuate 
that many prisoners. 
Now some have gone home but most of the platoon still 
remains. They continue the more routine duties of patroling 
and guarding the CP, checking civilian passes and listening 
to V'arious complaints and troubles Occasionally ;they talk of 
the past, but mostly they speculate on the future and wonder 
how Jap prisoners will act or whether there :will be any. 
-
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SLUGGING IT OUT 
The stakes were high, and the seasoned fighters were 
punching out victory in round after r ound. Now 334th's hard 
hitting •combat team faced a stiffer t est in the Roer-Rhine 
area. A wary foe was parrying after rocking back on his 
heels at Korrenzig, Baal, and Waldniel. 
Going had been rough at Waldniel, and beyond Boisiheim 
there was work for the heavy sluggers on Task Force Church's 
team. Heavy slugging is the role of the 334th Cannon Com-
pany's M3 105mm howitzers. 
The doughs had Boisheim well in hand that March mor-
ning but there was trouble ahead at Lobberich when Capt 
Theodme L. Beasley's cannoneers pulled in. Parallel fo1rces 
smashing toward the Rhine had been outdistanced. 
L•t John iA. Burns, Lt Peter Relac, and rPfc Donald B. 
Boylan reconno.itering, carried the fight to the foe, 2 miles 
beyond the front. Drawing enemy fir,e, the two officers 
directed their battery successfully to destroy an 88 and its 
vehicle while Pfc Boylan's Ml kept ·approaching attackers 
away. Then concentrated Jerry fire made the obervation 
point untenable. 
"A short distance in front of our lines.," related Lt Burns, 
"we met a reconnaissance unit of an armored division, which 
captured us." 
'"After 1We proved our identity , an officer ·asked us if we 
could give artillery support to armored infantry attacking 
Lobberich. Since their own division artillery wasn't in po-
sition to fire this field, we went with the leading elements 
making the attack and laid a concentration on the town, and 
fired by request at targets they observed." 
First !Sergeant Henry D. Young aided the armored artil-
lerymen in locating good gun positions, some few hundred 
yiards to the right of his own •company's battery. In the 
meantime, accurate firing data was being compu~ed inCannon 
Company's fire direction center by Cpls William Weeden, 
Eric Vero, and Leonard Seikmeier. 
From data supplied by these men, and without the benefit 
of the usual surveys, the armored division's self-propeUed 
mounts, 105mm, threw in their first round only 50 yards off 
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target. It was then an easy matter for the foward observers 
to direct the two batteries in a scorching barrage 'which raked 
the objective from end to' end. 
'T/Sgts William Bowers, Thomas Senier, and Clifford 
Reese, platoon sergeants, all reported excellent work by their 
gun crews and pointed to the next day's reconnaissanee re-
ports as evidence. Four Panther tanks, three anti-tank guns, 
th~ee 88 field pieces, seven vehicles, and ammunition dump 
were destroyed in 'that a'ction which helped to make Germ:an • 
opposition ineffective in Lobberich. 
"We were really on the ibeam that night and the next day 
too," said Sgt Donald Swanberg, typical section chief. "Then 
we knocked out a ba'ttery of 170mm field guns, a Panther 
tank, two scout cars, two heavy trucks, two anti-tank guns, 
a mortar position, and numerous personnel. That was at 
St. Tonis." 
Cannoneers will always remember the s'ticky mud of the 
Geilenkirchen beet fields where they learned the lessons of 
self-preservation and teamwork in attack. Whether firing as 
platoons in battalion support or tied in as a battery with 
division artillery, the men grew wise and seasoned in the lore 
of battle. They learned the power of their weapons and the 
skill of their leaders. !They became a successful unit of a 
successful team. Prummern, Lindern, Beeck, Wurm, and 
all the rest, became blasted symbols of what they, and others, 
had learned. 
"Our toughest test came in the Ardennes," declared Cpl 
William Niedermuller, who was one of the eight men whose 
Purple Heart tells something of the hardships in that sector. 
A persistent f.oe , aided by the vagar:i!es of the winter weather, 
called forth a full measure of resourcefulness as Cannon 
Company contributed to the saga of Verdenne, Hampteau, 
Marcouray. Icy roads, sharp cold, waist deep snow, and rock 
hard soil double d: the toil o.f all while •the 334th s•ought, ·and 
gained, successful complehon of its mission. 
'The Siegfried line and the Ardennes campaigns were 
seasoning experiences which made effective Cannon Com-
pany's contributions to the Roer and Rhine drives. Can-
noneers had learned to throw a heavy punch quickly ; they 
had become 334th's "heavy sluggers". 
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SKETCHES FROM SERVICE 
The men w ho k ept the 334th fed and clothed , and passed 
the ammunition have their record to speak for itself. Moments 
to remem'ber are noted h ere. 
PalenbeJl'g, 1December 1944 
The Jerry pl·anes are back making nuisances of themselves 
this morning. Everyone seems to know just what to do now. 
T/5 Joseph E. Blankenship takes off to man the AA mounted. 
50 cal machine gun in the back yard, assisted by the CO and 
Sgt Leonard Guiher, mess sergeant. So far we haven't sihot 
down a single one. Either we're poor shots or the planes• are 
out of effective range. The Luftwaffe is furnishing us our 
Christmas tree decorations this year. It seems that the Jerry 
pilots drop tinfoil strips to throw our radar devices off their 
trail. Anyway, the tinfoil makes for a beautiful tree. Under 
some protest Capt Steinhausen had a large tree brought into 
our crowded CP and mounted on the talble. Capt Willi'am G. 
Willard, Jr, Regimental MotorOfficer, remarked that the tree 
was taking up valuable "eating spa'ce", meaning that he puts 
his mess kit on that particular table while eating his chow. 
"Anyway, the tree stays," said Capt Hichard A. Steinhausen, 
CO, and so it did. Now, all are beginning to tolerate and even 
to appreciate it. Lt F•rank A. Pinto came in about noon 
bringing some decorations for our tree. He even had little 
figures comprising ·a manger scene. 
The favorite breakfast with our troops is hotcakes and 
bacon. Most mornings the fellows are willing to fmego break-
fast in order to get a few more winks of sleep. But if there 
is scarce mention the night before that hotcakes will be served 
for breakfast, the fellows will come out of their ho.les ·all over 
town and converge on the kitchen a quarter of an hour early. 
Our orderly room has taken on an air of distinct gaiety 
despite the,war. Pin-ups are increasing in number on the walls. 
Marche, 24 December 1944 
There was one crys•tal clear moment last night that we all 
would have liked to have preserved; Chdstmas caTols on the 
radro, the w.arm comfort radiated from this well-decorated 
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room and its small heater. A definite refinement and peace, 
marred .only by our dirty uniforms and heavy army equi-
page ... just seated around the room, no one saying anything, 
and with the "Battle of the Bulge" shaping up scarcely a 
mile distant. 
Gros Chene, 25 December 1944 
Christmas Day was, for the most part, just another day in 
the war. Our favorite breakfast of hotcakes was served at the 
usual 0700 to 0730. ·For our noon meal we had ham, potatoes, 
green peas and cofrfee. Our "big" meal with turkey, po.tatoes, 
brown gravy, corn, hot tea, grapefruit juice, (We could have 
a 46 oz can apiece if we wished), hard sugar candy and fruit 
cocktail, ·was served at 1900 .... The Luftwaffe in the form 
of a lone FW190 came over about 1300 and, after strafing our 
barn, dropped a bomb aimed at the nearby intersection which 
fell into an adjacent field, causing little damage but tossing 
huge chunks of frozen earth all over the surrounding ground 
for several hundred yards. 
Gros Chene, 27 December 1945 
The sky is clear today and the air is full of our planes. 
High in the blue one can see the vapor trails oif same fighters 
winding their way into the Rhineland to the east. To their 
right and much higher, 32 Fortresses are moving steadily 
across the sky .. they seem to hang there without a sign of 
motion they are so high . . Flak is blossoming quietly above 
the German lines. 
Biron, January 1945 
The house housing our CP is also occupied by an old man, 
his wife and thee children. And, oh yes, •three cows. One of 
the children is always singing .the "Star Spangled Banner," fiat. 
T/5 Claude A. Martin of Forest Hills, Louisiana, was up front 
driving last night and reported back to the OP that he had 
gone too far do.wn the wrong road and had run smack into a 
Nazi convoy and had turned around and beat it before the 
Jerries had realized what he was. (Note: The Germans at 
this time are using many of our vehicles which they had 
captured during .the initial successes of Rundstedt's offensive). 
T/5 Martin observes that the Jerries are not making any 
effort to heed blackout precautions and that their trucks are 
lit up like Christmas tres. 
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Lt Julius H . Porter - Lt Robert F. Jordan ·- WOJG Allen L. Law 
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Lt Charles B . Raymond - 1st Sgt Adam M. Yablonski 
Cpl Robert Willimon - Cpl George Tullus - S j Sgt Ed. Skeldon 
Eyg-elshoven, Felbruary 1945 
Hundreds of hungry civilians crowd around our mess. 
Wlhen the me'al is over and the scraps and leavings are 
brought out by the cooks for disposal, the civilians --most 
0f them very young children, scoop the buckets they carry 
into the swill and make their way jubilantly ba•ck through 
the throng. A little girl about 5 years of age wears a German 
rifle thong of beadlike construction about her neck a nd a 
American E'TO ribbon on her little coat. 
Service Company's job is primarily t o "get the suppLies 
through." This is what Service Company did. Our greatest 
cr.edit should go to those who supervised and drove 0ur 
convoys up to the carrying pa>rties, convoys loaded with vital 
supplies: Oapt Benjamin H. Tuthill, Jr., Lt Charles B. Ray-
mond, Lt F·rank A. Pinto, Lt Robert F . Jordan, Lt Ronald L. 
Nonnemacher, S/Sgt Edgar C. Skelton, S /Sgt Walter A . Cle-
ments, S /Sgt Herman N. Gibson, Cpl George A. Tullos, Cpl 
Donald A. Price, Cpl Estle M.Woods, Sgt Burdell F . Schwartz, 
and their assistants. 
E:each of us has our memories of fear and action. Many 
of us consider what happens to us as trivial in the light of 
the much la•rger events happening just ahead of us. We were 
all aware that anyting could happen at any time. The 
picture we will all carry with us from the war will be that 
of several GI's loading packing cases of material onto the 
sturdy back of the familiar 2 ;\-j) ton truck. That was ·our 
mission; that was what w e did. 
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IN THE THICK OF IT . · 
Defense .of the Hotton-Marche line was a Battle of the 
Bulge "must". If the German breakthrough suceeded at this 
point the vital Liege road would almost certainly be cut. To 
defend this line against mechanized attack, Anti-Tank Com-
pany was assigned to three key points. 
Capt Harry M. Deck disposed his defenses at road points 
on which the enemy's armor was most likely to appear. The 
third platoon placed its 57mm AT guns at Verdenne at the 
extreme right flank; the first platoon took the center at Menil; 
and the second gun platoon was emplaced at the extreme left 
flank at Hampteau. The mine platoon was centered at Menil 
and laid mine fields at all three positions. Before many hours 
had passed each of these units w:as involved in hot actions. 
At Verdenne the AT units consisted of three 57mm guns. 
Other units including a platoon of rifle troops and a section 
of heavy machine guns were deployed in the area. At 1600 
24 December German infantry began infiltration to a point 
about 300 yards from the positions a:t the right flank of the 
town. Under cover of heavy mortar and artillery fire the 
enemy charged. The 57mm gun was knocked out and its 
squad withdrew to the guns at the center and left. 
Concentrated enemy small arms fire soon made the center 
position untenable although the grew put up what resistance 
it could with small arms and a bazooka. By this time, all 
friendly units except .one heavy machine gun squad and the 
Afi' gun Platoon had withd.rawn from the ·town. !Then five 
Mark V tanks approached from the southeast. 
Unable to man the AT guns, the men of the squad fir.ed 
bazookas and small arms but did not stop the enemy. About 
1800 10urs orders came for a withdrawal into the woods north-
east of Verdenne. However, two men, TfiSgt Cranston Bolling 
and S/Sgt Arthur Lewis, were cut off by 'the tanks .and were 
obliged to take shelter in a house. From this position they , 
sniped at enemy f.oot troops in the vicinity. 
A counter-atta·ck by regimental units was made a few 
hours later and Verdenne was rdaken. AT gun .crews w2re 
among the first elements and these men manned their guns 
to fire at the retreating enemy vehicles. 
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S jSgt Arthur Lewis - Pfc Raymond Beauchamp 
~i 
Lt Carl Palm Cpl Earl I. Mirsky 
At Hampteau the sEcond platoon beg.an its action by 
attacking two enemy strong points which overlooked 
the town and p:rev.ented any movement of second battalion 
troops. The first squad under '8/Sgt Ray ·T. Harner eliminated 
these enemy posts after some excellent firing by the gunner, 
Cpl Earl I. Mirsky. 
On 26 December at 1600 the AT positions were attacked 
by numerically superior folt'ces of an estimated company 
strength. Lacking rifle support the second squad was soon 
overrun. ll'hey, with members of the mine and mine clearing 
platoon, then withdrew according to orders to ta more 
advantageous position already o:ccupied by the first and 
third squads. 
The full force of this drive hit the second platoon positions 
which were reinforced by a squad of men from E Company. 
The viciousness of the enemy attack soon forced the platoon 
from the hill black into town. There the unit was reorganized 
and with the support of machine gun fire from E Company 
the platoon launched a successful c-ounter-attack. Quick action 
of the third squad under S/Sgt Everett D. Hicks brought AT 
fire to bear on · the woods occupied by retre.ating enemy 
and prevented the Germans from reorganizing. The enemy 
withdrew with his wounded under the cover of darkness. 
The AT platoon at Menil was attacked at 1800 26 Decem-
ber by German armor and infantry. With a well-outlinsd plan 
of action in mind, the AT gun squads waited tensely as the 
columns of vehicles approached. But chance played its part 
and the ensuing events hardly could have been anticipated. 
It all started when the lead tank, finding difficulty in 
negotiating the narrow roadway, had to swerve slightly into 
the ditch to pass. It struck a daisy chain of mines W<hich AT 
men had planned to pull across th·2 path, and was knocked 
out. The second tank, clos•e behind·, stopped and fired around 
at the neaTby house, and was abandoned. As if in parade 
formation, other tanks and vehicles swung across the field 
to the east, echeloned to the right rear and ran head on into 
a large mine field. 
Three half-tracks missed this field but wheeled around 
to hit 18-mine road block which knocked them out. The 
to-tal number of vehicles destroyed by mine fields was four 
M.a:rk V tanks, 13 half-tracks, and eight motorcycles. Nearly 
200 prisoners •were taken in this decisive action. 
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WE PAY TRIBUTE ... 
To every man in the 334th "November 18" and "Prum-
mern" will always be the keys to a store ,of memories. Only 
a few men can speak with mutual understanding of those 
trying days when the impossible was achieved simply !be-
cause it had to be done. 
The Medics earned the respectful prais:e of every Rail-
splitter in their trial before the Siegfried defenses and their 
deed's since then have been no less admired. 'The men who 
wore theRedCross brassard on their sleeves and the brightly-
painted Red Cr,oss on their steel helmets performed their 
duty with honor. 
These pages, we hope, will serve as some acknowledgment 
of the debt every man in the regiment owes to the officers 
and men of the Medics. Consistently, they forgot self and 
performed their service in the face of great danger. Their 
story is not that of a single day. 
First Battalion doughboys remember their medics' devoted 
service at Prummern. That first day, No.vemlber 1-8, these 
men cared for 102 casualties, more than half of them fr'om 
other units of the 334th, 405th, and the British Sherwood 
Rangers. And for days ,that follarwed, the aid station was 
crowded with more than 50 casualties daily. 
This service was rendered despite constant artillery, 
mortar, and small arms fire, for the aid station itself was 
within 100-150 yards 'OJ the front lines. For a time it was 
necessary to maintain the station in the open and several 
medics and infantrymsn were wounded while in or near 
the area. 
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The very real threat of capture faced the medics when 
they set up their station in Prummern. Battalion pulled out, 
leaving the medics virtually surrounded by enemy troops, 
but they chose to remain to attend the 20-25 casualties 
awaiting evacuation. For thvee days aid station personnel 
had to evacuate wounded from the front to the aid station 
and from there to rear. Ambulances could not reach them. 
Aid station personnel evacuated casualties to the rear 
by jeep, passing over roads krotwn to be mined. Evacuation 
from the front was entirely by hand litter-carry for distances 
up to 1000 yards, so broad was the front being covered. Many 
times this litter carrying was through mine fields. 
Deeds like these and many others a·re what the infantry-
man thinks of wlhen he speaks of what the Medics have done. 
They must of necessity be thanked as a group, but every 
man will think of S'ome particular Medic that h elped a buddy 
in his dark hour. 
They are the men such as T/4 Robert E. Ward - "Doc" 
Ward to his friends in the S.econd Battalion- who lived to 
become a battlefield legend, who gave unselfishly through 
shellfire and bitter weather, who died during the Roer 
breakthrough •as he always wanted: with scissors and bandage 
in his hands while h e dressed the 'wounds of a fallen so.ldier. 
There is Pfc Archie Nail, the Company A aid man, who, 
during the first h ellish minutes of the First Batttalion's 
baptism of fire, wandered from wounded to wounded, dis-
regarding his own safety, giving aid •and comfort to an 
injured soldier even while his own legs were ripped by 
m mtar fire and death was only a few hours off. 
Soldiers like Archie Nail and "Doc" Ward buried once 
and for all the "pill rollers" tag that had haunted the medics 
from Camp Howze days until the jump-off on November 18, 
1944. Never again would the front-line soldiers scorn the 
men whose only weapons were a medical kit and soothing 
words. They had won their rightful place in the ·affections 
of the doughboys. 
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. . . . Following this page is a list of the men who died in 
the actzons of the 334 th Infantry Regiment. 
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Headquarters Company 
Capt Roher! L. Kimmel 
S/Sgt Howa!nd V. Isbell 
Cpl Robert R. Wi.Jiett 
T/5 Rus·S•e·ll B. Brooks 
Pvt Oliver P. Wimmer 
Anti-Tank Company 
T/4 WiiJi,a:m F. Myers 
Pfc Raber! L. HaH Jr 
Pte John H. Herrman 
Pvt Donald C. Black 
Cannon Company 
S/Sgt Charle·s A . Strebel 
Medical Detachment 
S/Sgt Buck R. Ha·le 
T/4 Robe·rt •E. Wa1r·d 
T/5 William E. Mathria·s 
T/5 Vir<g<il L. Pmk·er 
Pte Hoover H. Kemp 
Pte Clarence R. Miller 
Pte Archie N. NaH 
Pte John •G. Wmgo 
Pvt Pat C. Campbell 
Pvt RoJ.en S. I. Cl'ine 
Pvt George D. K·irsch 
Headquarters Company First Battalion 
S,'Sgt Will·i·am G. T•hompson 
T/4 Lo·uis J. Tuscano 
T/5 Fred Gratzon 
Pte Roger A . Jacobs 
Pvt Davi·d P. Keimel 
A Company 
2d Lt William R. Marsh 
T/Sgt Fred Huty 
S/Sgt Leo H. Angiol.in1i 
S/Sgt Jes.sie 0. Hooper 
S/Sgt George G. Pearson 
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Sgt E'dw,and B. Acuna 
Sgt Luther E. Snipes, Jr 
T/5 Angelo J. DiBlasi 
T/5 Charl·ie M. Jones 
Pte Haden E. Barkley 
; 
Pfc Elv.er J. Brown Pfc Dona·l,d R. Schne•ider 
Pfc John Buck Pfc Horace L. Sherry 
Pfc Fnank w. Che·ng·a Pfc lrv•ing W. Skaff 
Pfc Francis J. Dari·ley, Jr Pfc A ~nol1d E. St·armper 
p;fc Robert F. Davi·dson Pfc Frarnk F. Tamandli 
Pfc Emil.io Dri Benedetto Pfc Wrilbur S. Theuerkra•uf 
Pfc Harry J. Fars•sold Pfc Jo·se C. vma,senor 
Pfc Willioam E. Fry Pvt Hemy J. Bell 
Pfc Jack Fuller Pvt Davri·d rL. Castro 
Pfc Max E. Ga.rrett Pvt ls.ac W. Frazi.er 
Pfc En~ique G. Garzo Pvt Steprhen G·allegos 
Pfc Cha.rles E. G.ibbons Pvt Faris M . Glover 
Pfc Dona•lrd F. Gottfri•erd Pvt Eugen.e·sz Janicki 
Pfc Donarlrdl R. Hadden Pvt He·rbert A . Kelch 
P.fc 'I}J;il.l.iom R. Hanny.e Pvt No.~be,rto c. Martrinez 
Pfc B·arrt W. K•iem·an Pvt Sidney B. Meyer 
Pfc Leo Li·oht·en Pvt T•homars R. Olding 
Pfc John R. Malinowski Pvt Sirdney L. Schiffman 
Pfc Cha.rles M. Mane•e-r Pvt Maynard F. Simpson 
Pfc Edward A. Narhaney Pvt Ma,rshal.l R. Sims 
Pfc Olin D. Neil Pvt Lourie F. So•snoski 
Pfc Lively E. Nunn Pvt Anthony L. Val.enti 
Pk Hmry J. Rog•ers Pvt Ha.ro'l·d B. Woo·dman 
B Company 
11st Lt Howard M. Buchanan 
S/Sgt Ant<hony J. Cavallo 
S/Sgt Byron T. Coveney 
S/Sgt Oliver F. Dwyer 
S/Sgt Robe·rt O 'Horo 
S/Sgt Jame•s M. Stone 
S/Sgt James G. Watson 
Sgt Geo-rge M . Asmus 
Sgt Fre·d A. Le•s,se·r 
Sgt Raymond F. Stahler 
S.g•t Richmd P. Youngblood 
Pfc Kenmit C. Bowl.i·ng 
Pfc A!rboert E. B·a-rilow 
Pfc G·eorge C. Clark 
Pfc Segal Q. Coon 
Pfc Wayne M . Cox 
Pfc Ch·a•rle·s T. Ea.des 
Pfc Micha·e•l A . Garippo 
Pfc Donal•d R. Ho,utz 
Pfc Jo·s·eph T. Kon,drat 
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Pfc Fred A. K1U'IImar, Jr 
Pfc Harry D. Locker 
Pfc Clennie Man1hburn 
Pfc John C. McDaniel 
Pfc David C. Myers 
Pfc Adri,an L. Paci 
P.fc Pa1ul P. Ribe•ra 
Pfc Cha1rles A. Rocchio 
P·fc Rob•ert L. Slocum 
Pfc Abraham I. Smith 
Pfc Stephen Stanoik 
Pfc Howa·rd J. V·anas 
Pfc Ro·ger T. v .an Tuyl 
Pfc John A. Zipoy 
Pvt Edward F. Bowle•s 
; 
Pvt Gl·e•n M. Brown 
Pvt J.ames W. Byrum 
Pt Leo F. Corwin 
Pvt Lloy·d E. Davis 
Pvt Robert J. Fort·ier 
Pvt W.illi<e B. Gallimore 
Pvt Lym~:m W. Gresham 
Pvt Herb·ert L. Ke·lly 
Pvt Jos·eph N. La.81ane 
Pvt Cla·rence J. Merchant 
Pvt G·era·ld F. Ro·s·enfe·ld 
Pvt Lorenzo Sa l.g>ado 
Pvt Norman A. Sanders 
Pvt Theo·dore D. Sechrist 
C Company 
Capt Woodrow W. Fox 
Capt Earl L. Jackson 
2·d Lt Robert E. Ba,l·aban 
2d Lt Henry G . DeGrummond, 
T/S.gt Orvis F. Hill 
T/Sgt Edward T. Ma,rshok 
T/Sgt Clyde L. WiiiHord 
S/Sgt James E. Fannin 
S.gt Thomas A. Forr·s•st 
S·gt Charle•s G. Rapp 
T/5 Ru·ssel•l C. J. Marik 
Pfc Larurence T. Benson 
'Pfc DaV'i·d Carson 
Pfc Frank R. Die-si 
Pfc Patrick B. Dillon, Jr 
Pfc Spem T. Eugenis 
Pfc Roy W. Ev.ans 
Pfc R·alph V. K. Jones 
224 
Pfc Forre·st B. Koontz 
Pfc Clancy V. Lucas 
Pfc Faustino R. Lara 
JrPfc Ira P. Lawless, Jr 
Pfc Phil·ip W. Mutchler 
Pfc Antho·ny T. Na·gy 
Pfc Jame-s H. Nu,gent 
Pfc Billy F. Parker 
Pfc John E. Plast·er 
Pfc Ghar·les F. Pritchard 
Pfc Howell L. Re,aves 
Pfc Dave L. Reese 
Pfc Holly A. Rkhards 
Pfc Walter Stimach 
Pte Robe·rt C. Washack 
Pvt ·Ermal E. Armstrong 
Pvt Walter G. Berteletti 
Pvt Patrick J. Halp,in 
Pvt Haro.ld V. Ha•rdrick 
Pvt Donald A. Heinen 
Pvt Fema.ld J. Hillman 
Pvt Tha·dde,u•s A . Kwi•atkowski 
Pvt Benny M. La•spa1gnole.fta 
Pvt WHI1iam H. ua•usf.e·r 
Pvt Rioha,rd >E. uaver 
Pvt Wi llie V. Lea.th 
Pvt Leo Minkoff 
Pvt E·u·gen.e E. Mudd 
Pvt Alvtin H. Smith 
Pvt John J. Snook 
Pvt Harold H. W.ay, Jr 
Pvt Miller A . Yates, Jr 
D Company 
I·S! Lt Don Smith 
Sgt John J. Bresky 
Cpil Bruce C. Grubb 
Pfc Ma,urice W. By•all 
Pfc George F. Chappelle 
Pfc Micha·el C. ·Espo·s·ito 
Pfc Cliffond A. Goodnoh 
Pfc Glenn L Humbert 
Pfc Morris F. Knox, Jr 
Pfc John F. ·La·ne 
Pfc Clyde A . Puckett 
Pfc Ostbome Sam 
Pfc Gharle•s M. Traylor 
Pvt Jame E . .A.ma•son 
Pvt Thomas D. Biery 
Pvt Androdu1s R. Fisher 
Pvt Ne,il E Jun~in 
Pvt J.ame•s F. Maloney 
Pvt SHv·i>n D. Ma.theny 
Pvt Gordon P. Matfoioson 
Pvt Will·i:am F. Mont.gomery 
Pvt Caserio J. Ton1iola 
Headquarters Company Second Battalion 
Lt Co·l Jos,eph Wil.liams 
Major Jame.s V. Johnston 
Capt Se~mour B. S;ton.e 
l·st Lt Guy W. Eames! 
Sgt Wi·lliam M. Smith 
Cpl Da.ryl E. Pr.ice 
Pfc Ch1a1rle•s R. Altom 
Pfc Warren C. Ri.e·g·er 
Pvt Duane S. Campbell 
E Company 
2nd Lt Marvin W. Jamison 
2nd Lt Cly•de S. La,urent, Jr 
2nd Lt Harr·el R. Needham 
T/Sgt ·St•ephen J. Banik 
15 
T f.Sgt V·i:nceont Clementi 
S/.S:gt Antone Angotti 
Sgt Z·aca•ria•s D. E·sparza 
Sgt Lmen R. Ha:ll 
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Sgt P.ark M. Prine 
Pte Robe,rf A. Ashmore 
P,fc Sa:mu.e:l .F . . Biddl·ecomb 
Pte Homer A . Compton 
Pk J,e,weH I. Dil's,aver 
Pte Lyman B. Hart 
P·fc Rob-ert ·B. Hayman 
Pte William M. Lamb 
Pte K·enne1t.h L Lov;ing 
Pte Harold J. Morrison 
Pte v.ann 1B. Na•sh 
Pfc A•loi·s .P. Re,is.er 
Pte Thoma•s F. Schultz 
a 
Pte Je,an W. Scogg.in 
Pte Merle F. Shepherd 
Pfc Milton B. Smit1h 
Pte Hubert W. Spivey 
Pte Troy W. Sw:indeH 
Pte WaH:er Talik 
p,fc Samuel H. Vioke,rs 
Pfc Oaxton 0. Ward 
Pvt Nel•son G rant 
Pvt Norman S. LaPo.inte 
Pvt G . C. :E. •Le·tt 
Pvt Josepih T. Lippi 
Pvt .Eug•ene Stobak 
F Company 
2n1d Lt Harry C. Kelly 
S/Sgt B·emand ·Bems.tein 
S/Sgt John G.re:sl.ick, Jr 
S/Sgt :Fnands L. Hins·on 
S'/Sgt Gra,dy C. Morr-is 
S/Sgt Ra,lph H. Ree,d 
S/Sgt Clifford . H . T·ayilor 
Sgt AIJbi,n J. Molen 
Sgt G·eonge J. Wlas•a:k 
T/5 Thoma·s P. Ma-rt·in-i 
p,te EidrWii,n E. •Brock,le-sby 
P.fc -Ro'bert E. Colebank 
P.fc C•a1rl •F. -Dan ajovits 
P,fc John G. Er.d res 
Pte Raymon.d .Fu,sse,lm an, Jr 
Pte Robert R. Ha·inl,ine 
Pte ·Eidrwa·11dl .P. JK!a•rpov;ich 
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Pte Johnni.e J. Minghelli 
Pte Wiill.i,am S. Moran 
Pte Rlaymond M. Ober-dorf 
Pte 1EI.woq di D. Miska 
Pk Henbert B. Ronk 
p,fc Albert Teti 
Pte Ca•lVlin F. To•wne 
Pte Michael J. Vene-ziale 
P:fc Frank L. WaHers 
Pte W'iHiam J. Warenyi 
Pvt Jemel H. Hurt 
Pvt DaVIi,d McGr·aiW 
Pvt Lloyrd H. Redfem 
Pvt Cl.aw n 0 . Ree·d 
Pvt Oeme•nte R·ibera 
Pvt Edw:a,rd E. Sedl·acek 
Pvt Robert E. Town1s·en.d 
G Company 
1st Lt Glenn L. Van Ocker 
2nd Lt Claude W. Hinsley 
2nd Lt Harold L. Howdieshell 
T/Sgt W,il-liam B. Hawk 
T/S.gt Bernandl S. Reed 
S/S.gt Leon J. Re,ed 
S/ S.g't Michael J. Skrhich 
Sgt Do·ssie L. Dixon 
Pic Slanley Amdur 
Pic Thoma's R. A~usl'in 
Pic Horace M. Franklin 
P,lc G'Uiill,e·rmo M. G·amez 
Pfc Theodo-re W. Kue·tt 
Pfc A~dolph S. Negni 
Pfc Nonman Nessimoff 
Pfc ·Emil H. Schenke,l 
Pic Christopher Schiraldi 
Pfc .E,I,sworth L. Se·el 
Pfc James A. Seitz 
P·fc Leroy K. Shettl.er 
Pfc Ralph Stallworth 
Pfc Theodore Wthit~e 
Pfc Franci·s Yankos.ky 
Pvt Micha.el S. Adamczyk 
Pvt Randolph D. Avstin 
Pvt Le·Wii's R. Banni ster 
Pvt Alex G . Barber 
Pvt Sa·lvat-ore P. CanniC'i 
Pvt Canmelo Cemino 
Pvt Robert G. Chaddock 
Pvt Ale~ander F. Ei·sin,ger 
Pvt Georg~e A. G·erstenmaier 
Pvt Severin M . Meildg·aa·rd 
Pvt J. C. McMahan 
Pvt Mari,ano T. Ro•driguez 
Pvt Arnol F. Ry,an 
Pvt J. M. Scharf 
Pvt Arthur D. Smith 
Pvt Frank L. Tor·eHi 
Pvt Joseph W. Von D·uring 
Pvt EmHe D. Wolford 
H Company 
1st Lt Dean C. Harding 
2nd Lt Dani•e,l L. Foche·sato 
S/Sgt K. C. Mu:l,anex 
T/5 T.ip Hancock 
Pfc Freddie E. Hill·iand 
Pfc WilHam D. Kelley 
Pfc Frank Longoria, Jr 
15* 
Pfc Cla~u,de H. P.erk•ins 
Pvt Stanley A. Be.U 
Pvt Thelbert D. Lambert 
Pvt Ronal·d E. A. Maclatu,ghlin 
Pvt Lawrence J. McDona;ld 
Pvt A,u.gustine D. Nelli 
Pvt Edward G. Smith 
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Headquarters Company Third Battalion 
l·st Sgt Joseph B. Eisenha·uer 
SISgt L·eon H. Deck 
Pfc William W. Applewhite 
Pfc Joihn E. Cu,llen, Jr 
Pfc Miller D. Womble 
Company 
1st Lt Ralph B. Smith 
T/S.gt Walt·er K. Smith 
S/Sg·t ·Perry P. Corder 
S/Sgt Willilam C. Emmons 
S/Sgt Rkhmd C. Smiley 
S/Sgt Wenda! W. Verser 
Sgt Rodger B·all 
Sgt Ernest L. G.orLJim 
Sg,t Jame·s B. St Clair 
Sgt Conwell H. White 
T/5 Herbert Z. Davidson 
Pfc St·anley N. Botdorf 
P.fc Lester Bllount 
Pfc Patrick H. Bruc·e 
Pfc Charle·s W. Cope 
Pte Cha1rles A. Flana,gan 
Pte Rona•ld Gardner 
P,fc Fre1d G . Gonzales 
Pfc Henry A . Gost 
Pfc ·Pet•er J. Handley 
Pfc A1ustin J. Hersh 
Pte E·dwand Princ.e 
Pfc Sotio C. RossHto 
P.fc Hymen R. ·Rothblut 
Pfc John H. Rouse 
Pfc George W. R1ushmore 
Pfc G·lynn W. W,hitfield 
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Pvt Royall E. Barnes 
Pvt Peter V. Car.l,ino 
Pvt Orr•in H. Ca.rl,son 
Pvt Elbert I. Dark 
Pvt .Arthur F. Collett 
Pvt Al.len Collins 
Pvt Ro·s1s C. Danford 
Pvt Ceabern J. De.rauf 
Pvf Mel'.'in R. Elizer 
Pvt Owen J. Gra,dy 
Pvt Gfl.enn C. Harri•s 
Pvt Clarence B. Hog·g 
Pvt Jame•s F. KeHy 
Pvt Antone Kokai 
Pvt Floy1d D. Koz,iol 
Pvt Wii·Ham R. Lackie, Jr 
Pvt Silvio P. LaNumi·ata 
Pvt Cleo McCall 
Pvt Cl,a,nenoe E. McCollum 
Pvt Duane G. Ne•wman 
Pvt Eway R·i,der 
Pvt Melvin A . Robert.s 
Pvt LesH.e H. Ros·eberry 
Pvt Jos•eph M. Ros1s 
Pvt E·dlw.a•rd Schalit 
Pvt Ralph C. Stkkle 
Pvt Edward L. Worley 
K Company 
Is! Lt Harry E. Queer 
2nd Lt Bruce C. Chapman 
2nd Lt Loyal E. Le·ffler 
2nd tt •Edgar M . Rothschild 
2nd Lt Mercer A . Y.ea,g·er 
T/S:gt Donarld E. Z.ug 
S/'S.g1t Jo•se'hp A. Carafa 
Sgt Curma.n J. ·Be•gnaou.d 
Sgt Thoma·s N. Bl·ack,Jr 
Sgt Nicholas C. Got•se·s 
Sgrt Carlton 0. Harris 
~gt John •B. Lov.e·ly 
Sgt W.i·IJ!i<am S. McFadden 
Sgt John D. Schantz 
Sgt Ma·nley R. Yeckley 
T/4 Peter M. Mohs 
Cpl G ,erald R. Burm 
Cpl Orva.J J. Grell! 
Pfc Woffo·rd H . .Brown 
Pfc Ell G . oDa!niels 
Pfc WiHand G. Gibson 
Pfc Raymond Gui.ducci 
Pk John T. Gun.t.er 
Pfc Marl'in Kost•ik 
Pfc Hyman Litzky 
Pfc Frank C. Poland 
Pfc DaVIi.d T. PoweH 
Pfc Jack A. R·eynolds 
P•fc Robert Ro.sik, Jr 
P.fc Jos·ehp E. Santore 
Pfc Robert A . Schmidt 
Pfc Oliver R. We•i.ss.ert 
Pfc Frank A. W.erner 
Pfc Cha,rle•s L. We·scott 
P.fc Jes,se J. Wri·ght 
Pvt G1l•e:nn L. Be·lcher 
Pvt R. C. Booth 
Pvt Benjamin H. Goodlman 
Pvt 16u.genio Gonza·le•s 
Pvt •Eidlwand J. tamorie 
Pvt Jame1s S. McCl-ure 
Pvt Wii1J:i.a1m H. R·eede•r 
Pvt Ofc.a r L. Reouff 
Pv.f .P.eter J. Roiso 
Pvt Ha-rrison L. R·unyon, Sr 
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